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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Canadian military and veterans have a long history of dealing with psychological trauma 
caused by war and peacekeeping. Over the past century views about trauma among physicians, 
military leaders, society, and veterans’ themselves have been shaped by medical theories, 
predominant views about the ideal soldier and man, and the nation’s role in international affairs. 
Since the First World War, major conflicts and peacekeeping operations have been responsible 
for distinct shifts in how trauma is conceptualized, named, and experienced by Canadian soldiers 
and the public. Canadian historians have examined this subject by looking at particular wars, 
most notably the First World War, but no attempt has been made to provide a monograph-length 
study of military trauma over the past century. This thesis utilizes several lenses – medical, 
social, and cultural – to explore how conceptions of trauma changed from 1914 to 2014, how 
such changes affected veterans in their civilian life, and the interactions between medical and 
popular knowledge, military culture, and veterans’ lived experiences. With a particular emphasis 
on the latter, it uses oral interviews with veterans of the post-Cold War, government reports, 
medical literature, and national newspapers to track shifts in consciousness about trauma and its 
social and medical treatment. It argues that despite numerous changes in medical thought and 
popular understandings of trauma, stigmas about psychological illness persisted, and that 
masculine ideals inherent in 1914 were still present, albeit in an altered form, one-hundred years 
later. It also argues that the Canadian veteran’s experience demonstrates that from 1914 to 2014, 
trauma consistently oscillated between being a medical entity and a metaphorical representation 
of war, peacekeeping, veterans’ socio-economic struggles, and national identity. This thesis takes 
advantage of a historically unique openness in the Canadian military since the year 2000 to 
contribute to a growing literature about trauma in Canadian military history and society. 
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INTRODUCTION: TRAUMA, CULTURE, AND HISTORY 
 
Barry Westholm joined the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in 1982 in London, Ontario. 
Unlike numerous comrades, Westholm was not a “base brat” from a military family. Instead he 
deemed himself an “accidental soldier.”1 As a youth that got into “a fair bit of trouble,” the 
military helped him occupy his idle hands and satiate his need for adventure.
2
 He trained first at 
Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Cornwallis in Nova Scotia, and then CFB Borden in Ontario, 
ultimately finishing his apprenticeship training as a vehicle technician at CFB North Bay in 
Ontario in 1985.
3
 After completing his training, Westholm was stationed at Canadian Forces 
Europe in Lahr, West Germany, in 1987, where he remained for three years, giving him the 
opportunity to witness firsthand the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.              
Although the Cold War was over by 1991, the 1990s brought no rest for the CAF, which 
saw its personnel committed to a number of peacekeeping missions around the world. In 1992 
Westholm went on his first United Nations (UN) mission, to Cambodia as part of the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). While there he experienced the “sickly 
sweet smell of decaying bodies, garbage, excrement, [and] filth,” toured the killing fields of Pol 
Pot, and, on one occasion, had a rocket-propelled grenade pointed at the window of his truck. 
Yet, in spite of the harrowing moments he faced in Cambodia, it was during his second UN 
mission in 1995-1996 as part of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) that he began “a 
new life” as a result of mental trauma.  
Westholm’s trade is a unique one in the CAF, something known as Combat Service 
Support (CSS). A CSS soldier must be able to conduct highly delicate technical tasks directly in 
                                                          
1
 Westholm, Barry. Interview by author. Telephone. Toronto, July 30, 2014. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Vehicle technicians in the Canadian Forces are expected to be both technician and soldier, with their role changing 
based on the tactical situation.   
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the line of, or under enemy fire, and be prepared to “join the fight” at a moment’s notice. On 
numerous occasions, a CSS soldier has to operate independently or in a team of two, far away 
from committed military (infantry) support. As a CSS vehicle technician, Westholm’s duties in 
Haiti included, among other things, operating a wrecker to repair, extricate, and return damaged 
military equipment to base. On one fateful day he received a call to drive to Île de la Gonâve, a 
small island off the Haitian coast, to help move two UN trucks mired on the island’s only 
causeway and blocking access to a vital port.
4
 Westholm’s task began as a quintessential CSS 
mission – a crew of two people (Westholm the crew commander) dispatched kilometres away 
from their base to provide support to two damaged and mired vehicles. While traveling along the 
island’s unstable shore, Westholm’s truck sank directly into the mixture of coral and pebbles, 
rendering it immobile. Thinking still of his directive, he bargained with some of the island’s 
locals to call in the only bulldozer to attempt to extricate his truck. Unfortunately, the local man 
operating the bulldozer was quite drunk, and when he was “tantalizingly close,” drove it into the 
ocean, leaving Westholm and his colleague in both a metaphorical and literal quagmire.
5
  
Now, with their island’s only bulldozer in the ocean, many locals began gathering, some 
seething with anger, and armed with rocks and machetes. With only one comrade present, 
Westholm worried about their chances of leaving the situation unscathed, or even alive. 
Believing they were in imminent danger, he sent his colleague to seek help from nearby 
American troops. He was now alone with only a nine-millimetre pistol and ten bullets to defend 
his equipment and himself. In his own words, Westholm felt like “prey with wolves around me.” 
As the crowd closed in he engaged in banter with the group’s de facto leader, attempting to keep 
the conversation light-hearted and downplay his anxiety. Although outwardly calm, he now 
                                                          
4
 A predominantly barren and hilly island, Île de la Gonâve was often a hiding spot for runaway slaves during the 
French colonial period.   
5
 Westholm interview. 
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believed he was “looking at a medieval type of death,” and mulled over his options. Given the 
crowd’s size and his limited ammunition, he believed his chances of survival were small. He thus 
decided on his final plan: “I was going to shoot the guy I was talking to, and another upstart 
beside him. Those two were gone … a third [would be shot] if I could, and then I was going to 
kill myself.”6 
With the situation’s grim reality in full focus, Westholm spent – he estimates – almost 
fifteen minutes trying to keep the angry mob at bay. During that time, he surprisingly found his 
mind projecting thoughts of childhood Christmases, seeing in “perfect clarity” himself in front of 
the family Christmas tree in flannel pajamas. He also saw visions and memories of his own son, 
occurring simultaneously with his thoughts of family Christmas as he attempted to negotiate for 
his life. Back in real time, he considered what condition his body would be in when discovered 
by UN troops, “if they discovered it.” Westholm rested his hand near his pistol’s grip, leaving 
the hammer cocked, and safety off. With the tension now at its highest point, he locked eyes with 
the group’s leader and began to pull out his sidearm to execute his final, desperate act: kill as 
many of the group’s aggressors as possible and then commit suicide, to avoid being beaten, 
hacked, and possibly burned to death. It was the last decision he felt he would ever make. Then, 
just at the moment when he had made peace with the finality of his predicament, United States 
Special Forces and Canadian troops appeared in the distance, bringing with them enough 
equipment and personnel to scatter the angry locals, de-escalate the situation, and save 
Westholm’s life. Still thinking about his original mission, Westholm proceeded to pull his truck 
out of the sunken shore. He eventually extricated the UN vehicles and unblocked the island’s 
causeway, which nonetheless was left heavily damaged by the work. Mission accomplished and 
broken vehicles in tow, he made his way towards the United States Army landing craft to return 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
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to the main island of Haiti and home base. Feeling relieved about his last minute rescue, he 
arrived back at the Canadian camp at about 11pm. Knowing the situation back on Île de la 
Gonâve was still volatile, with an angry populous, a damaged causeway, and a bulldozer in the 
ocean, Westholm briefed his platoon commander of the incident and shortly after went to sleep. 
Several hours later, at 2:15am, Westholm was woken by his captain, who asked him if the 
earlier incident might have been one of the causes of a riot currently in progress. Westholm 
replied in the affirmative, upon which time his captain left. Sitting up in his bunk, he began to 
think about the hitherto unprocessed events of the previous day. Now, unshielded by the 
adrenalin that had propelled him through the encounter, the flood of thoughts and emotions about 
his near death at the hands of the angry mob hit him like a strong punch to the stomach. The 
concurrent thoughts which he had processed with such clarity on Île de la Gonâve now 
overwhelmed him, and he began to vomit. Westholm recounted: “I staggered out of that tent and 
went right to the portable toilet and puked my guts out, and sat there shaking like a leaf, like 
‘wow,’ because I could not process the amount of stuff that had happened out there, and the 
officer when he came in had brought it all to the forefront.”7 
Westholm felt tired the next day, but carried on with his duties. Then, the next night 
while asleep, his mind went back to Île de la Gonâve and he relived the entire event again, 
waking screaming at approximately 2:15 the following morning. He leapt from his cot and began 
to vomit again. Almost twenty years later, as I interviewed him, Westholm recalled waking up at 
2am many nights for years, like a programmed alarm clock. Despite the harrowing nature of the 
causeway incident, upon arriving back in Canada, Westholm chalked up his anxiety to the 
difficulties of the job. Nonetheless he began to notice a severe degradation in his mental 
capacity. His short-term memory was significantly reduced, as was his ability to multitask and 
                                                          
7
 Ibid. 
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focus. He became worried. He assumed his issues were connected to his “high impact job,” the 
handling of chemicals as a mechanic, and the physical stresses involved, including those of being 
a paratrooper, with its intense physical training. Over the next several years, his symptoms, 
including sleeplessness, nightmares, intense anxiety, and feelings of fight-or-flight (“Why am I 
scared at the mall?”) caused him to seek help from military physicians and psychologists on 
numerous occasions. He was given a MRI, CT scan, and other tests for physical injuries, but no 
definitive diagnosis was made. By 1999, after much “disjointed” support, feeling exhausted and 
frustrated at having made no headway, Westholm said “fuck it,” and attempted to cope as best he 
could on his own, immersing himself completely in work and avoiding the problems that plagued 
his mind. In his own words, “The military became my crutch ... All I really did was military, 
military, military, military ... Everything else was sort of put on the sideline.”8 Ultimately, he did 
what numerous colleagues would do – and have done – in his situation: “soldier on.” It was not 
until 2007, a full twelve years after the incident, that he was finally diagnosed: Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. 
 
Historical Connections 
 
 Although Westholm’s experiences are unique in many respects, they are also 
representative of the history – hitherto untold – of psychological trauma in the Canadian Forces 
after the Cold War.
9
 That history was shaped by several factors: First, by individual soldiers like 
Westholm, and other men and women – both prominent and unknown – affected firsthand by the 
way PTSD was viewed by rank-and-file soldiers, military leaders, politicians, and Canadian 
society during the late twentieth century; it was also a history formed by institutions, including of 
                                                          
8
Ibid.  
9
 Note about terminology: Given that “trauma” can also refer to physical injury to the body, it is important to note 
that “trauma” in this dissertation refers only to psychological trauma.  
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course the CAF, but also Canadian psychiatry and journalism; and finally, at a social level, it is a 
story about the socio-economic outcomes of trauma, consequences encapsulated in PTSD, a 
disorder with numerous links to historical manifestations of overwhelming anxiety.  
Westholm’s journey from health to illness and the familiar journey of numerous other 
CAF members during the 1990s and 2000s illuminate some of the key issues this thesis 
addresses: First, a general lack of understanding within CAF ranks during the 1990s about what 
PTSD and psychological trauma were, a dearth of knowledge reflected by the attributing of 
PTSD’s myriad symptoms to physical rather than mental injury. In some cases, troops and 
leaders expressed outright denial about the possibility of psychological injuries. Secondly, 
Westholm’s difficulties resulted from a military culture that instilled a highly masculinized 
warrior ethos, emphasizing the physical prowess, stamina, and bravery of its members, thus 
stigmatizing physical or mental weakness. Thirdly, and connected to this ethos, were the socio-
economic implications that affected anyone who presented mental difficulties; implications that 
often resulted in, at best ostracism, and at worst release from the CAF. Lastly, those released 
from the CAF sometimes found their career terminated before pension eligibility, meaning their 
post-service life began with ongoing illness and no pension or compensation for service-related 
injuries. 
For soldiers afflicted with psychological injuries, their diagnosis was as much a social 
and economic issue as a medical one, and was subject to larger factors beyond their control. 
Psychological trauma, and PTSD, trauma’s most well known manifestation, became prominent 
issues in the CAF and Canadian society during the 1990s and 2000s, but its appearance has a 
longer history, and it is one that has been shaped by military exigencies, medical and political 
interests, gender norms and expectations, and individual soldiers’ experiences. 
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Writing in the late twentieth century, historian of military psychiatry Hans Binneveld 
opined that, “One can no longer imagine a battlefield without psychiatrists and psychologists.”10 
Retrospectively, Binneveld’s assessment of the now inseparable link between the mental health 
profession and the military was somewhat prescient. The final decades of the twentieth century, 
in particular the 1980s and 1990s, saw the growth of a “culture of trauma” that made PTSD – a 
disorder defined by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 – a hotly debated topic in 
military circles, medical journals, and newspapers across the Western world.
11
 PTSD thus 
became a considerable concern for military leaders, as well as for the civilian governments they 
reported to. But such was not always the case. Throughout the twentieth century, psychological 
trauma oscillated between being a prominent subject and then at other times a focus only for 
specialist medical researchers. Ultimately, major conflicts like the two World Wars and Vietnam 
were the key catalysts that repeatedly brought trauma back into the public eye.
12
 The 
conceptualization of trauma and dissemination of research were predominantly forged and re-
ignited by the fires of war and, in the case of peacekeeping nations like Canada, by “military 
operations other than war.”13  
 
Trauma, Medicine, and History 
 
Standing at the crossroads of psychiatric, military, gender, and cultural histories, mental 
trauma provides historians a window into the societies and individuals affected by it, as well as 
the authorities who attempt to explain its myriad manifestations. Since trauma was first 
                                                          
10
 Hans Binneveld, From Shell Shock to Combat Stress: A Comparative History of Military Psychiatry, trans. John 
O’Kane (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997), 1. 
11
 Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists, 1914-1994 (London: Pimlico, 2002 [2000]), 385. 
12
 Ibid., passim.  
13
 Allan English and Sydney Dale-McGrath, “Overcoming Systemic Obstacles to Veteran Transition to Civilian 
Life,” in Alice Aiken and Stéphanie Bélanger, eds., Beyond the Line: Military and Veteran Health Research 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013),  257. 
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systematically studied in the nineteenth century, medical knowledge, patient experiences, and 
societal views of trauma have been refracted through different prisms, each shaped by 
cataclysmic events such as the First World War. Given the sheer scale and number of 
collectively traumatic events throughout the twentieth century, it is, historians Mark Micale and 
Paul Lerner remarked, “scarcely surprising that trauma has emerged as a highly visible and 
widely invoked concept.”14 By the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, 
conceptualizations of trauma escaped from the pages of medical journals and entered popular 
culture, becoming not just a clinical entity, but also a metaphor for life’s struggles.15 Thus, to 
trace the history of trauma is to trace the vicissitudes of a chaotic world and humanity’s moral 
failings. Discussions of exactly what constitutes “trauma” and its biological, psychological, and 
social effects have led to protracted and widely publicized controversies across the Western 
world. 
 Although physicians first became interested in trauma during the 1870s, it was not until a 
century later, with the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-III) in 1980 that the American Psychiatric Association (APA) officially recognized an 
entity called “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).”16 The timing was no coincidence. 
Coming on the heels of the Vietnam War and its divisive effect on American society, PTSD’s 
official recognition was due in large part to the lobbying efforts of antiwar psychiatrists, lay 
activists, and alienated veterans.
17
 PTSD located Vietnam veterans’ baffling postwar symptoms 
in external events caused by war and social alienation, thus “promising to free individual 
                                                          
14
 Mark Micale and Paul Lerner, “Trauma, Psychiatry, and History: A Conceptual and Historiographical 
Introduction,” in Micale and Lerner, eds., Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma in the Modern Age, 
1870-1930 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition 
(Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1980), 236-239. 
17
 Wilbur Scott, “PTSD in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease,” Social Problems 37, no. 3 
(1990): passim. 
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veterans of the stigma of mental illness, and guaranteeing them (in theory, at least) sympathy, 
medical attention, and compensation.”18 Although initially tailored for Vietnam veterans, over 
the succeeding decades the PTSD concept created a “consciousness of trauma” in Western 
society, bridging the gap between civilian traumas such as rape and natural disasters, and the 
traumas of war.
19
 Trauma’s psychological effects had hitherto been intermittently explored, 
usually during and after major wars, but most researchers lost interest as each war’s memory 
faded and its veterans were absorbed into the postwar economy. Official recognition of a 
disorder called PTSD, on the other hand, allowed sustained and targeted studies into trauma’s 
causes, which proved a “tremendous boon” to clinical research in the human sciences.20 Popular 
interest in trauma followed suit. As the 1980s progressed, an enormous medical literature about 
PTSD developed, and academic societies were created to share research.
21
 But despite the fact 
that PTSD’s recognition quickly led to medical interest in trauma, it was war trauma, and in the 
Canadian case peacekeeping trauma, that captivated the public and made PTSD an enduring 
subject of discussion.    
 
History, War, and Memory 
  
Clinical discussions of trauma in the 1980s and 1990s dovetailed with historical 
reappraisals of, and new approaches toward, past conflicts – most notably the First World War. 
Beginning in 1975, Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory explored the way British 
                                                          
18
 Micale and Lerner, “Trauma, Psychiatry, and History,” 2.  
19
 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 355, 385; Studies of war trauma in the 1980s dovetailed with an increasing interest in 
studying civilian traumas such as sexual abuse. The publication of psychiatrist and author Judith Herman’s Trauma 
and Recovery, based on experience working with sexual and domestic abuse victims, provides an excellent example 
of the bridging of the gap between civilian and war trauma. See Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The 
Aftermath of Violence from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (New York: Basic Books, 1992).  
20
 Micale and Lerner, “Trauma, Psychiatry, and History,” 2. 
21
 The best example of this was the 1985 creation of the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, a 
collection of researchers from around the world who meet to share research, clinical findings and strategies, and 
discuss theoretical knowledge on trauma.  
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soldiers on the Western Front utilized literary traditions to understand and cope with the horrors 
of modern war.
22
 Himself an American ex-infantry officer wounded during the Second World 
War, it was fitting that Fussell was first to investigate how the Western Front was “remembered, 
conventionalized, and mythologized” by its participants.23 He argued that the Great War was 
such an overwhelming experience for its combatants that it gave rise to a new, modern form of 
understanding; one that was essentially ironic.
24
 Soldiers’ experiences of the Somme and 
Passchendaele altered ideas of modern “progress” and changed forever the way war was 
conceptualized.       
Fussell’s study was partly stimulated by his interest in past soldier-authors’ experiences, 
which helped him to answer the very personal question, “Was my war unique, or merely 
commonplace and barely worth special notice?”25 Written while the Vietnam War raged, his 
book moreover was meant to demonstrate to American readers some of the “psychological and 
intellectual dimensions of ‘combat.’”26 By exploring the traumatic nature of war on its 
participants, he hoped “that the effect of the book ... might persuade them [Americans] that even 
Gooks had feelings, that even they hated to die, and like us called for help or God or Mother 
when their agony became unbearable.”27 Fussell’s literary history of war, modernity, and 
memory set the stage for future examinations of the construction of social memory. Responses to 
Fussell’s work, notably Jay Winter’s Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, and in the Canadian 
context Jonathan Vance’s Death So Noble, contributed to a novel analysis of how collective war 
                                                          
22
 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 [1975]); Peter 
Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World War (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013 [2002]), 182. 
23
 Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, xv. 
24
 Ibid., 38. 
25
 Ibid., 363; For more on Fussell’s personal experiences readers can also direct themselves to popular American 
documentarian Ken Burns’ multi-episode series The War, which utilized candid interviews with Fussell.  
26
 Ibid., 369. 
27
 Ibid.  
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trauma both forms and disrupts constructions of national identity and memory.
28
 All three works 
demonstrated that in the search for a unified collective remembrance, literal and metaphorical 
traumas often clash with ideas of the “good war” and myths about a war’s purpose.29 This 
dissertation expands on their analyses, highlighting how in Canada the traumatized veteran has 
been the living embodiment of the gritty, brutal, and harrowing nature of war and peacekeeping; 
a representation repeatedly at odds with collectively sanitized narratives tied up in medical and 
political projects. Traumatized soldiers’ experiences provide an inroad into how national 
identities and social memories are shaped, and equally important, how such beliefs conflict with 
the everyday struggles veterans face upon their return to civilian life.  
  
War, Society, and Masculinity Studies 
 
 
 As scholars reappraised ideas of war and memory, a concurrent literature exploring the 
historical shaping of masculinity developed in the 1990s and 2000s. Although taken up largely 
by male historians, it was a woman who first investigated the subject of war, psychiatry, and 
masculinity in significant depth. Elaine Showalter’s 1985 work The Female Malady uncovered 
historical representations of “feminine madness and masculine rationality,” and devoted an entire 
chapter to discussing how shell-shocked soldiers presented a challenge to English psychiatry and 
notions of manliness during the First World War.
30
 Her book was a stinging feminist critique of 
British psychiatry and she extended her gender analysis to how masculinity itself was 
pathologized using feminine constructs. Showalter argued the war was “a crisis of masculinity 
                                                          
28
 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997); Another noteworthy study that examines collective memory is Canadian historian 
Robert Rutherdale’s 2004 monograph Hometown Horizons. See Robert Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons: Local 
Responses to Canada’s Great War (Toronto: UBC Press, 2004). 
29
 See Vance, Death So Noble, esp. 3, 18, 260-261.   
30
 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1985), 2, 167. 
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and a trial of the Victorian masculine ideal.”31 In her view, numerous men were placed in 
overwhelmingly stressful situations and reacted with “the symptoms of hysteria,” a “feminine” 
disorder.
32
 As the war progressed psychiatrists explored the possibility that men’s problems had 
origins that might be more deeply rooted in their psyches than previously understood; a 
possibility that had a profound impact on conceptualizations of trauma throughout the rest of the 
century.
33
      
 Showalter’s work was the first to critically examine how psychiatric knowledge both 
shaped and was coloured by masculine ideals during wartime. Her discussion went beyond 
strictly medical concerns, highlighting the socio-cultural aspects of war trauma and the medical 
theories underpinning it. By situating “shell shock” in a particular time and setting, her book 
provided further impetus for scholars to reappraise medical categories and use a cultural lens to 
deconstruct how experiences of trauma and gender conflicted with one another.
34
   
Historian of gender and psychiatry Mark Micale’s 2008 work Hysterical Men, which 
tracked hysteria’s conceptualization across the centuries, highlighted the socio-political and 
                                                          
31
 Ibid., 171. 
32
 Ibid; Shell shock was, she stated, men’s bodily protest against a lack of control imposed on them by politicians, 
generals, and psychiatrists. See ibid, 172.  
33
 Ibid., 190. 
34
 Drawing inspiration from gender studies, scholars readily responded to Showalter’s feminist analysis of 
psychiatry and began examining the historical construction of modern masculinity that developed in the West. 
American cultural historian George Mosse’s 1996 work The Image of Man, which traced the rise of modern 
masculinity, signalled a new, incisive assessment of how masculinity “touched nearly every aspect of society.”  
Mosse provocatively stated that “All those who want to change society, as well as those who want to escape their 
marginalization, have to take the stereotype of modern masculinity into account.” A concept previously taken for 
granted, exactly what constituted masculinity, and how that definition changed at any given time, were increasingly 
placed under the gaze of historians seeking to unravel its many effects and meanings. See George Mosse, The Image 
of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 194, 3, 278, 6; In the 
Canadian context, during the 1990s historians likewise analyzed how societal expectations, and particularly gender 
expectations, have been shaped by medico-psychological dictates. Mona Gleason’s 1999 book Normalizing the Ideal 
provided a thorough critique of how “normalcy” and the “normal” post-1945 Canadian family were constructed 
through psychological knowledge and dissemination. While psychiatry focused on emotional and behavioural 
pathology, postwar psychologists proclaimed themselves authorities on what constituted normal family living. See 
Mona Gleason, Normalizing the Ideal: Psychology, Schooling, and the Family in Postwar Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999), passim; Mark Moss’ Manliness and Militarism is another notable work. See 
Mark Moss, Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys for War in Ontario (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).    
  
13 
 
medical discourses that created a willful blind spot in the minds of physicians afraid to 
acknowledge male nervous illness.
35
 Scared that men were not the paragons of rationality which 
centuries of intellectual thought had claimed, medical men “failed to constitute their own gender 
as a field of critical, systematized study.”36 That failure was, Micale stated, all the more 
surprising given the “rampant counter-evidence [about male nervous illness] in the clinic and the 
laboratory, on the streets and the battlefields.”37 Physicians’ refusal to turn their gaze inward 
reflected a fear that male hysteria could uncover “feminine” elements within the male psyche.38 
To be self-aware was thus deemed an “unmasculine” quality.39 Micale uncovered men’s “chronic 
inability to reflect nonheroically, without evasion and self-deception, on oneself individually and 
collectively;” a failure that had lasting effects on interpretations of shell shock during the First 
World War, an affliction contemporaries frequently compared to hysteria.
40
 Micale’s work 
displayed the highly gendered manner in which psychiatric thought and practice operated 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Importantly, Hysterical Men showed that 
it was only late in the twentieth century that medicine no longer played “a commanding role in 
producing the dominant fictions of masculinity.”41  
                                                          
35
 Mark Micale, Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2008); In a testament to Showalter’s enduring influence on the field, Micale’s prologue was titled 
“Hysteria: The Male Malady,” in his own words as a respectful nod to Showalter’s “important book.” See ibid, 
288n6. 
36
 Ibid., 278. 
37
 Ibid., 6. 
38
 Ibid., 281. 
39
 Ibid.  
40
 Ibid., 282, 139. 
41
 Ibid., 284; In the Canadian context Christopher Dummitt’s The Manly Modern represented the rise of masculinity 
studies. Most pertinent to this dissertation, Dummitt explored the unintended consequences of the “manly modern” 
project, especially how such consequences affected Canadian war veterans. His study highlighted the intricate 
historical web of medical knowledge, gender expectations, and pension questions, as well as a recurring pattern in 
Canadian history: the off-loading of long-term financial liabilities at the expense of Canadian veterans. See 
Christopher Dummitt, The Manly Modern: Masculinity in Postwar Canada (Toronto: UBC Press, 2007), 2, 4, 29-
51, 40; Recent works such as the 2014 book Ontario Boys by Christopher Greig, and the 2012 edited collection 
Canadian Men and Masculinities by Greig and Wayne Martino, display Canadian scholars’ continuing efforts to 
analyze the enduring effects of masculine norms on both individuals and society. See Christopher Greig, Ontario 
Boys: Masculinity and the Idea of Boyhood in Postwar Ontario, 1945-1960 (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2014); 
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Trauma, Psychiatry, and Canadian Military History 
 
 Discussions of war’s effects on societal norms and culture were broadened by the rise of 
trauma as a tool of historical analysis. Since the 1980 codification of PTSD as a mental disorder, 
scholars from several historical subfields (and other disciplines) have attempted to piece together 
the social, medical, and cultural meanings of trauma.
42
 With the rise of trauma debates in 
Canadian medical and popular culture, particularly in the 1990s and after, there was a concurrent 
rise in the number of historical studies linking contemporary ideas of trauma with earlier medical 
manifestations like shell shock.
43
 Prior to 1990 one looks in vain for mentions of PTSD in 
Canadian historical studies. For example, Tom Brown’s 1984 essay “Shell Shock in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force” highlighted the links between the shell shock “epidemic” during 
the First World War and the professional development of psychiatry and psychology, but made 
no mention of PTSD.
44
 Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew’s groundbreaking 1990 monograph 
Battle Exhaustion, which explored military psychiatrists’ efforts to treat battle exhaustion in the 
Canadian Army during the Second World War, made only one brief mention of “Post-traumatic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Greig and Wayne Martino, eds., Canadian Men and Masculinities: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2012).  
42
 Micale and Lerner, “Trauma, Psychiatry, and History,” 6; By the new millennium, historians’ interest was self-
evident. Ben Shephard’s 2000 book A War of Nerves, Mark Micale and Paul Lerner’s 2001 edited collection 
Traumatic Pasts, and Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely’s 2005 work Shell Shock to PTSD, all three of which trace 
the history of psychological trauma across broad timeframes and places, were demonstrative of expansive growth in 
the trauma history field. See Micale and Lerner, Traumatic Pasts; Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves; Edgar Jones and 
Simon Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War (New York: Psychology 
Press, 2005); See also Binneveld, From Shell Shock to Combat Stress.  
43
 In the United States, where the PTSD concept originated, this trend happened slightly earlier. For one early 
example that mentions PTSD in connection with earlier battlefield disorders see Richard Gabriel, No More Heroes: 
Madness and Psychiatry in War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), 77, 157.  
44Tom Brown, “Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918: Canadian Psychiatry in the Great 
War,” in Charles G. Roland, ed., Health, Disease and Medicine: Essays in Canadian History (Hamilton: McMaster 
University, Hannah Institute for the History of Medicine, 1984), passim. 
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stress syndrome.”45 Nonetheless, that mention was crucial because it was the first time Canadian 
historians linked post-1980 conceptions of trauma and earlier battlefield manifestations like shell 
shock and battle exhaustion.
46
   
Reflecting the gradual influence of trauma studies on historical writing, Terry Copp’s 
1998 essay on post-World War Two veterans’ psychological illness traced the subject’s history 
from shell shock “to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.”47 Copp acknowledged the rise of trauma 
research and discussions in Canadian print media amidst the numerous peacekeeping operations 
of the1990s, calling PTSD research a “growth industry.”48 A later 2010 edited collection by 
Copp and Mark Humphries about combat stress in Commonwealth soldiers across the twentieth 
century showed that by the new millennium views about the universal nature of trauma had 
caused scholars to re-think shell shock, battle exhaustion, and PTSD. Each manifestation was 
now viewed as an amorphous example of a similar and timeless phenomenon. Debates and 
controversies ensued.
49
 
                                                          
45
 Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 157; Copp’s 1992 essay on the development of 
neuropsychiatry in the Canadian Army during World War Two made no mention of trauma or PTSD at all. See 
Copp “The Development of Neuropsychiatry in the Canadian Army (Overseas) 1939-1943,” in C. David Naylor, 
ed., Canadian Health Care and the State: A Century of Evolution (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1992), 67-84.  
46
 To the best of my knowledge. 
47Terry Copp, “From Neurasthenia to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Canadian veterans and the Problem of 
Persistent Emotional Disabilities,” in Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein, eds., The Veterans Charter and Post-World 
War II Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 149-159; Allan English’s 1996 
study of  Canadian aircrew, which likewise discussed the role of psychologists and psychiatrists, in this case in 
aircrew selection, training, etc., made just one brief mention of PTSD in a footnote. See Allan English, The Cream 
of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew, 1939-1945 (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 217.   
48
 Copp, “From Neurasthenia to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” 156. 
49
 See Allan Young, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), passim, esp. 5-6; By the 2000s, in combination with the aforementioned rise of socio-
cultural histories, scholars interested in war trauma created more holistic analyses that examined societal mentalities, 
the medical profession, and traumatized veterans themselves. Historian Peter Leese’s 2002 Shell Shock, about the 
“mass trauma” of shell-shocked British soldiers and postwar society was an excellent example of the “new” 
historical trauma research. Leese examined the Great War shell shock phenomenon not just during wartime, but also 
its post-1918 emergence as a metaphor for the war itself. Leese argued that shell shock was both a medical 
phenomenon and a symbol of collective trauma. Moreover, that symbolism was not static. Put simply, shell shock 
“changed its meanings to suit the preoccupations of British society through the twentieth century.” See Leese, Shell 
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One seminal study arising from the post-1980 rise of PTSD research, responded to by 
authors across the Western world since, was Allan Young’s 1995 book The Harmony of 
Illusions. Young’s controversial thesis suggested that PTSD was not timeless, but instead was 
“glued together by the practices, technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, 
treated, and represented by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized 
these efforts and resources.”50 He particularly took aim at the belief that PTSD could be found in 
many times and places. Instead, he argued that the theory of a traumatic memory, emerging in 
the nineteenth century and enshrined later in the 1980 PTSD concept, was a modern creation 
unknown and unavailable to earlier societies. Young did not deny the reality of PTSD, but rather 
affirmed that PTSD was a separate phenomenon from earlier medical diagnoses like hysteria, 
brought together by a specific set of medical practices, research, and patients’ realities. Nor did 
he cast doubt on trauma’s reality, but instead the expansive diagnosing of PTSD under 
circumstances not directly related to war, such as feelings of guilt, something not necessarily a 
part of earlier traumatic phenomena like shell shock. For historians, the most important element 
of Young’s book was that it critically examined clinical practices, trauma theories, and historical 
negotiations between physicians and patients. His work displayed the importance of 
understanding how traumatic experiences “penetrate people’s life world, acquire facticity, and 
shape the self-knowledge of patients, clinicians, and researchers.”51     
Canadian historical scholarship on war trauma has been influenced by the above authors, 
but thus far few studies have emerged. Mark Humphries’ 2010 article “War’s Long Shadow” 
was the first to combine developments in these subfields to examine Canadian veterans’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Shock, 184, xiii, 3; Another noteworthy example was Peter Barham’s Forgotten Lunatics. See Peter Barham, 
Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).    
50
 Young, The Harmony of Illusions, 5-6.  
51
 Ibid.  
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experiences of postwar trauma and pension concerns from medical, gender, and socio-political 
perspectives.
52
 But in spite of Humphries’ initiative, little has since followed it. Copp and 
Humphries’ edited collection brought together a vast array of historical documents and 
perspectives, but their exploration of war trauma in Canada does not thoroughly address post-
1980 developments, and it does not appraise Canada’s challenges with peacekeeping trauma 
after the Cold War.
53
 
Since the 1980s Canadian military historians have led the charge to explore psychological 
trauma in Canadian history, but the aforementioned studies have largely focused on the First and 
Second World War, and no book-length study about Canadian experiences across the twentieth 
and early twenty-first century has been attempted.
54
 Moreover, aside from Humphries’ article, no 
Canadian historian has produced a comprehensive analysis of war trauma which utilizes 
developments in the gender and cultural history subfields.
55
 Previous works, which illuminated 
medical practices and theories of psychological trauma during and immediately after wartime, 
centred more on physicians than patients.
56
 With regard to peacekeeping experiences, there have 
been even fewer attempts to explore trauma’s effects on individual peacekeepers and Canadian 
conceptions of national identity. Journalist Carol Off’s 2004 book The Ghosts of Medak Pocket, 
about Canadian peacekeeping experiences in the Balkans during the 1990s, is one of the only 
book-length studies that examines peacekeeping trauma, and then only tangentially.
57
 Likewise 
                                                          
52
 Mark Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow: Masculinity, Medicine, and the Gendered Politics of Trauma, 1914-
1939,” The Canadian Historical Review 91, no. 3 (2010): 503-531. 
53
 Their work reproduced several peacekeeping trauma studies, but did not discuss them in a historical perspective. 
This was most likely because, as its title suggested, it was concerned primarily with combat stress, something 
peacekeeping has traditionally been excluded from. 
54
 Some of the sources cited throughout this dissertation discuss historical elements of trauma, but most are within 
military journals and thus focus on trauma vis-à-vis the military. Others likewise discuss elements of trauma history, 
but approach the subject from a strictly strategic or medical perspective.  
55
 To the best of my knowledge Humphries’ 2010 article is the only Canadian academic article of its kind. 
56
 See above works by Copp, McAndrew, and Brown. 
57
 Carol Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada’s Secret War (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 
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political scientist Sandra Whitworth’s 2004 book Men, Militarism & UN Peacekeeping presented 
a critique of UN operations and explored the gendered elements of peacekeeping relations, but 
trauma was relegated to only a small section of her larger narrative.
58
  
 
New Opportunities  
 
 
 Taking advantage of a unique and “open” moment in Canadian military history, this 
study traces how trauma has been interpreted by the military, Canadian society, and the 
individuals affected by it. At the cultural level, this dissertation is an examination of how 
physicians and patients entered into a dialogue of ideas about how trauma was constructed and 
understood at the experiential level. It is also a history of the socio-politics of trauma. This story 
draws heavily from the concerns expressed by soldiers traumatized by war and peacekeeping 
operations, and explores their economic motives and contributions to national identity.  
 PTSD and conceptions of trauma changed over time; tracking these changes reveals 
medical and cultural shifts in consciousness against the backdrop of military operations. 
Although medical knowledge and societal attitudes toward psychological trauma shifted from the 
early twentieth to early twenty-first century, stigmas about the mentally ill veteran persisted, as 
did the socio-economic troubles that dogged veterans as they reintegrated into civilian life. While 
the general trend was one of increasing understanding and sympathy, veterans from the First 
World War through to those returning from Afghanistan shared many of the same socio-
economic challenges. Indeed the language of illness and the shame associated with it remained 
consistent despite any changes in military operations, medicine, or technology. Although shifts 
                                                          
58
 Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism, & UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004); Whitworth subsequently followed this work with a 2008 essay that further explored the subject. 
See Whitworth, “Militarized Masculinity and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,” in Jane Parpart and Marysia 
Zalewski, eds., Rethinking the Wo/man Questions in International Relations (London: Zed Books, 2008), 109-126. 
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in psychiatric theory and orientation after 1980 helped to formally recognize veterans’ mental 
suffering, the clinical road to recovery often neglected the socio-economic realities of postwar 
and civilian life.  
Soldiers’ battles with traumatic events symbolize the nation’s struggle to reconcile its 
complex history, one that has made Canadians both battle-tested warriors and harbingers of 
peace in troubled areas of the globe. The plight of veterans, and how Canadians rationalize their 
plight, represents society’s attempts to honour and memorialize noble deeds, as well as to forget 
about the darker periods in our national tapestry. Historically, veterans’ experiences were 
accepted or discarded amidst the construction of social memories based on a “combination of 
invention, truth, and half-truth.”59 But even when unpalatable or inconvenient to prevalent 
societal views, their experiences refused to be fully submerged. Ultimately the traumatized 
veteran, whether afflicted with “shell shock,” “battle exhaustion,” or “PTSD,” represented the 
dangerous, unflinching, and enduring legacies of military operations across many times and 
places.   
This dissertation contributes to discussions of trauma and military history in a few key 
respects. First, it engages with debates about how trauma is experienced across different eras, 
showing that although certain manifestations of trauma, such as persistent nightmares, were 
common to every era, shell shock and its successors were rooted in particular times and places.
60
 
Like Peter Leese, and Allan Young before him, I view each trauma manifestation as a similar but 
distinct “idiom of sickness.”61 Put simply, PTSD is just another representation of trauma in a 
continuing cultural and medical project that aims to bring trauma’s numerous social and medical 
                                                          
59
 Vance, Death So Noble, 8.  
60
 Allan Young made a particularly strong case in this regard with his discussion of the traumatic memory, a cultural 
creation of the nineteenth century. The print media is especially guilty of sometimes still interchangeably using 
“shell shock” and “PTSD.”  
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 Leese, Shell Shock, 31. 
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effects under a neatly encapsulated umbrella.
62
 Exploring each phenomenon in its own right 
provides a greater penetration of socio-cultural trappings and allows historians to see the 
complex connections between individual lived experiences, medical theories, and societal views 
and representations; essentially spotlighting the shadowy realms that trauma experiences reside 
in. Historically, each trauma manifestation was an individual illness, but together they 
symbolized a particular view of war, and in the Canadian case, peacekeeping, as well as the way 
conflicts were retrospectively seen by society. By examining trauma thus, this dissertation brings 
the Canadian experience across the longue durée into international discussions of trauma history, 
something not yet attempted by Canadian historians in a monograph-length study.   
Equally important, this dissertation also adds to an incipient trauma history field in 
Canada, bringing together military, medical, and social histories. Veterans’ experiences speak 
volumes about the social experience of trauma, and from a cultural standpoint, about the 
construction of masculinity and its intimate ties to military culture. The military represents one 
of the last bastions of “traditional” masculinity; as such, exploring its connections to issues like 
trauma opens up further opportunities for understanding how military culture interacts with and 
shapes medical and lay perspectives on illness. Most importantly, this study heralds a lengthy 
examination of how trauma and peacekeeping both intermingled and conflicted with medical 
theories and cultural discussions after the Cold War; again something no Canadian historian has 
yet attempted beyond article-length studies. By bringing the historical narrative into the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century this project opens up new avenues for future researchers 
and demonstrates the benefits of a comparative, multifaceted approach to the history of trauma in 
the military and Canadian civilian society. It also opens up opportunities for comparative 
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dictum that “All theory, dear friend, is gray, but the golden tree of life springs ever green.” 
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histories to further analyze “universal” experiences of trauma, moving beyond the idiosyncratic 
experiences of veterans and into comparisons of military and civilian trauma in Canada.                 
   
Chapter Structure   
 
 This dissertation is divided into six chapters, each revolving around a particular war or 
peacekeeping mission. War, and the act of peacekeeping, heralded the rise of popular discussions 
about psychological trauma in Canada. While civilian trauma captured the attention of medico-
psychological researchers beginning in the 1870s, it was the strain and horror of military 
conflicts that haunted numerous men and brought their mental troubles into popular 
consciousness. Shell shock, battle exhaustion, and PTSD were and continue to exist as real 
entities, but the symptom patterns, patient experiences, and medical terminology were shaped by 
historically contingent socio-cultural and political factors.
63
  
 The first chapter examines organized medicine’s interest in psychological trauma from 
the 1870s through to 1914, and explores the Canadian Army’s experience with shell shock 
during the First World War. Medical theories about shell shock evolved alongside popular 
conceptions of manliness and proper soldiering; these ideas coincided with Canadian psychiatry 
and psychology’s early professionalization efforts. Shell shock became in many respects a 
metaphorical battleground on which differing medico-psychological theories competed with one 
another, before psychological theories explaining trauma gradually took precedence over 
organic, physical ones. Utilizing contemporary medical literature and newspaper sources like the 
Globe, the opening chapter shows how popular sympathies toward shell-shocked soldiers clashed 
with medical and military dictates that deemed such behaviour illegitimate and feminine. After 
the war, physicians were the gatekeepers of pensions, and believed in the importance of a pull-
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up-your-bootstraps work ethic. Those unable to adapt to postwar life were viewed as weak, 
effeminate, and undeserving of compensation. Thus physicians successfully denied numerous 
shell-shocked veterans pensions, supposedly for their own good.      
 Drawing on a combination of contemporary literature, newspaper sources, and a firsthand 
account by author and veteran Farley Mowat, Chapter two discusses the Canadian Army’s 
experience with “battle exhaustion” during the Second World War. Allied military psychiatrists 
attempted to prevent another shell shock epidemic by bringing battlefield trauma and 
psychological difficulties under the all-encompassing term of “battle exhaustion.” Ostensibly a 
transient condition solvable through rest and recuperation, battle exhaustion reflected a shift in 
medical thinking toward socio-psychological interpretations of war trauma. By the end of the 
Second World War, a general consensus developed that every man had his breaking point. But 
that development was a double-edged sword. If a “neurosis” continued after the war, it was 
predominantly caused by earlier life events and upbringing. Freudian and other psychodynamic 
approaches combined to produce a belief among Department of Veterans’ Affairs physicians that 
“neurotic” veterans should not be given pensions. Such men, they believed, must be prevented 
from shirking their duties as fathers, breadwinners, and leaders of postwar society. Once again 
numerous veterans were deemed weak, inadequate, and failed men by state-employed 
psychiatrists heavily influenced by contemporary beliefs about traditional manhood and what 
battle exhaustion revealed about a man’s inherent weakness.  
 Once again using newspaper sources and contemporary medical literature, chapter three 
shifts the focus to Vietnam and demonstrates the continuing link between psychiatry and war 
trauma. The Vietnam War stimulated considerable public discussions about trauma, while the 
televised and highly visible traumatized soldiers cultivated popular sympathy and frustration 
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about the impact of war on soldiers’ mental state. The war’s divisive nature, and the traumas 
numerous Vietnam vets experienced, dovetailed with a revolution in American psychiatry. In the 
1970s a group of biologically, anti-Freudian-oriented APA members campaigned to rewrite the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, American psychiatrists’ Bible. Their 
success, culminating in the manual’s 1980 third edition, set psychiatry on a vastly different 
trajectory, one which encouraged greater efforts into targeted and empirical research. Influenced 
by an eclectic group of radical psychiatrists, war veterans, and trauma researchers, the APA 
agreed to acknowledge a new conceptualization of trauma – “Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.” 
For the first time psychiatrists officially recognized a consequence of trauma that originated from 
without, rather than within those afflicted. But given PTSD’s socio-political origins, physicians 
in Canada and elsewhere at first largely dismissed it as an American, Vietnam-specific condition.      
 Chapter four traces the history of Canada’s peacekeeping operations and its contribution 
to national identity after the 1956 Suez Crisis, primarily through oral interviews with former 
peacekeepers, government documents, and cultural sources such as newspapers and television 
broadcasts. By the Cold War’s end, a specific vision of peacekeeping – characterized by 
Canadian soldiers gallantly keeping warring factions at bay in a clearly defined zone of 
separation – took hold. Nonetheless, after 1991 a new type of peacekeeping emerged, one in 
which combatants respected neither their enemies nor the peacekeepers sent to prevent further 
bloodshed. The Canadian military and public were psychologically unprepared for the horrific 
events that occurred in places like the Former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. Amidst 
numerous scandals throughout the decade, most notably the 1993 murder of a teenage boy in 
Somalia by Canadian peacekeepers, the CAF and Department of National Defence (DND) went 
into a defensive posture. Politicians and military leaders deemed peacekeeping trauma another 
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potential scandal, and thus attempted to deny it. Nonetheless, against the backdrop of harrowing 
military operations and a military culture that stigmatized psychological problems, trauma 
became a battleground for old and new interpretations of war trauma, masculinity, popular 
perceptions of peacekeeping, and the nation’s role in international politics.     
Analyzing transcribed soldiers’ testimonies from the Croatia Board of Inquiry (BOI) and 
oral interviews with Board members and former peacekeepers, as well as correspondence with 
the Board’s former Chairman, the fifth chapter explores the rise of PTSD in the Canadian 
national consciousness as a result of peacekeeping trauma.
64
 With almost 100 testimonies 
totalling approximately 2,000 pages, BOI documents and peacekeepers’ recollections display 
soldiers’ personal battles with trauma and the vagaries of military culture. Throughout the mid- 
to late-1990s, a series of prominent events such as Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire’s public 
struggle with PTSD, as well as the numerous disclosures of rank-and-file soldiers during BOI 
testimonies, caused a paradigm shift in views of psychological trauma. Canadian military 
leaders, politicians, and the general public gradually realized that trauma resulted from 
peacekeeping as well as war. Moreover, a disorder the general public once deemed a uniquely 
American veterans’ affliction gradually became linked in Canada with peacekeeping trauma, 
something hitherto unheard of. Publicly broadcast throughout its proceedings in late 1999, the 
BOI presented a challenge to historically suppressed discussions of men’s psychological 
problems and forced an acknowledgement of the reality of peacekeeping trauma.    
Tracing developments through interviews, government documents, news reports, and 
soldiers’ memoires, the sixth and final chapter discusses the battle between military reformers 
and an “old guard” after the Canadian Forces’ entry into the Afghanistan War in 2001. The 
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Canadian experience with trauma after 2001 was particularly instructive in what it revealed 
about the contingencies of medical categories and the importance of culture in determining the 
relevance of medical diagnoses. Throughout the early twenty-first century trauma remained a 
battleground for physicians, military reformers, and public debates about Canada’s national 
identity and role in international affairs. Behind those battles lay the traumatized veteran, a figure 
who once again demonstrated the importance of socio-economic factors in a soldier’s road to 
recovery. Veterans’ experiences showcase the consistent role of trauma as a prism through which 
to view contemporary social norms, medical knowledge, and cultural anxieties. For all of the 
changes over the one-hundred-year period covered, the final chapter highlights trauma’s 
continuing existence as both a clinical entity and a metaphor of the nation’s struggles to 
reconcile its national identity and military accomplishments with the traumatic experiences of 
those serving on its behalf.  
 
Methodology 
 
 In bringing together the history of trauma in the Canadian military across unique periods 
in the nation’s development, this dissertation relies on an eclectic array of sources. For tracing 
medical trends and changes to theory and practice, I have relied heavily on the Canadian 
Medical Association Journal. As a mainstream journal of Canadian medical practices and ideas, 
and one that has been continuously published across the timeframe this dissertation covers, the 
Journal proved crucial for tracking how and when Canadian physicians discussed trauma, as 
well as when such discussions faded into relative obscurity throughout the twentieth century. As 
the official organ of the Canadian Medical Association, the Journal is a barometer of mainstream 
medical opinions, and allows insights into the connection between the state, medicine, and the 
  
26 
 
military, especially during the First and Second World Wars.
65
 Using physical Journal copies, 
and later online keyword searches, I was able to locate numerous discussions of shell shock, 
battle exhaustion, and later PTSD. My search involved scanning all article titles from the 1914 to 
2000 period, looking specifically for titles that contained the words above and/or mention of 
“nervous” disorders; or the Canadian military more broadly. Once located, I read through each 
article and selected them based on whether or not they were of a qualitative (that is, those that 
spoke to theories of trauma and military/medical policy) or quantitative nature (those that used 
statistical analysis to report treatment success or failure). For the most part, the former type were 
utilized since they discussed the themes this dissertation addresses, such as general medical 
opinions of etiology and the relations of shell shock etc. to past instances of military trauma. 
These articles allowed a glimpse into medical thoughts on trauma, treatment methods, and the 
administration of government health initiatives for soldiers and veterans across the longue durée. 
 Other medical journals such as the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry (CJP) were similarly 
useful for providing comparisons and contrasts between medical and cultural representations of 
trauma, as well as how and when trauma became a subject of significant interest for Canadian 
researchers. As the official publication of the Canadian Psychiatric Association, the CJP likewise 
provides a unique window into the waxing and waning of medical research topics across the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Although never as influential or widely read as its American 
counterpart, the American Journal of Psychiatry, the CJP nonetheless displays the concerns and 
interests of mainstream Canadian psychiatric thought, and thus helps with tracing the rise of 
trauma as a significant topic for Canadian psychiatrists. Using a similar method as that for the 
Canadian Medical Association Journal, I examined article titles for mentions of trauma and read 
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through each piece, using them as a gauge for how and when trauma was discussed and in what 
contexts (i.e. civilian or military).
66
    
 Newspapers add another layer of depth to historical discussions of trauma in Canada, and 
thus constitute the most important cultural source drawn upon in this dissertation. To capture 
national, popular narratives over a one-hundred-year period, I have relied extensively on two 
newspapers with lengthy publication records: one nationally circulated, the Globe and Mail, and 
the other circulated in Ontario, the Toronto Star. This choice was made partially due to both 
papers’ long history, continuous publication record, and large circulation figures, and partially 
for expediency – namely that both papers’ archives can be easily accessed in numerous locations 
in physical print format, microform, and online. As the largest nationally-circulated newspaper, 
the Globe and Mail is a particularly useful source for examining media fascination with and 
reporting of war trauma, even despite its Toronto-based ownership and reputation among some 
Canadians as a spokesperson for the “old and male.”67 The Toronto Star is important because of 
its reputation for covering “sensitive” topics, e.g. military trauma, and as a barometer of opinion 
in the densely populated province of Ontario. In both cases, I relied first on physical library 
searches and later online keyword searches to accumulate notes on approximately 1000 articles 
on PTSD and its antecedents, stretching from the early twentieth to early twenty-first century.
68
 
After concluding my search I collated and selected the articles according to their relevance to my 
dissertation – e.g. whether or not the article discussed civilian or military trauma, etc. This 
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lengthy but thorough approach allowed for a clear picture of the rise and fall of newspaper 
reporting on trauma, and especially military trauma and veterans’ issues, over the period covered 
by this project. It also provided a look at how and when medical theories penetrated popular 
discourses, and how public discourses on the military and masculinity were discussed in these 
venues.  
 In other instances, I selected newspapers’ articles according to more idiosyncratic 
concerns. I utilized the Ottawa Citizen primarily because of its consistent (and early) coverage of 
military trauma in Canada after the Cold War. Long-time Citizen reporters David Pugliese and 
Chris Cobb have both earned a reputation among “insiders” and researchers as incisive and 
thorough examiners of Canadian military issues; thus their articles often discuss trauma in both 
contemporary and historical contexts. Pugliese gave an interview for this dissertation and Cobb 
was helpful for pointing me in the direction of earlier articles on the subject. Both men gave me 
an “insider’s” view of the battle between media investigators, Canadian military leaders, and 
federal politicians. 
Lastly, in regard to newspapers, for a brief but nonetheless important look at medical 
narratives and discussions of Canada south of the border I relied in a few instances on past issues 
of the New York Times. The Times has consistently published discussions of medical 
developments and military and veterans’ issues, including on occasion Canadian topics, and as 
such adds another layer of analysis, helping place Canadian developments in an international 
context. 
Regarding other Canadian cultural sources such as novels and memoires, I chose the 
particularly poignant and widely read accounts of Farley Mowat. Although there are numerous 
fictional and non-fictional accounts of the First and Second World War by Canadian authors, 
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there are few that explicitly mention trauma, shell shock, or battle exhaustion.
69
 Mowat wrote 
extensively and candidly of his war experiences, including how battle exhaustion affected 
Canadian soldiers in the Second World War, and through oblique mentions of his own father’s 
experiences in World War One, he referenced shell shock as well. His books are one of the only 
popularly read (and easy to locate) accounts of trauma’s effects on Canadian soldiers during the 
World Wars. When possible, I supplemented this view of early- to mid-twentieth century 
discussions of trauma with accounts by Canadian and non-Canadian veteran medical officers 
such as R.J. Manion and Lord Moran. This helps to compare and contrast the medical view with 
that of the frontline soldier. Thankfully for historians, the increased discussions of trauma in the 
Canadian military after the Cold War make it much easier to locate book-length narratives of 
trauma by veterans, the most prominent of which have been used in the sixth chapter. 
 
Methodology – Oral Interviews 
 
My main aim has been to capture as best as possible veterans’ lived experiences of 
trauma and how it affects them not just in a medical sense, but in their daily social lives. In this 
regard the most important primary source material was oral interviews with members of the 
Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS) program, a peer-support program for soldiers 
and veterans with operational stress injuries such as PTSD.
70
 In my search for the lived 
experiences of CAF members and veterans with psychological injuries, I first sent an e-mail to 
then OSISS National Program Manager Major Carl Walsh describing my project, asking his help 
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on how to proceed.
71
 He graciously forwarded my e-mail to Peer Support Coordinators across 
the country and asked them, should they wish to do so, to spread the word to their local peers. 
Within twenty-four hours I received several phone calls and e-mails from members willing to 
speak. Over the next few months I conducted phone interviews with eight OSISS members of 
various ages and ranks, consisting of seven men and one woman, from various provinces across 
Canada such as Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and Newfoundland. Given the sensitive nature of the 
subject – something that precludes “cold calling” or e-mailing veterans with trauma (or any 
veterans for that matter) out of the blue – my candidate pool was limited to the number of 
individuals who contacted me. In addition to the eight interviewees who completed discussions 
with me, several others initially expressed interest but either got “cold feet” on the arranged 
interview date or did not respond after initial correspondence. I later learned during the interview 
process from those who chose to stay the course that this was a common occurrence when 
speaking with OSISS members, since many were concerned about the career implications of 
speaking with someone outside the military. It became clear that a perennial fear of discussing 
military matters with “outsiders” was still prevalent among many within the Canadian Forces, 
and that mental illness, despite increasing discussions within civilian and military circles, is still 
a largely taboo subject.   
The majority of interviewees were peacekeeping veterans who participated in operations 
throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. There were also Afghanistan veterans, and a few 
participated in both war and peacekeeping operations. Our discussions usually lasted between 
one to two hours, and consisted of initial questions related to biographical information, and then 
generally became a stream-of-consciousness-style conversation. Each interview began with a 
series of prepared questions, but I did not attempt to steer any interviewee toward a subject they 
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were hesitant to discuss. I moreover wished to avoid “triggering” any disturbing thoughts or 
recollections, and to avoid any perception that I was probing for voyeuristic purposes. Thus, I 
attempted to sense their comfort level and adjust my questions accordingly. In most cases, after 
questions about their biographical information I let the interviewee direct the flow of 
conversation, though I tried to keep the discussion on military matters.   
The interviews were moving, inspiring, and sometimes emotionally disturbing. In several 
instances the interviewee had to stop and collect him or herself, and re-listening to the 
discussions for transcribing purposes turned out to be at times an unexpectedly difficult project 
for me. In an unflinching manner several interviewees freely related traumatic and harrowing 
operational events. I was particularly moved by the effect that such experiences had on their 
subsequent lives, and the many years some went without relating their experiences to anyone 
except their closest friends and family. A few suffered in silence for close to ten years, reaching 
the point of almost total collapse before finally seeking help. Some of their recollections, though 
graphic and disturbing, proved to be encapsulations of numerous recurring themes I wished to 
address. Thus, interview excerpts are reproduced at the beginning of several chapters to highlight 
the prominent issues faced by veterans with psychological injuries, and the challenges of 
bringing this history out into the open. 
In choosing which interviews to utilize, and where to place them in my narrative, I was 
forced to make subjective determinations of their relevance to the dissertation’s main themes as 
well as the degree to which the interview spoke to historical discussions of trauma. While some 
interviewees gave lengthy and detailed expositions about, for example, unfair treatment by 
superior officers or comrades, or interesting philosophical reflections on Canadian society vis-à-
vis the military, in some instances I was clearly seen more as a sympathetic ear than an historical 
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investigator – something that in itself speaks to many veterans’ desire just to find someone that 
will listen without judgement. Thus while some discussions were ostensibly (and 
unintentionally) therapeutic for the interviewee, and their testimony may prove useful for future 
research, after transcribing all interviews I found some inherently more direct and pertinent to 
the themes that this dissertation addresses, and utilized them more often as a result.                
Interviewees’ recollections proved to be a microcosm of larger narratives, and 
demonstrate the human story behind the medical, cultural, and political controversies. Readers 
should be warned: their reflections can be strikingly blunt, and in some cases the straightforward 
language they employed to describe traumatic events is in itself disturbing. Although I offered 
total anonymity to every interviewee, none wished it. Several instead expressed the hope that 
their uncensored and public story would prove helpful to other veterans afraid to come forward 
about their mental difficulties. Their testimonies represent a unique moment in Canadian history 
when soldiers and veterans are willing to publicly speak about their personal battles with trauma 
and with a military culture that emphases resiliency and toughness while shunning weakness. 
Prior to the 2000s, conducting this project would have been next to impossible, since groups 
such as OSISS did not exist, and given the closed nature of military culture, particularly in the 
1990s, it is highly unlikely anyone would have been willing to relate their experiences to an 
“outsider.” A few interviewees confirmed this conjecture’s validity, and one told me I was lucky 
to find “the softest spot to push.”72 It remains to be seen whether or not this window will remain 
open to future researchers. 
Listening to post-Cold War Canadian veterans’ difficult emotional journeys reveals a 
historical line that runs backward through time, to the similar experiences of their counterparts 
who served during earlier conflicts and operations. Although much has changed in Canadian 
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society and the Western world since 1914, traumatized veterans of the twenty-first century 
encounter many of the same dilemmas and are subject to many of the same socio-economic and 
cultural challenges as those who returned from the First and Second World War. Veterans’ 
stories represent a direct link to the past and highlight the importance of viewing their 
experiences not just as individual struggles, but also as the metaphorical struggles of the nation. 
Although previous authors and documentarians have utilized interviews with veterans, and some 
have even highlighted trauma, this dissertation expands on that approach by making veterans’ 
recollections the pivot point around which its historical discussion of trauma revolves. This 
dissertation “listens” to veterans and uses their thoughts as a way to reflect on how trauma is 
socially and philosophically experienced; essentially how trauma affects both one’s social life 
and worldview, rather than how it is diagnosed and viewed in medical terms. As one interviewee 
poignantly stated, despite physicians’ best efforts, trauma sufferers do not live in their doctor’s 
office. By listening to individual and cultural experiences of trauma historians can add to a 
growing understanding of PTSD and its antecedents as both medical entities and profound, 
shattering social experiences. Canadian veterans are finally willing to speak candidly about the 
effects of war on both the psyche and soul, and it is our duty to listen.              
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CHAPTER 1: A SHOCKING INTRODUCTION TO TRAUMA 
 
There is a legitimate nervousness, named “shell shock.” The real cases of this condition, when they are extreme, are 
sad to see. An officer or Tommy, who has previously been an excellent soldier, suddenly develops “nerves” to such 
an extent as to be uncontrollable. He trembles violently, his heart may be disorderly in rhythm, he has a terrified air, 
the slightest noise makes him jump and even occasionally run at top speed to a supposed place of safety. He is the 
personification of terror, at times crying out or weeping like a child.
1
  
 
 
A man that’s not afeard o’ thim shells has more courage than sinse.2 
 
 
 Writing in the late twentieth century, historian of military psychiatry Hans Binneveld 
opined that, “One can no longer imagine a battlefield without psychiatrists and psychologists.”3 
Retrospectively, Binneveld’s assessment of the now inseparable link between the mental health 
profession and the military was somewhat prescient. The final decades of the twentieth century, 
in particular the 1980s and 1990s, saw the growth of a “culture of trauma” that made PTSD – a 
disorder defined by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 – a hotly debated topic in 
military circles, medical journals, and newspapers across the Anglo-American world.
4
 In 
Western nations particularly, PTSD became a considerable concern for military leaders, as well 
as for the civilian governments they reported to. But such was not always the case. Throughout 
the twentieth century, psychological trauma oscillated between being a prominent subject and at 
other times a somewhat forgotten hobby of medical researchers. It was major conflicts like the 
two World Wars and Vietnam that were the key catalysts which continuously brought trauma 
back into the public eye.
5
 The conceptualization and dissemination of knowledge about trauma 
and combat-related psychological injuries were largely forged and re-ignited by the fires of war 
and, in the case of peacekeeping nations like Canada, “military operations other than war.” 
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 Historians have discovered documented links between combat and intense psychological 
duress as far back as the seventeenth century, and the mental effects of battle on combatants 
were recognized even during Biblical times.
6
 Commenting on the timelessness of war’s effect on 
the human psyche, military historian Richard Gabriel affirmed that, “If it were possible to 
transport a military psychiatrist back to the times of the Roman and Greek armies, there is little 
he would find in dealing with combat shock with which he was not already familiar.”7 
Nevertheless, despite ancient peoples’ familiarity with war’s stresses, it was only quite recently, 
along with the rise of professionalized medicine and modern technology, that psychological 
trauma was systematically studied. In their edited collection on the history of trauma, historians 
Mark Micale and Paul Lerner argued that in the period from 1870 to 1930 psychological trauma 
“acquired the status of a disease entity with a technical terminology, theories of causation, a 
classification, and therapeutic systems as well as medico-legal standing and governmental 
recognition.”8 Trauma’s newly acquired status derived in part from the fact that modernity 
brought with it unprecedented assaults on both the body and mind, but crucially, it also 
corresponded with organized medicine’s first systematic study of how those assaults affected the 
human psyche.
9
 The rise of psychiatry, neurology, psychology, and other allied disciplines 
coincided with, and was constitutive of, medical and cultural engagement with psychological 
trauma on a hitherto unprecedented scale.
10
          
Medical theories about psychological trauma began with mid- and late-Victorian 
physicians’ curiosity about the unique types of injuries that occurred when humans broke 
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centuries-old rates of velocity and spatial boundaries.
11
 In the case of early railways, one of the 
quintessential inventions of the modern age, a significant number of accidents resulted in many 
individuals suffering from “Railway Spine,” “Railway Brain,” or “Traumatic Neurosis,” an 
amorphous set of diagnoses that often involved a delayed stress response to the original 
traumatic event - in this case, a railway accident.
12
 In his 1866 publication On Railway and Other 
Injuries of the Nervous System, John Eric Erichsen, British surgeon and professor at University 
College Hospital in London, described seven cases of Railway Spine. Patients’ mental 
difficulties puzzled physicians, particularly since Erichsen’s original hypothesis was that a 
concussive force led to chronic inflammation of the spinal cord, producing a general disturbance 
of the nervous system. Mystifyingly, some patients appeared physically cured but their 
psychological difficulties persisted. Detailing the 1866 case of a “Mr. R.,” a patient seen fifteen 
months after the man’s accident, Erichsen’s notes stated that Mr. R. was “unable to transact any 
business since the injury. Is troubled with frightful dreams. Starts and wakes up in terror, not 
knowing where he is. Has become irritable, and can neither bear light nor noise.”13 Physicians 
were even more perplexed when it became clear that in many cases no damage had been done to 
the patient’s spinal cord, thus rendering Erichsen’s organic explanation untenable.14 By the 
1870s a number of physicians interested in psychological medicine and the puzzling nature of 
cases like Mr. R.’s began discussing the concept of psychological trauma, thus applying the 
concept of “trauma” to what had previously been utilized for strictly physical injuries.15 During 
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the 1880s Erichsen’s organic explanation was challenged by other physicians, such as surgeon 
Herbert Page, who argued that intense fright alone could account for patients’ symptoms and 
“traumatic hysteria.”16   
 The debate over psychological trauma and its effects occurred on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In an early Canadian example, during an 1898 meeting of the Association of Railway 
Surgeons in Toronto, Mr. B.B. Osler, a solicitor, former prosecuting counsel against Louis Riel, 
and brother of Sir William Osler, spoke to a group of Canadian and American physicians about 
“‘railway spine’ or traumatic hysteria, which causes so much trouble to railway surgeons and to 
lawyers.”17 Osler stated, like numerous future investigators, that, “The subjective nature of the 
symptoms made the subject very difficult,” and that “doctors rarely agreed” when assessing 
railway spine cases.
18
 Thus, the railway accident and its mental effects became an important and 
formative aspect of the history of trauma, being the first time that such phenomena were 
systematically researched and discussed in medical circles.
19
 Railway spine created a new 
awareness of the ability of traumatic experiences to provoke a series of physical and 
psychological symptoms; it also supported beliefs that modern life brought with it traumas of a 
previously unseen nature.
20
 Railway accidents metaphorically represented the rapid, 
uncontrollable, and sometimes shattering impact of modern technology on the human mind.
21
 As 
a medical cause célèbre during the late nineteenth century, railway spine laid the groundwork for 
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future trauma debates. Thus, when physicians encountered “shell shock” during the First World 
War, they understood that despite pretensions of modern progress, human beings were still 
inherently fragile and helpless against technology’s darker, destructive side.      
 
Over the Top  
 
Although railway spine brought trauma under the lens of modern medicine, it was “shell 
shock” during the First World War that propelled psychological trauma into the spotlight and 
attracted attention from physicians, soldiers, civilians, and governments. The nature and scale of 
weaponry, the manner in which it was utilized, and the generally appalling conditions during the 
First World War affected men’s minds in diverse ways. Several months after the outbreak of war 
in December 1914, the War Office in London received reports that an alarming number of 
soldiers from the British Expeditionary Force were being evacuated with “nervous and mental 
shock.”22 According to those reports, 3-4% of all ranks were being returned to Britain due to 
“nerves” and other forms of mental breakdown.23 Given the vicissitudes of what became a long 
and hard-fought war, every soldier counted, and as such, the British were quick to try and 
contain the problem. By early 1915 Dr. Charles Myers, a Cambridge University psychologist and 
MD, arrived in France as a “Specialist in Nervous Shock,” his goal to discover how to treat the 
numerous men ostensibly suffering from the shattering impact of enemy shells.
24
 
Historian Ben Shephard argued that shell shock was, “an early example of a common 
modern phenomenon: a medical debate, hedged with scientific qualifications, taken up by public 
opinion and the media in an oversimplified way.” He continued, “The early medical model of 
shell-shock, dominated by the image of the shell itself – a violent, concussive deus ex machina, 
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which arrived from out of the heavens and left the soldier a shattered, gibbering wreck, his 
nerves destroyed and his special senses, like eyesight and hearing, impaired – imbedded itself, in 
a crude and oversimplified way, in the public imagination.”25 Much like how stress and PTSD in 
the late twentieth century became identified with Vietnam jungle warfare, shell shock, presumed 
to originate from exposure to the concussive power of artillery barrages, became the iconic 
medical disorder of the First World War – an image still attached to the public consciousness 
across much of the world today.
26
   
Public sympathy toward shell shock in Britain and the rest of the Anglo-American world 
stemmed from frequent newspaper reporting, which by 1917 created the impression that shell 
shock was a normal and frequent consequence of war.
27
 A 1918 Globe article about a Boston 
Smith College course for women to assist in treating shell shock sufferers, which exaggeratedly 
proclaimed that in Canada “90 per cent of returned soldiers suffer from some nervous disorder,” 
certainly did much to contribute to such an impression.
28
 Nevertheless, sympathy and popular 
understandings went against military necessities and a military culture that did not tolerate 
weakness.
29
 Army attitudes to mental disorder were interwoven with traditional masculine 
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principles of honour, stoicism, self-control, and camaraderie.
30
 Mental disorder was linked with 
weakness, effeminacy, and cowardice, and viewed as something “treatable” by disciplinary 
actions.
31
 Plainly put, it was only the abnormal man who was frightened or repulsed by the 
sights, sounds, and actions of battle.
32
 At the same time as the British military applied a 
simplistic “sick, well, wounded, or  mad” model to soldiers’ health, military physicians faced the 
reality that the war produced large numbers of soldiers who broke down in battle with 
manifestations that slipped between the cracks of crude categories.
33
 Unable to fully grasp or 
classify the numerous types of troubled soldiers they encountered, doctors at the front sometimes 
resorted to simplistic or idiosyncratic labels such as “Mental” or “Insane,” and even unusual 
terms like “GOK,” an initialism for “God Only Knows.”34  
Military physicians were in the unenviable position of having to “invert normal civilian 
practice and go to great lengths to deny that a soldier was sick,” thereby preventing military 
“wastage,” while still tenuously clinging to their other duty – treating the sick.35 Canadian 
surgeon Robert James Manion, a Medical Officer, Military Cross winner at Vimy Ridge, and 
later Conservative MP, provided an in-depth view of life in the trenches in his 1918 memoir A 
Surgeon in Arms. He recalled frequently being visited by officers before battle and informed of 
individual soldiers’ “cold feet,” to prevent them from obtaining a medical reprieve under the 
pretense of illness.
36
 Since many early cases of shell shock were evacuated back to England, with 
most never returning to the battlefront, the military became concerned about the degree to which 
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knowledge of the term shell shock and its vagueness allowed malingerers – those feigning illness 
to avoid duty – to seek an honourable exit.37  
Based on his experiences as a Medical Officer during the First World War, British 
physician Lord Moran stated in his 1945 account of war’s psychological effects that, “When the 
name shell-shock was coined the number of men leaving the trenches with no bodily wound 
leapt up. The pressure of opinion in the battalion – the idea stronger than fear – was eased by 
giving fear a respectable name ... The resolve to stay with the battalion had been weakened, the 
conscience was relaxed, the path out of danger was made easy.”38 Put simply, shell shock’s 
amorphous symptoms and confusion about its causes allowed fearful soldiers to escape along 
with the genuinely ill. Colin Russel, a Canadian neurologist and later head of the 
neuropsychiatric ward of the Granville Canadian Special Hospital, Ramsgate, in England, 
summed up the situation in a 1919 article in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology: “Owing 
chiefly to the fact that these [shell shock and other] conditions were not fully recognized in the 
beginning, many cases were evacuated to England which would not otherwise have been, and the 
depletion of manpower in the front line from this cause became a very serious item.”39 In the 
summer of 1916 during the Battle of the Somme, one of the bloodiest battles in history, shell 
shock grew to “epidemic proportions.”40 As experts came into contact with a greater number of 
cases, it became clear that “shell shock” served far more as an evocative symbol of modern 
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warfare, and in some instances fear, than as an accurate description of what troubled many 
soldiers. 
By June 1916, the first authoritative study of shell shock was published by Harold 
Wiltshire, an experienced London physician who saw over 150 cases and compared notes with 
military doctors at the front. He argued that, in most cases patients showed little or no physical 
damage. The problem’s root, he believed, was psychological.41 He pointed to a “psychic shock” 
as the cause of many men’s symptoms, providing one example of a soldier who was traumatized 
after clearing away the remains of a group of men killed by shellfire.
42
 Somewhat presciently, 
Wiltshire also noted the ability of the mind to repress sights and emotions it was unable to 
fathom, an ability discussed at great length after the war and throughout the rest of the century in 
relation to trauma.
43
 Charles Myers, who helped popularize the term “shell shock” in 1915 in the 
Lancet, now realized the reality of war trauma was far more complex, and by 1916 with other 
experts like Wiltshire attempted to re-label shell shock and its manifestations “war neuroses” or 
“functional nervous disorders.”44 Their rebranding reflected a shifting medical consensus about 
the perceived psychological cause of many shell shock cases and an attempt to preserve medical 
authority over such matters. Moreover, at the command level, it highlighted medical officers’ 
and other experts’ partnership with military authorities to keep shell shock out of the hands, or 
more accurately put, the minds, of individual soldiers. Replacing shell shock with the more 
esoteric terms “neuroses” and “nervous disorders” was intended to prevent soldiers from arriving 
at their own diagnosis and ensure that stigmas about mental disorder kept them in line.     
                                                          
41
 Ibid., 31. 
42
 Ibid.  
43
 Ibid.  
44
 Ibid., 32.  
  
43 
 
The Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), which sent 600,000 members overseas during 
the First World War, also had many soldiers diagnosed with war-related psychological injuries – 
estimates range between 9,600 and 15,000.
45
 Faced with such numbers the Canadian Army 
established two neurological hospitals at Granville and Buxton in England in 1915-16.
46
 
Historian Tom Brown demonstrated that, similar to the British army, shell shock became a 
battleground on which Canadian physicians vied with each other as well as the exigencies of war 
and military culture. Psychiatry was a “divided profession” on the eve of war. Somaticists, who 
believed that mental and nervous disorders were the product of physical lesions, contended with 
followers of Freud and other prominent neurologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists, who 
argued such disorders were not brain diseases, but disorders of the mind.
47
 Robert Manion, cited 
above, believed shell shock’s root cause was “the subjection of the nervous system to a strain 
which it is unable to withstand, making it collapse instead of resiliently rebounding.”48 Such a 
collapse could be brought about by “the effects of severe shelling; by being buried by an 
explosion of shell or mine; or by the killing beside the sufferer of a companion.”49 Regardless of 
their theoretical stance, though, Canadian Army physicians were not free from contemporary 
value judgements about cowardly behaviour, nor their prime directive – to return as many 
soldiers as possible to battle.    
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Many doctors did not consider shell shock a legitimate war injury. Instead, they believed 
the shell-shocked soldier “suffered from a lack of moral courage, a failure of the will, [and] a 
loss of self-control.”50 Manion, a rare exception to the rule, deemed shell shock “a legitimate 
nervousness,” and something which in the extreme case was “pitiable to observe.”51 But when 
assessing a soldier reporting mental or physical injuries, the medical officer’s loyalty was first 
and foremost to the Army. Although the individual was of paramount concern to the physician in 
peacetime, in war it was necessary to “look at disease and physical non-effectiveness from a 
collective point of view.”52 It was for this reason that on one occasion while reviewing sick 
troops Manion overheard a disgruntled soldier mutter “one never gets a fair deal from a military 
doctor.”53 Distinguished Canadian physician Sir Andrew Macphail, early editor of the Canadian 
Medical Association Journal and himself a Vimy Ridge veteran, believed shell shock was at its 
core a display of “childishness and femininity.”54 Macphail’s belief, shared amongst most 
medical officers and civilian physicians, demonstrated the link contemporary doctors made 
between the hysteria-like symptoms of shell shock and hysteria’s long history as a disorder 
deemed predominantly feminine.
55
 For the soldier who had “his wind up” or simply wanted out, 
though, a shell shock diagnosis provided a legitimate way to exit the conflict. Thus shell shock 
constituted a serious issue for military authorities and governments, both ultimately concerned 
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with victory. Lord Moran described the weariness and fear that pervaded the ranks in 1917 as 
“no longer a private anxiety, it had become a public menace.”56      
By mid-1917, with the war’s outcome still in doubt, Commander of the British Army Sir 
Douglas Haig forbade use of the term “shell shock” verbally, in any reports, or on medical 
documents, except in cases classified by the Officer Commanding the Special Hospital. In place 
of “shell shock” doctors were to use “Not Yet Diagnosed – Nervous (NYDN),” a term that 
prevented soldiers from self-diagnosis and, at least officially, removed shell shock as a 
recognized war wound.
57
 Haig’s order reflected not only concerns about manpower, but also the 
reality that, as neurologist Colin Russel reported, many soldiers were diagnosed with shell shock 
despite never actually seeing the battlefront.
58
 Although physicians attempted to help officers 
“sort out the shirkers from the heroes” and provided medical backing to the military’s stance on 
shell shock, it was evident by war’s end that psychological medicine could neither unequivocally 
explain and categorize psychological trauma nor prevent some – either physicians or patients – 
from applying “shell shock” as they saw fit.59 Once the proverbial genie was out of the bottle it 
proved difficult to contain. In spite of authorities’ attempts the term remained in circulation by 
both physicians and soldiers throughout the rest of the war, becoming in one sense a medical 
condition, and in another sense a metaphor for the physical, spiritual, and mental traumas of the 
Great War.
60
 Shell shock’s resonance also supported Paul Fussell’s appraisal of the War’s ability 
to stimulate a shift in consciousness.
61
 In a similar manner to how soldier-authors during the 
Great War utilized literary traditions to rationalize the War’s horrors, shell shock symbolized a 
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physical, mental, and societal attempt to explain the Great War’s effect on the collective psyche. 
Essentially, shell shock became a medical ailment for some and an explanatory device for others.  
 
Shocking Legacies 
 
 
Shell shock’s prominent appearance during the First World War was a turning point in 
the history of psychological trauma. Abram Kardiner, an American psychoanalyst who saw over 
1000 patients with war-related “neurotic disturbances” in the 1920s, wrote in his seminal 1941 
work The Traumatic Neuroses of War: “The neuroses incidental to the great war made the world 
neurosis-minded. They were studied with more care than at any time previously, and the 
literature is encyclopedic.”62 The most salient issues: the need to define “war neuroses;” sorting 
out the legitimately injured from the “effeminate” and malingerers, not just for battle but also for 
pension purposes; reconciling military needs with the reality that modern warfare was inherently 
traumatic for participants; and the role of the press in bringing psychological injuries to public 
consciousness, remained common themes throughout the twentieth century. 
Regardless of physicians’ ostensible success or failure during the war, both psychiatry 
and psychology were visibly strengthened by their wartime use. In Canada, as elsewhere, 
psychiatry was enhanced by its newfound need for services outside of the asylum, its 
traditionally sole locus of practice.
63
 The discipline emerged from the First World War with “a 
new-found sense of professional identity and self-worth, its status and prestige greatly enhanced 
in the public mind.”64 It was, Tom Brown noted, not coincidental that the Canadian National 
Committee for Mental Hygiene (CNCMH), the forerunner of the Canadian Mental Health 
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Association, was formed in 1918.
65
 After the Great War psychiatrists played a leading role in 
deciding many of the issues noted above, namely defining war neuroses, aiding governments in 
pension decisions, and modifying programs for mentally ill veterans. Leaders in the fledgling 
Canadian mental health field took steps to ensure their position was secured and enlarged. One of 
the first aims listed for the newly formed CNCMH was, “War Work (a) Psychiatric examination 
of recruits [and] (b) Adequate care of returned soldiers suffering from mental disabilities.”66 A 
February 1918 article on the CNCMH’s formation in the home of a Mrs. Dunlap highlighted the 
Committee’s ambitious aims: “[the study of] problems of mental health, nervous and mental 
disorders, mental deficiency, epilepsy, inebriety, and the mental factors involved in crime, 
prostitution, pauperism, immigration and the like.”67 Among the many luminaries present at the 
formation were: Dr. C.K. Clarke, Dean of Medicine and Professor of Psychiatry at the University 
of Toronto; Clifford Beers, founder of the American National Committee for Mental Hygiene; 
Dr. E.A. Bott, later head of the Psychology Department at the University of Toronto and 
specialist in aviation psychology for the Royal Canadian Air Force in World War Two; and the 
aforementioned Great War neurologist and shell shock expert Colonel Colin Russel.
68
 Top 
officials in the postwar mental health professions had a strong connection to the military. For 
many it proved to be a training ground for testing out new ideas and gaining credibility as 
experts on a wide range of non-military issues.  
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Politics, Manliness, and Pensions 
 
 
While the mental health professions benefitted from the war’s effect in stimulating 
academic interest in the mind, the frontline soldier’s experience with shell shock became an 
individual and collective trauma planted deeply enough that forgetting the war was often 
impossible. For those lucky enough to escape death or physical injury there were the lingering 
effects of witnessing carnage and destruction on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The work of 
shell-shocked British poets Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon, and most famously in the 
Canadian context John McCrae’s “In Flanders Fields,” were testaments to a war that haunted 
many of its participants for the rest of their days.
69
 Even civilians were fascinated by shell shock 
and attempted to distill its essence in print, a trend exemplified in the interwar period by the 
character Septimus Warren Smith in Virginia Woolf’s 1925 novel Mrs. Dalloway. In the book, 
Smith, a First World War veteran suffering from shell shock, commits suicide after experiencing 
postwar hallucinations and receiving the news he is to be involuntarily committed to an 
asylum.
70
 Though fictional, Smith’s story was representative of the ghosts that haunted numerous 
veterans upon their return home. Cultural depictions of veterans’ lingering trauma played an 
important role in helping postwar societies come to terms with the Great War’s immense 
destruction and sense of loss. Crucially, they also underpinned political discussions about the 
veteran’s role in postwar society. Lastly, books like Mrs Dalloway highlighted that for many 
men the war’s end only signified the beginning of the “second battle” – reintegration to civilian 
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society and the fight for financial compensation. For those whose minds were temporarily or 
permanently affected by the war, that battle was made much more difficult.  
The Great War produced thousands of veterans who returned physically and mentally 
wounded, and the question of what constituted a legitimate injury was a thorny issue after the 
1918 Armistice. In Canada, as in other combatant nations, the return of wounded soldiers greatly 
strained the already fragile socio-economic order. Unlike in previous wars, such as the Second 
Anglo-Boer War, when disease far outstripped the number of soldiers killed in battle, the First 
World War was unique because the majority of sick and wounded troops returned home alive.
71
 
The sheer scale of returning men compounded a problem that existed because, “Pensions, 
bounty, [and] kindred issues hardly rippled the surface before 1914.”72 Nevertheless, as early as 
1915, Canadian officials outlined a program for retraining and rehabilitating soldiers, first 
through the Military Hospitals Commission (MHC) and by October 1915 the Military Hospitals 
and Convalescent Homes Commission (MHCHC).
73
 The Commission provided medical care, 
vocational training, and occupational therapy, with the goal being veterans’ future independence 
and employability; a purported win-win for both parties. Despite a large number who benefited 
from the program, in 1919, the year the Pension Act received royal assent, Canada had 42,932 
disability pensioners, and by 1939 their number had grown to 80,103. Pensions were a great 
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financial strain on the federal government, and proved to be a controversial issue throughout the 
interwar period.
74
  
Canadian federal officials attempted to steer a path between Britain’s perceived 
conservative approach towards veterans’ pensions and the “pension evil” that followed the end 
of the Civil War in the United States just over fifty years prior. In the former case, Canadians 
visiting Britain before 1914 remembered veterans begging on street corners, while in the United 
States a more liberal approach to pensions had led to many abuses. So-called “deathbed 
marriages” and a proliferation of claims agents and pension attorneys looking to make their 
fortune through exploiting loopholes in the system, supposedly on behalf of their clients, meant 
that by 1914 one-fifth of U.S. federal spending was earmarked for veterans’ pensions.75 The 
Canadian government aimed to avoid both outcomes. The creation of the MHC and its future 
incarnations represented an eclectic approach that attempted to balance veterans’ needs and the 
nation’s obligation to them with a desire to save money wherever possible. Keeping pension 
costs down and ensuring the public treasury was protected meant taking a firm stance on the 
question of deserving and undeserving veterans. Unfortunately for numerous veterans, the 
ostensibly objective approach of pension officials and advising physicians was often coloured 
with contemporary moral judgements about masculinity and a prevailing middle-class doctrine 
of industry and adaptability. Canada was far from European battlefields, and though Canadians 
read about the horrors of trench warfare, many still viewed veterans unable to gain or keep 
employment as evidence of the traditional “fecklessness of soldiers.”76 Their attitude reflected 
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historical middle-class views of the traditional soldier: a working-class man, usually of criminal 
temperament, who in Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald’s opinion was only skilled at 
hunting, drinking, and chasing women.
77
  
During the interwar period, when an ostensibly injured veteran appeared before a pension 
board the biggest single concern for officials was “attributability” – whether or not the injury 
was attributable to war service.
78
 While on the surface a seemingly easy question, the open-
ended interpretation of attributability led down many paths. In their 1987 work Winning the 
Second Battle historians Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright succinctly stated the issue’s 
intricacies: “Disability might be an objective medical question; how far the disability was 
‘attributable’ to service was a matter of almost metaphysical complexity.”79 Visibly disabled 
soldiers who lost a limb or suffered gunshot wounds could be quickly assessed and classified on 
a pension scale, but many injuries were not as easily pigeonholed.
80
 As but one example Morton 
and Wright cited soldiers who contracted syphilis overseas. Pension officials perhaps rightly 
questioned whether or not soldiers could attribute venereal disease to war service.
81
      
Throughout and after the Great War, even more than physical injuries, mental illness 
constituted a troublesome category for the Commission and its later forms, the Department of 
Soldiers’ Civil Reestablishment (DSCR) and the Department of Pensions and National Health 
(DPNH). That trouble was partially due to returning soldiers who suffered war-related trauma 
and partially to lax enlistment standards that allowed “obviously insane” recruits to sign up for 
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the CEF.
82
 While the provincial and federal bureaucracies argued over the cost and responsibility 
of sending them to an asylum, the public and veterans’ associations objected to such measures 
because they believed veterans driven to chronic mental illness by war deserved more than 
overcrowded, neglectful, and stigmatizing mental institutions.
83
 In the case of shell-shocked 
soldiers, anger over sending them to mix with incurable civilian patients, many of whom were at 
that time the senile elderly and chronic schizophrenics, eventually convinced the Commission to 
utilize a former mental hospital at Cobourg, Ontario as a centre for shell shock sufferers. The 
irony of housing veterans in a former civilian asylum, and the treatment methods employed, 
many of which resembled traditional asylum methods, was lost on Commission officials.
84
 At 
Cobourg the treatment regimen ranged from benign therapy like sports to more intense measures 
such as electroshock, the latter often utilized to help “will” the veteran back to good health.85 
Public sympathy and advocacy by groups like the Great War Veterans Association, one of the 
forerunners of the Royal Canadian Legion, helped to find places for the severely affected, but the 
compensation issue was much more complex.  
Military and cultural historians Terry Copp and Mark Humphries succinctly summed up 
the Canadian interwar pension situation for shell shock sufferers, indicating that the pension 
issue “made sure that the debate over the aetiology [cause] of shell shock remained at the front 
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and centre of the [medico-legal] discourse. After all, if shell shock was due to bursting shells or 
noxious gases, surely a soldier’s disability was attributable to war. If it were due to some innate 
weakness of character or defect in biology, on the other hand, the state would be spared a 
significant burden.”86 Limited medical knowledge and a desire to control costs combined to 
ensure that physicians and pension officials fell back on hereditary and/or character flaws to 
deny “attributability.”87 They essentially explained shell shock victims’ inability to engage in a 
productive postwar life as self-induced malingering.
88
 Russel, the CEF’s chief shell shock 
specialist cited earlier, believed shell-shocked soldiers willed themselves to sickness. In such 
cases, by providing pensions the government only encouraged their inappropriate behaviour and 
continued dependence on the state.
89
 That strategy allowed officials to reduce pension costs and, 
in their minds, renew veterans’ desire for gainful employment.90 Numerous physicians viewed 
their encounter with shell-shocked men as a symbolic battle in which the former must be 
victorious.
91
 Essentially, “Whether doctors took them seriously or dismissed them as cowardly 
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malingerers, the consequences were virtually identical.”92 Physicians did acknowledge that some 
veterans were so severely affected they could never be employed or care for themselves again. 
For that category they recommended asylum committal. The remainder were left to convince 
pension officials their inability to reintegrate was a result of war trauma rather than their own 
innate, personal flaws. 
At a societal level, pension seeking for wartime trauma was in and of itself viewed by 
many as a transgression of social norms, namely masculine codes that required men to be 
“aggressive, self-reliant, and un-emotional.”93 Mark Humphries’ research with Canadian 
veterans’ pension documents showed that even soldiers whose diagnosis had verified them as 
“real men” in wartime were often refused state assistance in the postwar period.94 The reason, 
beyond cold economic concerns, was that, crudely stated: “Real men did not break down, nor did 
they allow their emotions to interfere with their manly duty as breadwinners and providers.”95 
Constructed thus, the Board of Pension Commissioners, responsible for granting and reviewing 
pension claims, utilized ostensibly objective medical science to bolster beliefs that “shell shock,” 
“neurasthenia,” and other categories of psychological illness were the result of character defects, 
most often of a hereditary or dispositional nature.  
The Board’s approach drew not just on medicine and psychology, but also longstanding 
lay perceptions and constructions of manliness. Educational historian Mark Moss’ 2001 work on 
the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth century education of young boys in Ontario – a province 
that produced almost half of CEF volunteers – revealed that a host of secular organizations such 
as the YMCA, Boy Scouts, patriotic clubs, libraries, and schools instilled in young boys a belief 
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that the ultimate test of manliness was war.
96
 In a society undergoing vast socio-economic 
changes war was “an antidote to the crisis of masculinity, the fear of being perceived as 
effeminate, the plague of luxury and materialism, [and] the changes brought about by 
industrialism and the feminization of society.”97 Seen against this historical backdrop, doctors’ 
hesitancy about legitimizing war trauma was both an expression and reinforcement of societal 
norms. Put simply, to be unduly affected after the war’s end meant failure as a man. Physicians 
were ultimately concerned with perpetuating social norms, protecting the socio-economic order, 
and ensuring their continued place as experts in pension questions.
98
 Their assessments were 
based more on professional interests and predominant middle-class beliefs than objective 
medical science.
99
  
One of the unfortunate results of government and medicine’s partnership in the interwar 
period was that, “thousands of legitimately traumatized veterans were left uncompensated by the 
state and were constructed as inferior, feminized men.”100 While psychologically injured 
veterans’ losses were measurable in denied compensation, their difficulties were also less 
tangibly evident in a rejection and humiliation received at the hands of pension officials and 
physicians. Throughout the interwar period the number of veterans manifesting psychological 
problems increased, particularly as the Depression set in. Many were confined in public asylums 
across the country, leaving them suffering in silence amidst other mentally ill patients and 
forcing their families to contend with the socio-economic difficulties of losing a father, husband, 
brother, or son. The rest, haunted by war but uncompensated in peacetime, were granted “the 
                                                          
96
 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 15. 
97
 Ibid., 143; Those fears were based to some degree on an “increasingly visible and vociferous women’s movement 
[that] accentuated self-doubt.” See ibid, 110; Worries about societal decline and men’s effeminization were also 
thoroughly covered in a European context by Micale. See Mark Micale, Hysterical Men, passim. 
98
 Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow,” 530. 
99
 Copp and Humphries, Combat Stress, 91. 
100
 Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow,” 503. 
  
56 
 
renewed privilege of fending for themselves in a business-like, profit-driven society.”101 When 
shell shock pensions were awarded – a rare occurrence – they were often only granted for six 
months to a year, rendering their recipient’s financial troubles ameliorated for only a brief 
duration.
102
 It must be acknowledged that for the vast majority of returned soldiers, life after 
1918 resumed with old or new employment and eventually progressed into a stable rhythm.
103
 
But for the thousands of psychologically affected veterans, postwar life provided a continuous 
challenge made all the more difficult by their lingering wartime memories.  
The First World War brought trauma to the forefront in an unprecedented manner. Those 
who bore psychological war wounds – individual soldiers – were the most affected. A mixture of 
socio-economic conservatism and postwar anxieties, fueled by the Depression, ensured Canadian 
veterans were provided with a firm message from government and physicians that the best cure 
for their ills was a “brisk immersion in civilian life.”104 Pension officials and physicians were, 
Morton and Wright argued, “Men of their time, as convinced of the virtues of economic 
individualism as they were of scientific expertise. For able-bodied veterans, they believed, a 
swift transition to civilian self-sufficiency and their breadwinner role was the best way to remove 
the vestiges of soldierly dependency. Even for the disabled, the transition must be as swift as 
possible.”105 Colloquially put, contemporaries believed that an age-old “pull yourself up by your 
bootstraps” mentality and return to their role as breadwinners would sort out veterans’ problems.  
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Shell-shocked veterans, the “worst off” of those seeking pensions, had a difficult road, as 
their unseen injuries caused physicians and much of the lay public to designate them shirkers, 
malingerers, and inferior men.
106
 In an era far removed from the standard double-income family 
of the twenty-first century, an early twentieth century man’s competence as a father and husband 
was intimately tied to his ability to provide.
107
 As the sole family breadwinner, a veteran unable 
to provide for his family was not only viewed as a weak character, but also a failure as a man. 
Rigid standards of masculine behaviour and comportment, including a strong work ethic and 
willpower, were seen as crucial for maintaining the social order.
108
 Nervousness, exemplified in 
the shell-shocked veteran, was deemed the behaviour of “weak and womanly men” and seen as a 
threat to society.
109
 Thus, the “nervous” man remained a “principal foe of manliness” throughout 
the early twentieth century and beyond.
110
     
Physicians and researchers studying “war neuroses,” on the other hand, greatly benefitted 
from the war, establishing themselves as the go-to experts on psychiatric/psychological illness, 
despite the evident lack of progression in definition or “cure.” With the emphasis placed on 
veterans’ heredity, predisposition, and character, the examination of individual case histories 
became invaluable for pension officials to separate the deserving from undeserving. Physicians 
were the natural experts for that task. For historians of trauma, the most pertinent legacies were 
the issues shell shock framed for future decades: The perceived causes of, and medical debates 
over trauma; the medico-psychological community’s role in defining such debates; the socio-
economic considerations tied to traumatized soldiers, i.e. pensions and treatment, both of which 
became a public concern; and lastly, challenges to views of the ideal soldier and man that trauma 
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brought to light. As the interwar period progressed and the Depression took hold, the public’s 
focus was on basic necessities like food and employment. Shell-shocked veterans, whether in the 
asylum or struggling with civilian life, faded into the background. It took another war to bring 
discussions of trauma back into the public spotlight.  
 
From Shock to Exhaustion 
 
When the Allied nations entered the Second World War they had to re-establish many of 
the techniques used in “forward” psychiatry toward the end of the Great War.111 During the 
enormous demobilization that took place after 1918, the relationship between psychiatrists and 
the military had largely disintegrated and thus had to be rebuilt.
112
 War neurosis, or “battle 
exhaustion” as shell shock was rebranded in 1943, was initially dismissed as a significant 
concern in the Second World War, partly because combat in 1939-1940 was swift and decisive, 
leaving little time to set up organized structures for dealing with mental casualties. Allan Young 
characterized the classification of war neuroses in the Second World War as “too confusing to be 
properly interpreted by historians” and without a “Rosetta stone” to provide clear translation.113 
Likewise in his 2007 essay on battle exhaustion in the Canadian Army during the Second World 
War, former CAF Reservist and Afghanistan veteran Ryan Flavelle opined, “Battle exhaustion is 
an easy condition to be sympathetic to, but a much more difficult one to understand.”114 
Historians have long been challenged by the term’s vague nature as well as the manner in which, 
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like shell shock, battle exhaustion provided a blanket diagnosis for numerous manifestations of 
anxiety. Nevertheless, generalizations can be made. While during the early stages of the First 
World War shell shock was deemed the result of physical factors, by the Second World War the 
“pendulum had swung almost entirely in the other direction.”115 In 1939 most physicians 
believed war neuroses originated in the mind (psychogenic).
116
  
As in the First World War, most military officers tried to reject psychiatrists’ integration 
within the military hierarchy. Their rationale was by then well-established: Whatever the chosen 
term, psychiatrically-sanctioned war neurosis provided soldiers an alternative to fighting.
117
 
Resistance was also partly based on a social-psychological and sociological approach to human 
behaviour that developed between the wars and placed importance on strong leadership and 
primary group relationships – in the military’s case, a strong esprit de corps.118 Military officers 
believed a strongly led and tightly-knit group was less likely to break in combat, thus preventing 
psychological breakdowns as well. That approach also had medical backing. Influential journals 
like the Lancet promoted the idea that a man’s constitution and connection to the unit were 
paramount in determining his likelihood of cracking during or after combat.
119
 But in spite of 
military leaders’ apprehension, the long, intermittent, and brutal nature of the Second World War 
meant that psychiatrists and psychologists were eventually perceived as an unwanted but 
necessary part of casualty management.
120
   
A few researchers noticed early in the war that trauma was again becoming a focal point 
of discussion. American psychoanalyst and Sigmund Freud devotee Abram Kardiner stated in his 
1941 work The Traumatic Neuroses of War that with regards to manifestations of war neurosis in 
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soldiers of the Second World War, “the symptomatology [symptom profile] of this syndrome is 
no different today than it was during the last war.”121 Like numerous colleagues, he believed that 
modern war “introduced certain conditions conducive to neuroses in those so predisposed.”122 
Kardiner’s research and work with traumatized soldiers convinced him that in every war there 
were soldiers who suffered long-term psychological effects. He was unequivocal in his statement 
that, “One of the certainties with which a warring nation must contend is that at the termination 
of the conflict there will be a considerable number of problems dealing with those soldiers who 
return more or less damaged.”123 For psychiatrists and psychologists the debate still hinged on 
whether the persistent character of psychological trauma in some soldiers was due to 
predisposition, by 1939 largely tied to life-history and upbringing, or whether every man had a 
breaking point.   
Despite its prescience Kardiner’s book went largely unnoticed for three more decades.124 
In the military milieu, the potentially troublesome nature of trauma was downplayed by medical 
officers and leaders who believed that well-trained units minimized mental breakdowns, even in 
sustained bouts of combat.
125
 If breakdowns did occur, soldiers were to be treated close to the 
front with rest, an immediate medical response to the trauma, reassurance from physicians about 
their prognosis, and firmness about their duty to return to combat. That method, developed 
during the second half of the First World War, became known as the PIE system (Proximity of 
treatment to the battlefield, Immediacy of response, Expectancy of a rapid return to the unit and 
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recovery.
126
 PIE was used with some success in the later stages of the First World War, again in 
the Second World War, and is still a generally accepted system in use by militaries in the twenty-
first century.
127
 Under such a system, army officers believed no specialists were needed, except 
for serious cases treatable by distant neuropsychiatric hospital units.
128
 For the military what 
mattered most was, as always, preserving manpower. Psychiatrists were disruptive to this goal 
because they removed men who, in officers’ eyes, simply needed a quick rest and firm pat on the 
back. Even Winston Churchill was skeptical of wartime psychiatry, believing psychiatrists to be 
a burden on the army and their work capable of descending into “charlatanry.”129    
 
A Rude Awakening 
     
 
The British at Dunkirk in May 1940 were the first Commonwealth nation to feel the full 
brunt of war, and the psychological effects on surviving soldiers provided clues that even 
seemingly “normal” and well-trained individuals could break under intense pressure. Pushed by 
the Germans back to the French port of Dunkirk, 250,000 British Expeditionary Force troops 
waited for evacuation while enduring sleeplessness, shelling, and bombing by German Stuka 
dive bombers. The effects on men’s psyches were evident: one soldier proclaiming he was 
Mahatma Gandhi and another remaining absolutely still while protecting an imaginary basket of 
eggs were just a few examples of the troops who had reached their breaking point.
130
 Dunkirk 
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tested the assumption that no forward psychiatrists were needed. It also poked holes in the view 
that combat breakdowns were attributable to a soldier’s weak disposition.131 
On 6 July 1940 William Sargant and Eliot Slater, two civilian physicians working for the 
Sutton Emergency Hospital in London, published a report on the treatment of military war 
neuroses seen after Dunkirk.
132
 They made an important distinction between “acute shell shock” 
seen after Dunkirk in numerous seemingly normal men, and neuroses seen in soldiers during the 
Phoney War before May of 1940. Their study generated interesting insights: First, they 
recognized that under enough physical and mental strain, and numerous traumatic events such as 
the sight of dying comrades, even men with solid work records, high intelligence, and normal 
personalities could “crack.” Second, they noted that even with regard to intense anxiety states the 
symptoms were usually of a short duration. Lastly, they wrote that the longer soldiers’ symptoms 
were allowed to persist without treatment the greater the chance their thoughts and behaviour 
patterns became ingrained.
133
 Sargant and Slater’s treatment plan involved inducing a hypnotic 
state in patients with the widely used sedative, sodium amytal, after which time they attempted a 
“recovery of amnesia,” a “reinforcement of suggestion,” and “the relief of hysterical 
symptoms.”134 Psychiatrists believed that method helped the patient relive and work through the 
repressed traumatic events – a process called abreaction – while also preventing the nervous 
system from incurring further stress. In a publication several decades later, Sargant expressed his 
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belief that Dunkirk demonstrated the folly of trying to quickly “patch up” soldiers and send them 
out to battle again, given that battle was what caused their break down in the first place. Citing 
the First World War, he pointed out that even the threat of firing squad and execution of those 
deemed cowards was not enough to prevent break down in soldiers under intense and continuous 
stress.
135
  
After Dunkirk, it was not until a few years later, during the battles in the Middle East and 
North Africa, that the British Army was forced to acknowledge that a number of men were 
breaking down due to what they believed was fatigue and nervous exhaustion.
136
 British Army 
Consultant Psychiatrist G.W.B. James, a veteran of the Somme and Passchendaele, encountered 
a situation when he arrived in 1940 that reminded him of the early First World War. He was 
dismayed to find no “modern” program for psychiatric casualties, and felt that army physicians 
“had no conception of breakdown in war and its treatments, though many of them had served in 
the 1914-18 war.”137 By 1942, when forward psychiatry was finally put in place, he was certain 
there were limitations on what a soldier could endure. Convinced by his examination of fifty 
psychiatric casualties in July 1942 that much of the problem stemmed from the physical toll of 
modern warfare (and especially the desert) on a soldier, he changed use of the term “Not Yet 
Diagnosed – Nervous (NYDN)” to “physical exhaustion,” and then to “battle exhaustion.” 
Similar to how shell shock captured the shattering effect of shells on soldiers’ bodies and minds 
during the First World War, battle exhaustion encompassed and symbolized the physically and 
mentally exhausting effects of the Second World War on infantrymen.
138
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Although the British Army was forced to accept the reality of battle exhaustion and other 
forms of mental breakdown among troops, it did so very grudgingly, assigning battlefield 
psychiatry a very low priority throughout the war. Among General (later Field Marshal) Bernard 
Montgomery’s staff, as but one example, there was a prevailing belief that psychiatry was 
something akin to witchcraft.
139
 Thus, for the war’s duration, despite occasions such as in July 
1944 when a group of infantry in Montgomery’s 21 Army Group suffered a 25% battle 
exhaustion casualty rate, military leaders continued to attribute mental breakdowns more to 
swings in morale from a long, tough campaign, rather than to the nature of combat.
140
 There was 
a link between the duration and intensity of battle, troops’ experience level, and the number of 
battle exhaustion diagnoses, but the military had a desire to downplay numbers. In a testament to 
the resilience of the human mind and spirit, most symptoms of trauma, as predicted by Sargant, 
were relatively short in duration; or so it seemed.  
Military leaders’ optimism about battle exhaustion rates also reflected a hitherto 
unmentioned development of the interwar and early Second World War period. While 
psychiatrists were busy digesting the lessons of the First World War during the post-1918 years, 
psychologists were equally busy researching human behaviour, and more importantly for any use 
in a military context, developing tests to screen out those “predisposed” to breakdown. Simply 
put, while psychiatrists focused on emotional and behavioural pathology, psychologists claimed 
expertise on normalcy and personality development.
141
 Given an adherence by numerous 
psychologists to the hypothesis that breakdowns could be accurately predicted by personal and 
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family histories as well as deviant behaviours like drug use, they affirmed that with proper 
testing most of the “unfit” men could be weeded out before induction. That approach, in theory, 
saved the military time and money on training “neurotic” men and lowered the incidence of 
mental breakdown in combat. The problem with such a belief though, was that it conflated two 
different issues: stress and mental disorder, and mental “deficiency” and mental disorder.142 A 
seemingly normal man breaking down because he “had enough” or because he was exposed to 
traumatizing events was different in kind from an individual with a pre-existing, latent mental 
disorder cracking because he was inherently less able to cope with mental duress. Sargant and 
Slater’s distinction between “acute shell shock” and “neurosis” was an important one, since it 
made clear that many men who had broken down during the Phoney War (in which no combat 
was seen) were not of the same category as those who had been unable to continue because of 
trauma. Unfortunately, it was easy to confuse the two, and researchers were limited in their 
ability to neatly categorize the myriad ways in which mental capacity and behaviour expressed 
themselves. 
 Both the British and Canadian armies rejected intelligence testing and psychiatric 
assessment for recruits at the beginning of the war.
143
 Each nation went in its own direction, but 
they shared some general beliefs and trends. Physicians took away from the First World War the 
lesson that a rigorous selection process was necessary due to the number of ostensible “misfit” 
men who made it into uniform, but putting measures into place to prevent a similar recurrence 
was a mammoth task. Questions such as what criteria should be used to assess a man’s fortitude 
for service, and whether that assessment should be made by an army officer, military physician, 
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or a civilian psychologist, were thorny.
144
 Military leaders at first opted for the safest option for 
bringing in the highest number of troops, which was no testing or screening at all. In the 
Canadian case, the decision to forego screening measures was a reflection of the medical 
profession’s attitude toward psychiatry and psychology. The majority of civilian and military 
doctors believed that well-trained physicians, particularly those with previous war service, could 
evaluate a soldier’s character and fortitude just as effectively as specialists.145 Dr. John Griffin, 
long-time CMHA president and consultant to psychiatrist Brock Chisholm during the war, stated 
that “The medical profession, including those in Canadian Medical Corps ... seemed even anti-
psychiatric in attitude.”146  Thus, when the Canadian military entered the war, leaders believed 
their own selection process, which consisted of a very rudimentary screening that inadvertently 
put men with mental illness and physical disabilities into uniform, was sufficient.
147
    
The British Army initially approached personnel screening with similar attitudes, and was 
the first to see its consequences. After Dunkirk, the British implemented a testing and screening 
program with the help of psychiatrists and psychologists, partly in response to criticism from 
publications like the Lancet, which claimed that more men were breaking down from pre-
existing neurotic disorders than from combat; an obvious indicator that the Army’s ad hoc 
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screening method was ineffective.
148
 Psychiatrists in particular gained traction within the British 
Army between 1940 and 1942, “advising on a range of issues that went well beyond usual 
definitions of psychiatry.”149 They were even allowed to create their own medical division at 
Whitehall. Nevertheless, the power of commanders on the ground meant that throughout the war 
psychiatric casualties were dealt with inconsistently and in a manner largely dependent on 
officers’ whims.150 Psychiatrists were, in practice, never entirely welcomed in any Allied army. 
Perhaps the best symbolic – and literal – rejection of psychiatric casualties came from American 
Lieutenant-General George S. Patton Jr., who in 1943 infamously slapped one mentally affected 
soldier with his glove, calling him a “goddamned coward.” One week later he threatened another 
with his pistol and punched the man on the head.
151
 Patton’s frustration partially stemmed from 
the “wastage” that occurred during the Sicily campaign, and his actions exemplified a reticence 
among military leaders to acknowledge the reality of mental casualties, despite mounting 
evidence in both world wars.
152
           
In Canada, psychological testing gained ground in 1941 when Minister of National 
Defence J.L. Ralston took an interest in the potential benefits of intelligence and aptitude 
measurement. By the Second World War psychology and intelligence testing had attained a 
foothold in Canadian schools and social welfare institutions, in part because of its relationship 
with the mental hygiene movement and CNCMH throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
153
 The 
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discipline’s forays into the war effort were a reflection of its incipient growth and influence. E.A. 
Bott, chair of the psychology department at the University of Toronto and president of the newly 
formed Canadian Psychological Association, went to Britain to consult with the Canadian Army 
overseas and report on British research.
154
 Bott later joined the Royal Canadian Air Force, and 
his studies on Canadian aircrew, told in great detail in Allan English’s 1996 book The Cream of 
the Crop, came to similar conclusions as numerous army psychiatrists: given enough cumulative 
stress, any man would break, and treating men away from the battlefront turned most “curable” 
patients into chronic cases.
155
 Psychological testing was given its biggest boost when the 
charismatic and larger-than-life Colonel and psychiatrist George Brock Chisholm was put in 
charge of a new directorate of personnel selection in 1941.
156
 
 The directorate was established to create a comprehensive system of personnel selection. 
Its goals were: to classify all Army personnel; identify potential officer material; identify those 
of higher intelligence; uncover “neurotics;” and weed out men deemed to be of lower 
intelligence. The directorate’s aims mirrored several initiatives in civilian circles, and clearly 
expressed psychologists’ expanding ambitions.157 Though a psychiatrist, Chisholm espoused 
many “neo-Freudian theories of sexuality” and as an adherent of the mental hygiene movement 
saw psychology’s value in preventing “mental weaklings” from entering the Army.158 
Chisholm’s plan was not without controversy though, and revealed professional jockeying 
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between psychologists and psychiatrists. Colin Russel, the shell shock expert, was now 
Consulting Neuropsychiatrist to the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (RCAMC) and 
believed that the number of men referred for psychiatric examination based on their 
psychological test results was excessive.
159
 It was his opinion that psychologists were better 
suited to identifying and reassigning men who, based on perceived capabilities, were being 
misused by the Army. Put another way, he intimated that psychologists were out of their 
depth.
160
 Somewhat chastened by his experiences, Russel was convinced that attempting to 
identify potential “neurotics” through psychological testing was a fruitless endeavour.161  
Nonetheless, the support psychological testing received from Chisholm and Ottawa 
meant that in 1942 personnel selection officers were given a mammoth task: conduct a 
psychological examination and psychiatric history covering family, school, employment, and 
other factors such as sexual adjustment, of all Canadian troops overseas.
162
 Chisholm, who was 
no stranger to controversy, believed an undue feminine influence during childhood rearing was a 
prime reason numerous men were unfit for military service. In two speeches on 11 February 
1944 given before the Rotary Club and Welfare Council of Toronto, he affirmed: “Too many 
women are bringing up too many boys on women’s values.”163 He argued women were “not 
oriented toward society. They are oriented toward men.” That orientation, in his estimation, 
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weakened men’s sense of obligation to their community and made women a liability, particularly 
in wartime. Thus weakening mothers’ influence over men was the best strategy for helping 
recruits adjust to army life.
164
 Given women’s extensive involvement in the war effort, 
Chisholm’s opinions unsurprisingly caused a “furor stirred in women’s circles,” many of whom 
felt he had denigrated their contributions.
165
 The subsequent fallout led Defence Minister Ralston 
to make a “clarification” in the House of Commons on Chisholm’s behalf.   
In a Globe and Mail article covering the controversy several days later, the author 
defended Chisholm’s view, stating, “The records of this war indicate that, emotionally and 
psychologically, many young Canadians went into uniform badly equipped for war.”166 Echoing 
Chisholm’s earlier statements, the author continued: “It has been pretty well established by the 
psychiatrists, in their search for weaknesses which develop in later life, that some men are the 
victim of a ‘mother complex.’”167 The result was that “today cases of war neurosis are treated 
according to the basic causes, often present in the individual from early childhood.”168 Evidently, 
Chisholm’s theories of childhood development and women’s influence on a soldier’s 
psychological profile had supporters among the lay public. Statements about the negative 
influence of overbearing mothers helped relocate the blame for war-related mental disorder from 
traumatic wartime events to individual failings, and at a societal level, to the women who 
predisposed men to their failed masculinity.
169
 Thus, in the mood of optimism about the 
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“progress in the 20 years between the two wars,” Chisholm and his supporters decided to 
proceed with psychological testing and a combing of soldiers’ life histories, to find out those 
who bore the mark of excess femininity and mental weakness.
170
  
In practice though, many psychologists and psychiatrists were tolerant of difference and 
exercised circumspection about the varying degrees of masculinity, as well as shrewd suspicions 
about the connection between men’s subjectively assessed masculinity and its use as a prediction 
of combat performance. As the war progressed, it became clear that ostensibly “feminine” men 
often performed well in combat, and conversely, “masculine” men sometimes failed the test of 
war. Historian Paul Jackson’s work on homosexuality in the Canadian military during the 
Second World War demonstrated that throughout the war, particularly in 1944 and beyond as 
frontline manpower became a concern, psychiatrists often looked the other way, even when 
faced with openly homosexual and “effeminate” recruits. Likewise homosexuals who had been 
tested in battle and proved themselves good soldiers were often spared medical discharge, even 
in cases when their homosexuality became known to physicians and was no longer an open 
secret known only within their unit.
171
 Despite official policies that were hostile to homosexual 
men and women within the military, homosexuals were usually deemed too valuable to the war 
effort to be considered a problem unless their behaviour was particularly egregious or it became 
a scandal for officers and higher authorities.
172
 Psychiatrists’ handling of homosexuality was a 
reminder that arbitrary assessments of a man’s character, especially those involving judgements 
about masculinity and femininity, were fluid, and the way a soldier performed in battle and his 
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value to the unit were the prime factors in whether or not his “femininity” became a problem for 
authorities.
173
  
When Chisholm was appointed Director General of Medical Services in 1942, and later 
Deputy Minister of Health, it was clear his star, and his views, were on the rise. In 1943, 
personnel selection officers were ready to “reclassify” and re-examine the entire Canadian Army 
overseas, but the plan was scuttled when the tides of war sent the 1 Canadian Division to the 
Mediterranean and other units became focused on training for Operation Overlord, the future D-
Day landings.
174
 
The Canadian military and Ottawa were not oblivious to psychological trauma and 
psychiatric casualties prior to Canada’s engagement in combat.175 Only five months into the war, 
in January 1940, Ottawa announced the planned establishment of a neurological hospital behind 
the front lines in France, a “spearhead of a scientific drive to reduce the heavy toll taken by 
nervous disorders in wartime.”176 The hospital was to include several prominent Toronto and 
Montreal doctors and nurses. It was to be headed by Colin Russel, then neurological consultant 
to the Medical Services and professor of neurology at McGill, and was to treat both brain injuries 
and nervous disorders.
177
 Medical authorities believed the hospital would be “an important factor 
in reducing postwar pension costs.”178 Reflecting perceived advances since the Great War and 
perceptions of neuropsychiatry’s role as preventive medicine, they affirmed that, “men suffering 
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from various types of hysteria who in the last war spent months and even years in hospitals will 
this time be discharged fully fit for duty in a matter of days.”179 The author cited the example of 
a neurological hospital for Canadian troops in England set up toward the end of the First World 
War, noting that 71% of cases were able to return to full duty in six months. Similar results were 
expected in 1940.
180
 Reinforcing the primacy of early treatment in ensuring recovery, the article 
summarized the specialist’s crucial role in that process: “[T]o give the patient a new philosophy 
to overcome his troubles before something, which doesn’t exist physically, succeeds in making a 
physical wreck of a man.”181   
For Russel, the “secret of psychotherapy” and cure for battle exhaustion was a “mental 
contest resulting in the victory of the physician.”182 As was so often the case in both world wars, 
unforeseen events changed the Army’s best laid plans, and several months later the German 
Blitzkrieg swept the Allied forces off the continent. Russel and his staff, who arrived in Britain 
just as the Dunkirk evacuation was taking place, were instead located in a spacious mansion near 
Basingstoke in Hampshire, England. The 200 bed hospital they established there became known 
as No. 1 Neurological and Neurosurgical Hospital, or simply Basingstoke.
183
 Colloquially, many 
troops referred to Russel, his colleagues and the hospital itself as “No. 1 Nuts.”184 Their original 
structure as a mobile hospital accompanying the Army was altered, and they instead found 
themselves treating civilian victims of the Blitz, Dunkirk evacuees, and Canadian soldiers 
injured (and psychologically affected) by the numerous motorbike accidents that occurred during 
the night time blackout. Those early experiences, many with civilians and soldiers who had not 
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seen combat, convinced Russel and his staff that their belief in the predisposition hypothesis of 
neuroses was correct.
185
 If men broke down without seeing battle, it stood to reason that the 
cause of their illness must stem from “constitutional predisposition.”  
                                                          
185
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CHAPTER 2: BATTLE EXHAUSTION AND MEDICAL MOVEMENTS 
 
The question at issue is of some consequence in war. If a man is rested in time will he have another summer of high 
achievement, or if that is only a forlorn hope is it more sensible to cut losses? To put it differently, can a good fellow 
who is showing signs of wear and tear come back?
1
 
 
 
Although Canadian combat units had little experience until the Sicily campaign in 1943, 
their grueling battles in the Mediterranean and Western Europe after D-Day caused numerous 
troops to end up mental casualties, in spite of initial optimism among military leaders and 
medical men. During the Italian campaign alone, the Canadian Army suffered 5020 
neuropsychiatric casualties, out of a total of 25,090 casualties.
2
 Canadian author Farley Mowat, a 
second lieutenant in The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (the “Hasty Ps”), wrote a first-
hand account of his regiment’s duress in his 1955 book The Regiment, and later his 1979 memoir 
And No Birds Sang.
3
 In The Regiment, Mowat made direct reference to witnessing his comrades 
visibly affected after a particularly tough battle against German troops during the Moro River 
Campaign in mid-December 1943. He wrote: “These men were beyond pride, beyond praise, 
beyond condemnation. They were empty of all emotions and knew nothing except for a 
stupefying weariness. The medical officers had a term for individuals who had reached the end 
of their tether. They called it ‘battle exhaustion’ and it was a polite term that meant ‘burned 
out.’”4 One could easily read this passage and, save for the term “battle exhaustion,” mistake it 
for a description of the effects that First World War “shell shock” had on numerous men. 
Subsequent to one particularly savage battle, after tallying the regimental deaths, Mowat 
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lamented that, “Physically the exhaustion of the Regiment was just short of total ... Spiritually, 
the wastage had been even greater.”5  
Within Mowat’s books there were numerous examples of traumatic events and their 
effects, including the witnessing of a tank officer struggling to pull himself from a burning tank 
turret – and failing – as the flames consumed him.6 In another passage, Mowat discussed terror’s 
effect on a soldier who took refuge in a nearby house to escape enemy shells: “Under the stairs 
was a human being, but not human in its abject terror. It was a soldier, crouched hard against the 
wall, and weeping bitterly and piercingly into cupped hands.”7 He laconically reported the 
reaction of combat-hardened soldiers familiar with such terror, affirming “they, too, did not 
forget.”8 Perhaps most evocative was a description of a thirty-five-year-old stretcher-bearer who 
broke under the strain of battle. Amidst the night-time explosion of mortar bombs, Mowat caught 
sight of the man: “Stark naked, he was striding through the cordite stench with his head held high 
and his arms swinging ... He was singing ‘Home on the Range’ at the top of his lungs. The 
Worm That Never Dies [fear] had taken him.”9 In the days that followed, Mowat noted that 
ambulance jeeps were constantly on the move, and for the first time since the regiment had gone 
to war, “they also carried casualties who bore no visible wounds.”10 He also wrote of how he was 
warned about psychological casualties in a letter from his father, a First World War veteran, who 
called them “the most unfortunate ones” who “had their spiritual feet knocked out from under 
them.” Mowat’s father wrote to him, seemingly with a mixture of pity and anger, that, “The beer 
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halls and gutters are still full of such poor bastards from my war, and nobody understands or 
cares what happened to them.”11  
 
Lessons Slowly Learned 
 
 
Like the poets and novelists of the First World War, Mowat captured the spirit of a war 
that, despite its occasional lighter side (he was keen to also note the humorous moments), left an 
indelible imprint on participants’ minds. As with its allies the Canadian Army entered combat in 
1943 poorly prepared to deal with battle exhaustion, despite its experiences during the First 
World War.
12
 Terminology was also initially chaotic before 1943 and carried pseudo-scientific 
connotations. Many men were labelled “psychopathic personality, inadequate,” “grossly 
inadequate personality,” or “inadequate with added battle neurosis” before battle exhaustion 
became the preferred diagnosis.
13
 Rather than the Second World War being a watershed moment 
in the way that psychological trauma and casualties were understood, the official medical history 
of the war expressed that the same diagnostic and treatment methods of 1914 to 1918 were 
retrieved and slightly advanced.
14
 In fact, when the 1 Canadian Infantry Division went to action 
in Sicily in 1943, its preparation for mental casualties consisted of one psychiatrist.
15
 What was 
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unique about the Second World War was that psychiatrists were, when present, more closely 
attached to the division and their relationship with the administrative authorities was tighter.
16
 
Taking their cue from the British, in October 1943 the Assistant Director of Medical 
Services, acting on the advice of neuropsychiatrists, issued instructions that all suspected 
neuropsychiatric cases be labelled with the temporary diagnosis of “exhaustion” (eventually 
“battle exhaustion”) until seen by a specialist.17 That decision was made because the term 
“carried no stigma,” and because, “The term suggested an innocuous curable condition to the 
casualty himself rather than frightening him with psychiatric terminology or making him think 
he suffered from some mental illness of a serious and disabling nature.”18 Authorities and 
psychiatrists were keen to avoid another “shell shock” epidemic. The “exhaustion” label allowed 
a soldier honourable escape from the battlefield while also suggesting his condition was transient 
instead of permanent, since “exhaustion” implied a state of weariness reversible by rest.19 The 
term also had the added bonus of preventing medical officers ignorant of battlefield psychiatry 
from mistakenly diagnosing soldiers suffering from other maladies as psychiatric cases.
20
 
Nevertheless, the recorded occurrence of malarial soldiers being accidentally labelled as 
neuropsychiatric cases demonstrated, among other things, that the multifarious nature of 
psychological trauma could easily be confused as something rather different by non-specialists.
21
  
As with the First World War, it was difficult to appraise psychiatrists’ professional 
success during the Canadian campaigns of 1943 to 1945. In his retrospective survey of Canadian 
military psychiatry in the Mediterranean theatre A.M. Doyle, who served as a psychiatrist 
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attached to the 1 Canadian Division during the war, described his role as being one of a 
“traveler.” He saw few psychiatric casualties in the early stages of the Sicily campaign, but as 
fighting intensified on mainland Italy in December 1943 – during the same battles Mowat 
experienced – he recounted that in one twenty-four hour period he saw “57 patients and still did 
not keep abreast of the deluxe.”22 Doyle, for his part, stuck to his guns that most cases were 
predisposed to neuropsychiatric disorder and “should have been weeded out as unfit for combat 
duty long before they got into action.”23 Doyle’s view reflected beliefs in psychological 
predisposition and the need for more rigorous personnel screening, and was echoed in May 1943 
by RCAMC District Psychiatrist Major D.G. McKerracher, who similarly opined that 
“experience has shown that these newly revealed psychiatric disorders invariably existed, at least 
potentially, before the individual was inducted into the army.”24 Unlike numerous colleagues 
who by the war’s end arrived at a consensus that any man had his breaking point, whether 
“normal” or not, Doyle and McKerracher still believed that, “Most of our mistakes have been in 
the direction of trying to keep too many inadequate or neurotic people in positions of stress that 
they cannot endure.”25  
Also clear from Doyle’s account was that psychiatrists were still unwanted participants. 
He commented that although the Sicily campaign was dissatisfactory, he had “at least been 
‘accepted’ when he was given command of a company of #9 Canadian Field Ambulance to take 
them on the assault upon Italy at Reggio.”26 Many officers and physicians still felt psychiatrists 
allowed numerous men to shirk their duties using a “psychiatric escape hatch.”27 It was only with 
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the “especially traumatic time” in Normandy, during which the Canadians suffered exhaustion 
casualty rates as high as 30%, that psychiatrists were finally given respect by medical officers: 
“Like [Charles] Myers on the Somme in 1916, they suddenly found themselves in great demand, 
no longer the mocked pariahs of medicine. The doctors with 2
nd
 Canadian Division, who before 
going to France had declared ‘We will have no psychiatric casualties’ and had refused to 
integrate the psychiatric service into the corps or divisional medical system, now rushed to offer 
the tiny psychiatric staff any help he could.”28 Regardless of any perceived successes or failures, 
by 1945 specialists believed battle exhaustion often occurred in relation to the intensity of 
combat. Moreover, in spite of psychiatrists’ claims, early treatment close to the front and applied 
psychological pressure on a man to return to his unit also proved of little value in many cases.
29
  
 One astonishingly frank description of the battle exhaustion experience was provided by 
Colonel F.H. van Nostrand, Great War veteran and the Canadian Army’s senior psychiatrist in 
1942. In a paper given before the Inter Allied Conference on War Medicine at the Royal Society 
of Medicine in London on 9 July 1945, van Nostrand espoused, “There has probably been more 
muddled thinking and talking in connection with psychiatry than with any other branch of 
medicine ... Even the nomenclature of psychiatric disease has no uniformity, and many of the 
terms have no precise meaning, except to the persons using them ... [This] was a definite 
handicap in setting up a rational psychiatric service in the army.”30 He made it clear that 
psychiatric advances made in the Second World War were better painted in terms of “lessons 
gained” rather than definitive conclusions.  
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Van Nostrand affirmed that the first three years of war taught psychiatrists that in 80% of 
psychiatric cases, there was “definite evidence of constitutional predisposition,” but, unlike many 
of his First World War counterparts, he also pointed out that the next largest group consisted of 
“soldiers of better type who break down because of the cumulative effect of the stresses of 
war.”31 Unfortunately, neither group was salvageable, because, “The first [group] ‘can’t take it’ 
and the second ‘have had it.’”32 Van Nostrand also expressed his belief in the futility of 
personnel selection systems, declaring, “We [psychiatrists] do not believe that any of the tests or 
batteries of tests now employed in testing recruits, accurately measure stability or the ability of 
the man to carry his anxieties without breakdown.”33 Put simply, there was “no psychological 
breathalyser or litmus test.”34   
During his concluding remarks van Nostrand made another frank statement: “I am not 
convinced that psychiatry will ever solve the vast problem of the psychiatric breakdown of 
soldiers during war.”35 His rationale displayed two dichotomies still irreconcilable in the twenty-
first century: First, he saw a “direct conflict” between the needs of the military and the needs of 
the individual soldier as assessed by his physician; second, in essence the attitudes and behaviour 
of the “successful” soldier required a detached mindset at complete odds with all previous 
teachings about personal safety, destruction, and the taking of human life.
36
 He finished with a 
plea “for the adoption of realistic attitudes toward the reactions of normal men and women to the 
stresses of war.”37 In terms of unequivocal knowledge about psychological war trauma, the 
Second World War, like the war before it, ended with a whimper rather than a bang. By placing 
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emphasis on soldiers’ life history and constitutional makeup, the 20% who had “had it” were still 
deemed the exception to the rule.   
   
Medical Knowledge, Masculinity, and Pension Questions  
 
   
The Canadian public was well aware of war’s effect on soldiers’ minds by 1939. Enough 
Canadians had seen shell-shocked veterans firsthand that by the Second World War the term and 
its evocative meaning were part of popular parlance. A 1940 Globe and Mail article discussing a 
downturn in the Saskatchewan wheat market stated that the situation could “be diagnosed as 
‘shell shock.’”38 When the first hospital train brought eighty-nine Canadian war casualties to 
Toronto in August 1941, a reporter noted a “shell shock case” in the crowd, though it is unclear 
how they made that determination.
39
 The public also took a great interest in the care of veterans 
suffering from psychological troubles, as evidenced by letters written to newspapers about the 
subject. One J.A. Kirkwood, expressing indignation at the conditions at Christie Street Veterans’ 
Hospital in Toronto, wrote that it was a sad reflection on Canadian patriotism that German 
prisoners of war were kept “like tourists” in Muskoka, Ontario, while Canadians “shell shocked, 
[and] driven crazy with the awful sights they have seen and experienced” were lodged in a 
hospital no better “than a flophouse.”40 In another instance, Mrs. Jimmie Smith angrily described 
how the Army returned her son to combat despite his evident psychological difficulties. The 
young man was accidentally blown into the air on D-Day by Allied planes and saw his friends 
killed. He suffered from shell shock, but shortly after the event she received word “he was out of 
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the hospital and back in the lines.”41 She quoted a letter from the young man that mourned, 
“Mom, the way I feel right now, I will never be any good for army or civilian life.”42 Such letters 
reflected in part a shift in public attitudes regarding the care of wounded soldiers and veterans. 
Mothers, many whose husbands had fought through the First World War, and who had witnessed 
firsthand its effects on the numerous physically and psychologically affected veterans, were “no 
longer content meekly to take back their boys as shattered hopeless parcels dumped on their 
doorsteps” and instead often “demanded them back good as new.”43   
From the war’s beginning, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the Liberal government 
were quick to address returning veterans’ needs. On the advice of Canadian Pension Commission 
Chairman Harold French, himself a Great War amputee, the King government established a 
committee on demobilization and rehabilitation in 1940 to create a program for returning 
veterans.
44
 By December 1940, several subcommittees were exploring a number of salient issues, 
including “neuropsychiatric cases.”45 Under what became the General Advisory Committee on 
Demobilization and Rehabilitation, the federal government broke from past practices, creating a 
system of rehabilitation benefits for everyone who served overseas (men and women 
inclusive).
46
 Returning military personnel, cared for after 1944 by the newly created Department 
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of Veterans Affairs (DVA), were provided with a range of statutes, orders, and regulations, all of 
which came to be known in 1945 and after as the Veterans Charter.
47
  
Measures included, among other things, a year’s free medical care following discharge, 
student loans, and training courses for ex-service women.
48
 There were many long-reaching 
effects, such as a rise in university enrollment, a new understanding and treatment of disability, 
and the creation of “big government.” Nevertheless, while the Veterans Charter was a “nation 
building experience,” it was like all social programs a product of its time and place. The Charter 
and principles behind it were still rooted in traditional attitudes that deemed a strong work ethic, 
ambition, and independent financial means the goals of every proper man.
49
 The program made a 
break with the past in much of its practice, but the ideology behind it was essentially 
conservative. The Charter’s goal was above all else to utilize short-term programs and costs to 
prevent veterans’ long-term dependency on the state.50 As with the interwar period, 
psychologically injured veterans unable to work or retain employment were once again deemed 
undeserving of pensions.  
After the war psychiatrists repeated their advice about granting pensions to “neurotic” 
veterans. Despite the profession’s skepticism toward personnel selection systems and admittedly 
chastened knowledge of war neuroses, those deemed experts nonetheless felt certain enough in 
their theories to deny mentally ill veterans compensation using a similar justification as their 
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interwar counterparts.
51
 In Canada, care of neurotic veterans was given to the DVA. In turn, the 
DVA’s Division of Treatment Services appointed Dr. Travis Dancey as adviser in psychiatry, 
making him one of the key officials behind DVA policy.
52
 Dancey began his career at the 
Verdun Protestant Hospital for the Insane in Montreal, served overseas at No. 1 Neurological 
Hospital, and later became head of the No. 1 Canadian Exhaustion Unit in late 1944.
53
 In the 
final months of the war, he treated hundreds of battle exhaustion cases using physical therapies 
and hypnosis.
54
  
Notwithstanding his experimentation with physical therapies, Dancey was a firm 
adherent of the psychodynamic (life-history) approach to mental illness. As such, he subscribed 
to the concept of “secondary gain,” something he defined à la Freud “the psychological and 
sociological advantages obtainable through being ill.”55 In a similar manner to Russel and 
numerous Great War physicians, Dancey and his Second World War colleagues saw pensions as 
detrimental to neurotic veterans’ recovery. Psychiatrists believed neuroses stemmed from 
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childhood and upbringing, not from war trauma. Thus any anxieties from the latter were 
expected to disappear with time. If symptoms persisted, a physician need only look to how the 
trauma symptoms were utilized to cover up the ostensibly original traumas from early life. 
It is worth quoting at length Dancey’s comparison between neurosis and physical illness to 
understand how he conceptualized the physician’s role in pension questions. In 1957, Dancey 
and a colleague, G.J. Sarwer-Foner, both employed at Queen Mary Veterans Hospital in 
Montreal, wrote an article for the Canadian Medical Association Journal that discussed the 
persistent problem of the “secondary gain patient.”56 With regard to pensions, by then a widely 
discussed subject in the civilian context as well, the authors unequivocally stated the unique 
character of the pension issue as it related to the neurosis patient:  
 
One might say that the subject of a neurosis is looked upon in a different way from other 
sick people. This may be true, but physicians should not be guilty of assisting the patient 
to remain ill through the payment of a monthly sum of money. It may well be that some 
people are penalized by this policy, but it must be kept in mind that this over-all policy is 
much more productive of good mental health than the opposite scheme would be.
57
 
 
  
Dancey and Sarwer-Foner’s rather utilitarian approach was self-evident. In the battle 
between patient and physician, the latter must always prevail, even if his Hippocratic tendencies 
urged him otherwise. Some patients might be harmed by this approach, they acknowledged, but 
most would benefit, and the alternative – dependence, unemployment, and continued sickness – 
was far worse. Their view was not a radical one, having been elucidated by others before, during, 
and after the interwar period. Abram Kardiner stated in 1941 that, “The demand for and the 
dependency upon compensation is an essential and unconsciously determined defense 
mechanism and cannot be considered a prime factor [in secondary gain], although it is often an 
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obstinate source of resistance in treatment and rehabilitation.”58 Throughout the postwar years, 
Dancey compiled Great War psychiatric research conducted in the same vein to reinforce his 
position. He also consulted and engaged in correspondence with those of a like mind, including 
Dr. J.P.S. Cathcart, Chief Neuropsychiatrist of the DVA.
59
 Their view of neurosis pensions fit 
well with a conservative government program, i.e. the Veterans Charter, which had the ultimate 
aim of encouraging work and reducing veterans’ dependency on the state. For all of their good 
intentions, Dancey and Sarwer-Foner’s characterization of neuroses placed a medically-endorsed 
stamp on any denial of compensation for those suffering from chronic war trauma. 
Dancey and his colleagues’ view was more striking because it went against increasing 
evidence of cases involving “normal” men who suffered from war trauma and did not recover 
with time, as expected. In an August 1947 Canadian Medical Association Journal article, Major 
R.M. Billings, Captain F.C.R. Chalke, and Captain L. Shortt, all from the Royal Canadian Army 
Medical Corps, published a follow-up study of fifty-five veterans diagnosed with battle 
exhaustion during the war.
60
 They discovered that even six months after being discharged, the 
men reported a wide range of persistent maladies, including: “nervousness and restlessness;” 
“depression, hostility, seclusiveness, shyness;” “battle dreams;” “startle reaction;” “insomnia;” 
and “psychosomatic disturbances.”61 Their study bore out the impression that “psychiatric 
disturbances precipitated by the severe mental trauma of warfare are not entirely benign, and that 
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physical and mental symptoms persist into civilian life.”62 In what turned out to be a prescient 
inference, they surmised they were “dealing with men whose difficulties and treatment-needs 
were increasing rather than decreasing, difficulties which may have future social implications, 
and treatment-needs which will have to be met eventually.”63 Indicative of the social climate and 
stigma toward mental illness was the fact that only 25% of those deemed in need of treatment 
had sought medical advice by the time of follow-up.
64
 Up until the 1960s, most mental health 
services were provided in large, custodial, overcrowded psychiatric hospitals. That situation did 
little to foster positive views toward mental illness or discussions of psychological difficulties.
65
 
Moreover, despite the commonplace nature of battle exhaustion diagnoses in the later war years, 
a laissez-faire attitude toward the socio-economic order encouraged veterans to fight through 
problems and avoid dependency on the government.
66
            
Thus after 1945 an “uneasy compromise between psychodynamic doctrine and the 
empirical evidence of veterans suffering from war-related chronic neurosis” developed in 
Canada.
67
 The original post-1945 program for demobilizing veterans was supposed to include 
treatment only for conditions that arose up to one year after service. Nevertheless, the persistence 
of war-related neuroses among some veterans, and the delayed manifestation of others, forced 
the DVA to consider other approaches.
68
 Hence, while Dancey and Canadian Pension 
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Commission officials work to ensure their compensation was minimal, the eventual alternative 
for chronic neurosis patients was hospital and therapeutic treatments. After consulting a 1943 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) report on pensions and considering “those methods 
employed in other [presumably Commonwealth] countries,” the DVA decided to offer treatment 
to any veteran with a neurosis “regardless of his time or place of service or of his income 
provided it was felt that his symptoms could be expected to fade after a brief period of 
therapy.”69 That program, which included the option of outpatient treatment, provided, among 
other things, the first clue that psychiatry was possible outside of the mental hospital.
70
 Dancey 
and his colleagues were nonetheless careful to ensure that “dangers inherent in other schemes” 
were prevented, which meant “no financial allowances were permitted either to the patient or to 
his family.”71 Dancey was characteristically blunt: “Although this may create hardships, it does 
minimize any desire that a veteran may have to remain more or less permanently in hospital.” An 
added outcome of that approach created “a state of affairs where his family will urge him to 
return to work as soon as possible.”72 Chronic “neurotics” were encouraged to seek treatment 
instead of pensions. Simultaneously, a socio-economic milieu developed which prodded those 
outside the hospital to return to their prescribed, manly duties as family breadwinners. 
At a 1950 meeting of the APA, Dancey discussed the ostensible successes of the DVA’s 
modified program. He declared that 420 veterans had received treatment under the new 
“classification” from 1 January 1948 to 31 December 1949.73 That number corresponded to 
roughly 20% of all general hospital psychiatric cases under treatment at the time. He affirmed 
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that DVA district psychiatrists held the opinion that a “definite benefit” was noticeable in 
approximately 75% of cases. In a testament to the prevailing and enduring spirit of a pull-up-
your-bootstraps work ethic, one of the main criteria for judging treatment success was the 
patient’s ability to return to work; the other was the patient remaining symptom-free for three 
months to one year.
74
 As an example of the work being undertaken, Dancey reported on the 
Montreal system. At Queen Mary Veterans Hospital, a group of resident physicians enrolled in 
the McGill psychiatry course and other, part-time psychiatrists (who held private practices) 
utilized “analytically oriented psychotherapy” as the chief treatment method. In line with current 
practices, they also utilized “aids” such as insulin therapy and “diversional therapy,” the goal of 
the latter being to ensure every patient was fully occupied during hospital waking hours.
75
 In 
1946 Veterans Minister Ian Mackenzie boasted that Ste. Anne’s Hospital, also in Montreal, had 
good reason to hope for a 75% success rate treating “psychotics” using “electric shock therapy 
and insulin and sub-insulin shock.” Mackenzie noted the same treatments were also effective for 
neurotics.
76
     
A March 1947 Globe and Mail article on neurosis therapy at Westminster Hospital in 
London, Ontario provided a more complete picture of what the DVA program entailed.
77
 There 
doctors focused on promoting “Self,” “Job,” “Home,” “Friends,” and “Religion” to a group of 
“young victims of neurosis” and other psychologically troubled veterans.78 Westminster 
                                                          
74
 Ibid; One cannot help but notice the psychodynamic understanding inherent in this view. Since the illness was 
deemed to stem from unconscious factors and earlier life events, physicians saw a patient’s lack of symptoms as 
progress in working through their internal conflicts and an increase in their “ability” to remain symptom free. Such a 
view seems to have sometimes confused spontaneous (or otherwise) remission with patients’ willpower and 
“ability” to make their mind healthy.    
75
 Ibid., 346; Dancey did not elaborate on what the diversions consisted of, though one can infer based on 
contemporary mental hospital care that they were akin to recreation and other stress-free activities. One cannot help 
but notice a hint of nineteenth century “moral” therapy in that approach. For a description of group psychotherapy 
conducted at Queen Mary Veterans Hospital see The Globe and Mail, 14 January 1952.  
76
 The Globe and Mail, 23 March 1946; Ste. Anne’s was a DVA administered hospital. 
77
 Westminster was likewise a DVA hospital.  
78
 The Globe and Mail, 17 March 1947.  
  
91 
 
provided care to 700 veterans of both world wars who suffered from “neurosis” or “psychosis,” 
and the article glowingly reported that treatment consisted of “much more than drugs and 
psychotherapy.” Patients were divided into three groups: neurosis patients, “parole” patients 
(patients who had suffered from psychosis but were deemed to be “cured of a psychosis 
sufficiently”), and a third group of “psychotic patients” in closed wards under orderly 
supervision. The article’s author noted the presence of grand pianos in multiple sun rooms and 
patients’ artwork hanging on the walls. Patients also benefitted from “OT” (occupational 
therapy) shops, where they worked at hand looms, carpenters’ benches, and potters’ wheels. 
Their tooled leather was so well crafted that it apparently aroused “the acquisitive instincts of 
feminine visitors.”79 In addition, a significant degree of co-operation with the University of 
Western Ontario allowed patients to tour the university’s observatory, natural science collection, 
and museum. The author reported that during the previous Christmas season 450 men from both 
closed and open hospital wards had been treated to a university Follies production. He happily 
concluded “there wasn’t a single ‘incident.’”80    
It is difficult for historians to appraise the relative success or failure of the DVA approach 
in terms of veterans “cured,” though it was evident that at least some remained ill and did not 
seek hospital treatment. Most men simply carried on as best they could, with many using the 
timeless method of alcohol intoxication to rationalize or cope with troubling memories. Many 
decades later a World War Two veteran at Sunnybrook hospital in Toronto stated that, “You 
were viewed as weak if you couldn’t handle it ... In the culture of the time, you didn’t talk about 
it.”81 For his part Dancey confidently claimed there was a “universal opinion” among district 
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psychiatrists that the modified program for neurotic veterans should be preserved, with minor 
alterations.
82
 He concluded by pointing to the “wider ramifications” of the pension question, 
particularly since the veterans’ pension program was part of a “rapidly developing interest” in 
social security for the non-veteran “man in industry.”83 Regardless of Dancey and his colleagues’ 
view of the compensation question, pressure from veterans across the country unresponsive to 
the offered treatments slowly eroded psychiatrists’ ability to completely prevent pension-
granting.
84
 Moreover, the Assessment and Rehabilitation Unit of the DVA, the unit through 
which neurosis pensions were granted, allowed a “backdoor route” for those who had been 
denied compensation by the Canadian Pension Commission. Dancey was unequivocal in his 
opposition to a secondary route for troubled veterans. He affirmed the only reason that that route 
was not heavily utilized was due to limited publicity and the complexity of the appeal process.
85
  
Dancey continued writing even in 1970 to campaign against pensions for what he then 
termed “socio-psychological disability.” Again pointing to war veterans, he deplored the 
conditions whereby pensioners avoided work and forced their spouse to earn in order to keep 
their meager pension. The result was detrimental to the family because, “The husband then does 
the housework and there is a significant degree of reversal of role, with its deleterious results.”86 
With more than a hint of paternalism, Dancey cautioned against blaming the veteran, contending 
that a pensioned veteran was to be viewed as “a victim of circumstances and perhaps rather 
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fortunate in being able to obtain a marginal income, in spite of its emasculating qualities.”87 The 
real problem in his estimation was the clinical physician, who was considered the “weakest link” 
and often demonstrated “sheer ignorance” of the patient’s “psychodynamics.”88 For Dancey the 
pension issue was primarily a medical one, but his characterization of the interaction between 
illness and socio-economic questions was evidently influenced by contemporary gender norms. 
Thus the “uneasy compromise” between psychiatric doctrine and war-related neurosis persisted. 
The DVA’s post-1945 reliance on psychiatrists, a relationship that expanded throughout 
the postwar years, represented “a more general trend ... in which the dictates of masculinity were 
medicalized.”89 Although the federal government’s approach to psychologically injured veterans 
evolved during the 1918-1945 period, there was more continuity than change. The same 
“masculine codes” of self-reliance and stoicism expected of men in post 1918 society were also 
evident after the Second World War.
90
 Pension-seeking was still construed as an “unmanly” 
activity, since pensions for war-related neuroses promoted dependence and prevented men from 
pursuing their ostensibly natural role as breadwinners. Psychiatrists like Dancey were absolute in 
their linking of idleness and illness. Men were deemed “better” or “cured” largely based on their 
attempt to return to their traditional role as manly, orderly breadwinners.   
Hence there existed what cultural historian Christopher Dummitt called an “awkward 
overlap between the state’s emphasis on the ideals of liberal self-sufficiency and manly 
breadwinning” with regard to the treatment of disabled veterans, especially those with troubled 
minds.
91
 The federal government and psychiatrists’ goal was to literally and figuratively get men 
back to working condition. In Veterans Minister Mackenzie’s words, the aim was to return 
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neurotic war veterans to society “as normal, useful citizens.”92 Veterans’ mental state mattered 
only if it hindered gainful employment, a situation which disrupted the family unit and society.
93
 
Nevertheless, similar to their physically disabled counterparts, men traumatized by war felt 
entitled to compensation. Some in Canadian society agreed. In a 31 January 1948 Globe and 
Mail article, the author noted that although DVA physicians argued against pensions for 
neurotics, “some believe it [the policy] is obsolete and should be amended, [and] an ex-
serviceman suffering from neurosis is entitled to [a] pension, just as if he had lost an arm.”94 By 
denying the legitimacy of that claim the psychiatrist represented for many veterans the “worst 
agent of the modern state.”95  
Moreover, by diagnosing and describing veterans’ mental states, behaviour, and 
upbringing, psychiatrists “trod on the territory of manliness, secreting negative attitudes toward 
mental illness into this domain that the veterans considered sacrosanct.”96 At a time when 
psychiatry was going through an “expansive period of professionalization” which extended the 
borders of medical “knowledge” into the socio-economic domain, psychiatrists’ explicit 
“medicalization of manhood” codified and reinforced masculine norms.97 Put simply, to work 
was to be a proper man and be healthy; to be a pensioned neurotic was the inverse state of 
manliness and health, since it left a man primarily in the home and dependent – a naturally 
feminine state. There was little separation of medical knowledge and socio-economic norms. 
Like their First World War comrades, psychologically injured veterans of the Second World War 
faced an inherently unequal relationship with psychiatrists in both pension hearings and the 
                                                          
92
 The Globe and Mail, 23 March 1946.  
93
 Ibid.  
94
 The Globe and Mail, 31 January 1948. 
95
 Dummitt, The Manly Modern, 45. 
96
 Ibid. 
97
 Ibid., 46. 
  
95 
 
hospital. A psychiatrist’s judgement of their mental state and behaviour affected not only pension 
eligibility, but a man’s personal and home life as well. As demonstrated by Dummitt’s research 
on Shaughnessy Hospital in Vancouver, the process was in and of itself painful and disturbing 
for many men. Their life history, behaviour, work ethic, and subjectively assessed manliness 
were all simultaneously placed on trial.
98
 
 
Korea 
 
Just as 1918 brought about a dismantling of the psychiatric services created by militaries 
during the Great War, demobilization after 1945 caused “a rapid and remarkably complete 
collapse of the elaborate psychiatric system developed by the medical services of the 
Commonwealth armies.”99 Most psychiatrists, having served their country, were keen to quickly 
demobilize and resume interrupted careers.
100
 Military psychiatrists returned to “an uncertain 
future,” with prominent men obtaining university-affiliated hospital appointments and their less 
eminent colleagues resuming careers in provincial mental hospitals.
101
 The Army lost interest in 
psychiatry, and after 1945 the few psychiatrists who remained were once again placed in a 
screening role; an apparent act of amnesia regarding the lessons learned about its questionable 
effectiveness during the war.
102
 Consequently, when Canadians went to fight in the Korean War 
as part of British Commonwealth Forces Korea, their one forward psychiatrist initially 
represented the only psychiatric specialist in 1 Commonwealth Division.  
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As with the two World Wars, what began as a relatively lax policy on battle exhaustion 
gave way to a system resembling forward psychiatry in August 1951.
103
 Psychiatric casualty 
rates, as in the Second World War, were worst during intense fighting or prolonged artillery 
bombardments.
104
 For Canadians, due to the fact that many battles were “counted in hours rather 
than days or weeks” battle exhaustion was, according to Korean War historian Brent Byron 
Watson, “comparatively rare.”105 In the “battle of Hill 355,” responsible for the largest 
proportion of neuropsychiatric casualties, battle exhaustion still accounted for less than 1% of 
total casualties incurred by 1 Royal Canadian Regiment.
106
 Watson argued that, given the degree 
of deficiencies in training and equipment, it was “astonishing” more Canadian soldiers did not 
succumb to battle exhaustion throughout the conflict.
107
  
In most major respects, psychiatry during the Korean War was akin to the previous war, 
with battle exhaustion still the preferred diagnostic term, and one of the best therapeutic methods 
still considered motivation – namely the “expectancy” principle.108 Mild cases were sent back to 
duty almost immediately, while more severe cases were evacuated to the field dressing station, 
sedated, and provided with short-term psychotherapy. The majority of exhaustion cases were 
eventually returned to their units, though more seriously affected soldiers were placed in support 
                                                          
103
 Copp and Humphries, Combat Stress, 349; Most cases were initially sent to Japan since there was little provision 
and no organized program for dealing with them. 
104
 Edgar Jones, “Army Psychiatry in the Korean War: The Experience of 1 Commonwealth Division,” Military 
Medicine 165, no. 4 (2000): 257; Brent Byron Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-
1953 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 104. 
105
 Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 104.  
106
 Ibid.  
107
 Ibid., 107; The Canadians were not the only army that went to Korea unprepared. The Americans also hastily 
prepared and early in the war saw entire groups of men running for their lives. See Shephard, A War of Nerves, 341.  
108
 Jones, “Army Psychiatry in the Korean War,” 258; Jones argued that F.C.R. Chalke’s appointment as an expert in 
personnel selection was an “attempt to stem the flow of evacuees.” This was a result of the fact that Canadian troops 
were hastily assembled and recruited as the Canadian military was relatively small and poorly prepared after five 
years of demobilization. Many soldiers were lost to chronic medical conditions or psychiatric problems within the 
first six months before the situation leveled off. In a few particularly egregious cases, a seventy-two-year-old man 
was signed up, as well as a man with an artificial leg. See ibid, 257; Binneveld, From Shell Shock to Combat Stress, 
129-130; Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, 158.  
  
97 
 
units or sent back to Canada.
109
 Upon their return from Korea, Canadian veterans with 
neuropsychiatric problems were provided with the same treatment programs as their World War 
Two comrades and encountered many of the same difficulties and dilemmas. 
As the Cold War set in during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Canadian government 
began a re-expansion of its defence capabilities. From 1949 to 1953 the number of Regulars 
increased from 47,000 to 104,000, and the Canadians established a long-term commitment to 
European defence against communist encroachment.
110
 Canadian military communities and 
bases remained in Germany for another forty years, with CFB Lahr in southern Germany being 
the last to close in August 1994. Nevertheless, after Korea, with the military’s loss of interest in 
psychiatry and Canadian soldiers no longer engaged in large-scale combat, veterans’ mental 
health discussions were once again relegated to psychiatric hospitals and beer halls.  
 
The Spoils of War 
 
 While veterans’ mental health was less of a prominent issue than it had been during and 
immediately after the two World Wars, psychiatric services were nonetheless on the rise. That 
trend reflected a burgeoning professionalization of Canadian psychiatry that began with the 
Great War. In their 1963 national appraisal of Canadian psychiatric services, the CMHA 
acknowledged the galvanizing effect the First World War had on psychiatry. Contrasting the 
prevalent pessimism toward the treatment of mental illness in the early twentieth century, they 
stated: “Realization that a rational and even scientific psychological treatment of mental illness 
was possible [sic] began only when the thousands of World War I shell shock casualties 
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demonstrated dramatically that everyone has his breaking point, everyone is vulnerable to 
psychological, social and physical stress.”111 In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
psychiatrists were mainly found in asylums and had little respect among their medical 
colleagues, being considered “just a step, if that, above the spa-doctors and the homeopaths.”112 
After the Great War, psychiatrists and other mental health professionals, e.g. neurologists, 
became the de facto experts on shell shock and its myriad presentations. Their professional 
prestige rose accordingly. Historians have been somewhat more circumspect about the Great 
War’s legacy for Canadian psychiatry. Tom Brown pointed out that the Great War led to the 
beginning of psychiatry’s foray into purposes outside of its essential mission, and that the 
“Therapeutic State,” a system in which medicine and the state collaborated to control 
disapproved and deviant thoughts and actions, was “first forged in the crucible of the Great 
War.”113 The First World War instigated the spread of wartime psychiatric ideas into medical 
and civilian culture, and paved the way for psychiatrists to once again be called upon in the next 
war.     
The Second World War and Canadian physicians’ experiences with battle exhaustion 
produced even more confidence amongst those in the Canadian psychiatric profession and were a 
key factor in its expansion after 1945.
114
 The succumbing of many soldiers to war-related 
traumas reified the idea that “mental-health problems could befall normal individuals,” thus 
setting the stage for the growth of the mental health industry.
115
 In his 2001 assessment of the 
postwar period, then editor of the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry (CJP) Quentin Rae-Grant 
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wrote that 1950 was “marked by an aura of optimism derived from the experience of the need 
for, and value and recognition of, psychiatry during World War II.”116 Psychiatric manifestations 
during World War Two were responsible for renewing interest in psychiatric disorders and 
treatments after decades of pessimism stemming from overcrowded asylums and few effective 
remedies for mental ailments.
117
 Numerous physicians who learned psychiatric theories and 
techniques during the war became eminent leaders in the post-1945 field. They brought their war 
experience into civilian practice, shaping Canadian psychiatry in the process.
118
  
The Second World War’s impact on the mental health profession can be demonstrated 
simply by looking at the author list of More for the Mind. F.C.R. Chalke, Medical Officer during 
the war and postwar researcher on battle exhaustion, became the University of Ottawa Chair of 
the Department of Psychiatry, one of the Canadian Psychiatric Association’s founders (CPA), 
and editor of the Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal (now the CJP) from 1956 to 1972. 
John (Jack) D. Griffin was a colonel in the Canadian Army and worked under Brock Chisholm 
during the Second World War, later developing psychiatric rehabilitation programs for ex-
service men and women, and among many other accomplishments, became General Director of 
the CMHA from 1951 to 1971. B.H. McNeel served as Officer Commanding 2 Canadian Corps 
Exhaustion Unit in Normandy. He was later appointed as adviser to the Deputy Director Medical 
Services, after the war writing of his experiences with battle exhaustion and becoming chief of 
the Mental Health Branch of the Ontario Department of Health.
119
 All three men had significant 
experience with wartime mental disorders, specifically battle exhaustion, during the Second 
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World War. They all went on to have long and influential careers in psychiatry and psychiatric 
policies after the war. 
The war was also responsible for stimulating the CMHA’s growth and the creation of 
distinctly Canadian psychiatric institutions, most notably the CPA. Until 1951 many Canadian 
psychiatrists were APA members, attending meetings south of the border, keeping up with 
developments through professional journals, letter correspondence, and face-to-face discussions 
at symposiums.
120
 The postwar period and significant numbers of men affected by wartime 
experiences demonstrated the “magnitude of the psychiatric disorders facing veterans and their 
families after the war,” Canada’s relative unpreparedness, and psychiatrists’ inability to lobby as 
a national body.
121
 Canadian psychiatrists also acknowledged that despite collegiality with their 
American neighbours, the APA could not influence the Canadian government. Consequently, 
intermittent discussions began in the mid-1940s to create a Canadian association, culminating in 
the 1951 establishment of the CPA.
122
 The CPA, along with the CMHA, henceforth became one 
of the leading Canadian institutions for encouraging public and government interest in 
psychiatric issues, and helped in establishing a professional identity for psychiatrists.           
In 1950, the Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene became the Canadian 
Mental Health Association. Throughout that decade the CMHA developed provincial divisions 
and local branches across Canada. One of the CMHA’s main goals was to increase public 
interest in mental illness and health. That task was accomplished largely through the 
development of volunteer programs in psychiatric hospitals, the creation of information and 
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referral services, and consistent lobbying of the federal government on mental-illness related 
issues.
123
 Concisely stated, “Scientific and professional opinion was marshalled in support of 
better methods of treatment and care.”124 The CMHA also helped create a National Mental 
Health Research Fund. The Fund provided money for young researchers interested in mental 
illness and mental health, areas which hitherto received little funding or curiosity from medical 
students, in large part due to the low status attributed to psychiatrists by their peers.
125
 The 
CMHA acknowledged that terms reflected a prevailing spirit of the times, and fought to have 
legal and public language changed, so as to abolish terms such as “idiot,” “imbecile,” and 
“lunatic.”126 CMHA General Director John Griffin and his colleagues lamented that even the 
medical profession was often reluctant to accept mental illness as a group of diseases that 
deserved an investment of professional time, research, and money.
127
  
The CMHA’s efforts dovetailed with the 1948 National Health Grants Program 
introduced by the Mackenzie King government and Paul Martin Sr., Minister of National Health 
and Welfare. The program included, inter alia, a Mental Health Grant to aid provinces in 
developing and improving facilities for the mentally ill.
128
 The great mobilization of medical and 
ancillary personnel into the Canadian Army during the Second World War created a situation 
whereby many overcrowded mental hospitals were greatly understaffed, leading to deteriorating 
conditions into the late 1940s.
129
 The Mental Health Grant not only helped to reverse that trend, 
but over the next ten years fuelled the creation of new buildings, the opening of clinics, an 
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increase in staff numbers, and according to Griffin et al., a “new professional interest in mental 
health and illness.”130 
The Second World War and war-related mental disorders nonetheless illuminated some 
of psychiatry’s most evident shortcomings, perhaps the best example being a lack of any 
standardized set of diagnostic criteria or definitions for mental disorders. Though psychiatrists 
devised names and rough symptom criteria for major psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia, 
combat created psychiatric manifestations quite different from the “insanity” experienced in 
asylums.
131
 Many affected soldiers were just “normal” men who had broken under the 
psychological strain of war.
132
 Before psychiatrists settled on “battle exhaustion,” as with the 
First World War, reactions to stress and anxiety were given many varying and idiosyncratic 
names.
133
 During wartime, military hierarchies could impose a standardization of terms, e.g. 
battle exhaustion, but in a civilian milieu psychiatrists were free to use any terms they wished. 
Moreover, since most of the existing manuals were influenced by decades of asylum practice, a 
milieu where patients suffered from chronic mental illnesses like dementia and schizophrenia, 
they did not reflect what many patients presented after 1945.
134
 Van Nostrand’s lament about the 
situation once again seemed accurate: “the nomenclature of psychiatric disease has no 
uniformity, and many of the terms have no precise meaning, except to the persons using 
them.”135 
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The manifestations of trauma and other psychological disturbances, as well as a lack of 
any standard manual or system, resulted in a proliferation of terms and ideas that by the late 
1940s amounted to “chaos.”136 According to psychopharmacological researcher Thomas Ban, 
during the early postwar period there was “all kinds of nonsense” and “Everyone had his own 
little song.”137 The American Psychiatric Association responded by creating a standard manual to 
bring order to the chaos. In 1948 a committee on naming laboured over an all-encompassing and 
national classificatory system, the result being the 1952 publication of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM-I.
138
 DSM-I was an evident example of how the 
Second World War influenced civilian psychiatry across North America: it was a modified form 
of the U.S. Army’s War Department Technical Bulletin, Medical 203 (Medical 203), created in 
1943 by a committee chaired by Brigadier-General William C. Menninger, an influential 
psychiatrist serving in the Office of the Surgeon General.
139
 
Medical 203 codified much of the psychodynamic bent of numerous APA practitioners. 
Heavily influenced by Swiss-American psychiatrist Adolf Meyer, the first psychiatrist-in-chief 
of the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, as well as Freudian theories, Medical 203 and DSM-
I both characterized mental disorders as “reactions” of the individual in response to emotional 
states brought on by life events and circumstances.
140
 Meyer, who coined the term 
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“psychobiology” to describe his approach, emphasized the importance of researching all 
biological, psychological, and social events pertinent to a patient’s case history.141 Reflecting its 
Freudian-Meyerian spirit, Medical 203 saw combat exhaustion as “often transient in character” 
when promptly treated, but something which might progress into “one of the established neurotic 
reactions” if left unchecked.142 The authors viewed combat exhaustion as a predominantly 
transient phenomenon, thus making it a “temporary diagnosis” until a more “definitive 
diagnosis” - the “real” disorder related to the patient’s life-history - was established.143 In DSM-
I, combat exhaustion was replaced by “Gross Stress Reaction (GSR),” and categorized as one of 
the “Transient Situational Personality Disorders,” but DSM-I nonetheless copied almost word-
for-word the language and characterization of Medical 203.
144
 As with combat exhaustion, GSR 
was an appropriate diagnosis if the individual had been exposed to “severe physical demands or 
extreme emotional stress,” except DSM-I went a step further by stating this reaction could occur 
not only in combat, but also “in civilian catastrophe (Fire, Earthquake, Explosion, Etc.)”145 The 
broadly conceived approach taken by both documents illuminated a shift in the “institutional 
geography” of North American psychiatry as more psychiatrists in the postwar period moved 
into private practice, and hospital and community psychiatrists brought with them a synthesis of 
Meyer and Freud’s ideas.146 Although DSM-I was less widely read than the Manual’s future 
editions, it was an important document for enshrining psychiatry’s predominant approach for the 
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following few decades. While it is difficult to gauge the extent to which psychiatrists actually 
consulted DSM-I in their daily practice, the spread of the psychodynamic approach was apparent 
in a 1959-1960 survey by the American Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP), which 
reported that eighty-eight out of ninety-three U.S. and Canadian medical schools taught 
psychodynamics.
147
 
Between 1945 and the late 1960s, North American psychiatry, and in particular academic 
psychiatry, was also dominated by psychoanalysis, an approach popularized by the teachings of 
Freud and his followers. Psychoanalysis aimed at, among other things, finding the root of present 
psychological difficulties in childhood events.
148
 Even at McGill University’s Allan Memorial 
Institute, where the influence of biologically-oriented researchers like Heinz Lehmann and Ewen 
Cameron was pronounced, psychoanalysis was still represented, and according to Thomas Ban, 
the milieu was one where every type of psychiatric approach – including psychoanalysis – was 
represented.
149
 That period, which Edward Shorter termed the “psychoanalytic hiatus” in 
psychiatry, was characterized by a brief era during the mid-twentieth century when “middle-class 
society became enraptured of the notion that psychological problems arose as a result of 
unconscious conflicts over long-past events, especially those of a sexual nature.”150 Psychiatrists 
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embraced this approach because it helped them to escape the dreary and stultifying nature of 
large mental hospitals, allowing them to seek community hospital employment or private 
practice opportunities.
151
 One effect of that movement was that for a few decades psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy became synonymous, with psychiatrists at the forefront despite the fact that 
neither practice necessarily required medical expertise. Although there was some truth in 
Shorter’s argument that the draw of medicalizing the psychoanalytic approach was that it helped 
psychiatrists to “exclude psychologists, psychiatric social workers, and other competitors from 
the newly discovered fountain of riches,” their motivation went beyond financial matters.152 
Psychoanalysis, with its ostensible ability to explain the mind’s complexities and individual 
motivations, “filled a vacuum” that earlier heredity-based theories left after their dissipation.153      
In Canada, Brock Chisholm’s rapid rise as Director General of Medical Service for the 
army in 1942 and appointment as the first Deputy Minister of Health in 1944 ensured that he 
disseminated the psychodynamic approach to a generation of Canadian psychiatrists both during 
and after the war.
154
 Although Canadian psychiatrists were less influenced in the immediate 
postwar period by Freud and Meyer than their American colleagues, the psychodynamic 
influence on Canadian practitioners remained significant, particularly on those who went to war. 
Echoing Brock Chisholm’s wartime speeches, in January 1947 John Griffin, Chisholm’s 
consultant psychiatrist in wartime, told the Forest Hill Home and School Association in Toronto 
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that during the war “it was common to find vigorous, healthy young men who—as a result of 
inhibiting crippling dependence on their mothers—were incapable of participating in the defense 
of their country.” Once again stressing the importance of letting boys be boys, Griffin asserted 
that, “The over-solicitous parent and mother who pampers, dominates and controls her son 
interferes with his mature development into young manhood.”155 Griffin believed parents must 
take their lesson from the Army and its capacity for instilling traditional masculine virtues when 
appraising human relationships.  
Moreover, like Chisholm, Griffin affirmed that a boy whose “basic boyness” was not 
lauded and encouraged by his mother would become laden with guilt, fear, and inferiorities, 
making him far less adaptable to difficult situations – e.g. wartime stresses – later in life.156 B.H. 
McNeel, a co-author of More for the Mind and chief of the Mental Health Branch of the Ontario 
Department of Health in the 1960s, stated, like Chisholm and Griffin, that a possessive mother 
was “often a contributing factor” to her child’s mental difficulties.157 Thus, influential Canadian 
psychiatrists utilized their war service and experience with war-related mental disorders as a 
confirmation that, in the words of gender historian Christopher Grieg, mothers converted 
“‘normal’ boys into emasculated boys who lacked the necessary amount of masculinity to 
engage successfully in military combat.”158  
In postwar Canada, men like Chisholm, Dancey, Griffin, and McNeel became defenders 
of traditional masculinity, and attempted to defeat gender anxieties brought on by altered postwar 
labour and gender relations. They used ostensibly objective psychiatric knowledge to reassert a 
traditional, “normal” masculinity prevalent earlier in the century. While during the war their 
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quest was largely confined to propping up anxious soldiers and reminding them of their duty to 
the country, after 1945 numerous physicians carried on that mission, becoming stalwart 
advocates of a return to a fearless and stoic masculine ideal. As they did with pension questions, 
psychiatrists utilized medical knowledge to affirm the legitimacy and primacy of their 
mission.
159
 Boys, like their fathers, needed to be taught to be “rational, physically and 
emotionally self-controlled and disciplined, upright and moral, loyal, and obedient.”160 Chisholm 
and others preached that such values had already been taught by the military. War had instructed 
them in the connection between prewar coddling and postwar neuroses that came not from the 
trauma of battle, but from faulty, effeminate parenting.    
Psychiatrists returning from war brought with them novel ideas about treatment 
approaches. Those who saw battle exhaustion firsthand and, for better or worse, returned many 
psychologically affected soldiers to combat, believed that environmental stresses played a key 
role in mental illness. From that inference it was a short step to the belief that in a civilian setting 
early treatment outside of the asylum could also produce positive results.
161
 Given that most 
psychiatrists had trained and been employed in large mental hospitals before the war, where 
patients often languished for decades, the potential of early psychiatric treatment to head off 
chronic illness and eliminate the need for prolonged institutionalization was reason for optimism 
about the future.
162
 Put simply, “the success in returning to active duty servicemen who 
experienced psychological problems renewed a spirit of therapeutic optimism and activism, 
which was carried back into civilian life after the war.”163  
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In Canada, that confidence intersected with Chisholm and other influential psychiatrists’ 
enterprise to “rouse the Canadian public to an awareness of the problems of mental health.”164 
Just like GAP, formed under the stewardship of American Brigadier-General William Menninger 
in 1946, aimed to make psychiatry an important part of the postwar shaping of American society, 
Chisholm, his allies, and the CMHA in particular were keen to see social psychiatry at the 
vanguard of a new Canadian social order.
165
 One of the CMHA’s key aims was for mental illness 
to be “dealt with in precisely the same organizational, administrative and professional framework 
as physical illness.”166 The Association’s successes throughout the early postwar period included 
the designation in 1951 of Mental Health Week during the first week of May each year. Local 
branches across the country used that week to raise awareness of mental illness through public 
visitation of mental hospitals, school poster and essay contests, and press articles.
167
 Amidst 
great socio-economic changes over the next few decades, the Canadian psychiatric profession 
remained deeply involved in treating mental illness in the community and local hospitals, as well 
as spearheading campaigns to de-stigmatize mental illness and gain a foothold for psychiatric 
services in publicly-funded health insurance legislation. Thus while Griffin and his More for the 
Mind co-authors lamented in 1963 that the federal Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services 
Act of 1957 specifically excluded mental hospital patients from the benefits given to psychiatric 
patients in general hospitals, several years later they saw the fruits of their labour enshrined in 
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the 1966 Medical Care Act, which provided funding for all psychiatric hospitals and did not 
discriminate between physical and mental illness.
168
 
 Concurrently, as “social” psychiatrists strove to ensure a more equal treatment for 
mentally ill patients, and psychoanalysts in private practice treated less severe mental illnesses, 
in another important site – the laboratory – researchers were at work throughout the 1940s and 
1950s on experiments to ameliorate and classify mental illness through drug-induced alteration 
of brain chemistry. During a time when, for example, Montreal’s Verdun Protestant Hospital had 
1600 psychiatric patients and only a few physicians, researchers like Heinz Lehmann undertook 
experiments to mitigate the symptoms of major mental illnesses like schizophrenia.
169
 Although 
most of those experiments came to naught, in 1953 Lehmann introduced a new antipsychotic 
drug – chlorpromazine – that had the seemingly miraculous effect of ameliorating the psychotic 
symptoms of chronic schizophrenia.
170
 Lehmann quickly introduced English-speaking North 
America to chlorpromazine, and the result was the beginning of “the era of 
psychopharmacology.” That moment was “a turning point in the history of psychiatry.”171 
Beyond the alleviation of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia, depression, and mania, 
chlorpromazine and future drugs had the societal effect of accelerating deinstitutionalization – 
the downsizing or closing of large psychiatric hospitals across the country. Patients previously 
unable to live outside the walls of the hospital were often then free to live independently.
172
 On a 
professional level, biological psychiatry, an approach characterized by the idea that major 
psychiatric illnesses were the result of disordered brain chemistry and development, was given a 
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renewed confidence that slowly but eventually overtook psychoanalysis/psychodynamics as the 
dominant conceptualization and treatment of mental illness later in the century.
173
 
 The 1960s became “the high-water mark of the psychoanalytic movement.”174 At that 
time the most influential chairs of psychiatric departments across North America were trained 
psychoanalysts, and psychiatrists trained in analysis even began talking about treating major 
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia.
175
 The spread of psychodynamic psychiatry and Freudian 
ideas could also be seen in the DSM’s second edition (DSM-II), released in 1968, which 
replaced most of the Meyerian “reactions” in DSM-I with Freudian “neuroses.”176 As with DSM-
I, the second edition characterized many disorders as the result of underlying psychological 
conflicts, and like its predecessor, the diagnostic criteria it provided remained vague.
177
 DSM-II 
also made a significant break with its earlier edition in that Gross Stress Reaction, which had 
encapsulated psychiatrists’ experiences with war trauma, was eliminated, or seen another way, 
reclassified and placed under the umbrella term “Adjustment Reaction to Adult Life 
(ARTAL).”178 Instead of a full analysis and description, the Manual provided just three short 
examples of ARTAL, one of which simply stated: “Fear associated with military combat and 
manifested by trembling, running and hiding.”179 Such a simplistic description hardly scratched 
the surface of the multifarious symptoms seen by psychiatrists over the previous half century. 
The Manual’s appendices provided a list of other stressful events connected to it, e.g. railway 
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accidents, but made no attempt to explain how the events specifically related to the symptoms.
180
 
Thus, DSM-II “contained no specific listing for a psychiatric disorder produced by combat.”181    
 Scholars interested in the DSM’s evolution have viewed the elimination of GSR from the 
Manual’s second edition in numerous ways. Psychologist John Wilson, who examined the 
historical evolution of PTSD diagnostic criteria across the twentieth century, opined that the 
simplicity and inadequacy of the examples used in DSM-II to describe ARTAL gave “pause to 
inquire as to why there was not a more adequate and complete delineation of the various types of 
trauma; their common effects on psychological functioning and the known clinical features 
associated with such stressful life experiences.”182 Perhaps even more puzzling, he noted, was 
why despite the occurrence of many traumatic events such as the Korean and Vietnam wars in 
the period between 1952 (publication of DSM-I) and 1968 (publication of DSM-II) GSR was not 
retained or enlarged. Ben Shephard explained this lacuna by noting that in the mid 1960s “few 
psychiatrists with first-hand experience of warfare were still around,” but there was evidently 
more to it than that. There were throughout the 1960s studies published in prominent journals 
such as the American Journal of Psychiatry and Archives of General Psychiatry on the 
persistence of “stress reaction” among combat veterans, so it was not true that psychiatrists were 
no longer aware of or disinterested in war trauma.
183
  
By 1965, when the DSM-II was in its planning and editing stages, American troops had 
already entered the Vietnam War. Their early experiences there from 1965 to 1967, when the 
rate of psychiatric breakdown among soldiers was only about five per 1000 troops – compared 
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with about fifty at the beginning of the Korean War – convinced military psychiatrists they 
“appeared to have licked the problem.”184 Unlike during previous wars, the Americans 
immediately provided each battalion with medical personnel trained in psychiatric disorders and 
assigned psychiatrists to infantry divisions.
185
 Shephard concisely summed up the situation: 
“There was [during Vietnam] military psychiatry from the start, not from the point where things 
began to go wrong.”186 The Americans’ early implementation of forward psychiatry appeared to 
prevent an epidemic of psychiatric casualties, as had occurred at various points during the First 
and Second World Wars. Their ostensible success was confirmed by the 1970 book Men, Stress, 
And Vietnam by psychiatrist Peter Bourne, a team member of the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research and Vietnam veteran.
187
 Bourne attributed the initially low rate of breakdown among 
American troops to empirically grounded ideas of war neurosis and the implementation of 
forward psychiatry.
188
 Bourne was so confident in early successes that he espoused there was 
“reason to be optimistic that psychiatric casualties need never again become a major cause of 
attrition in the United States military in a combat zone.”189 The lack of wartime experience 
among DSM-II editors combined with the early successful treatment of war neuroses in Vietnam 
to convince the Manual’s editors that there was no need to focus on or retain GSR.190  
The psychodynamic leaning of many practitioners was a likely factor in this decision. As 
with the Second World War, numerous psychiatrists believed Vietnam veterans haunted by their 
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war experiences suffered from a neurosis or psychosis that originated prior to combat.
191
 Despite 
decades of evidence to the contrary, they affirmed that any persistence of war-related 
psychological problems could be explained by underlying conflicts within the individual 
stemming from earlier life events. With years of distance since the Korean War’s end in 1953 
and Vietnam in the 1960s, during which time veterans’ issues became less prominent, 
psychiatrists became convinced their model was accurate. But changes in the Vietnam War’s 
course and an increasing number of veterans reporting psychiatric problems in the early 1970s 
coincided with sweeping changes in psychiatric research and thinking to set both psychiatry and 
trauma on a different trajectory by the end of the decade. Concisely stated: 
 
More than any other war in the twentieth century, Vietnam redefined the social role of 
psychiatry and society’s perception of mental health. Five years after the fall of Saigon, a 
new psychiatric term was devised, tailored to the needs of veterans. Psychiatric 
counselling was made available on an unparalleled scale, paid for by the United States 
government. Even more significantly, Vietnam helped to create a new ‘consciousness of 
trauma’ in Western society.192  
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CHAPTER 3: VIETNAM, TRAUMA, AND RECOGNITION 
 
Perhaps wars weren’t won any more. Maybe they went on forever.1 
Then ... the vets began to insist upon dealing with immediate psychological struggles, which were considerable, 
having to do with relationships to those around them, with their changing sense of masculinity, and with their 
conflicts with the society to which they returned.
2
 
 
As the Vietnam War drew to a close, the rise of veterans’ groups such as Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War (VVAW) reflected a troubled social milieu in the United States. Given 
the unpopularity of the war and the difficulties numerous veterans had readjusting to civilian life, 
war-related psychological problems once again became a subject of popular concern. Many 
soldiers abruptly returned alone from Vietnam by plane, instead of with their unit and by ship, as 
veterans of earlier wars had. That change in method gave returning men less time to mentally 
decompress and readjust to life as a civilian, and few or no comrades with whom to vent their 
experiences. Moreover, unlike their First and Second World War counterparts, troops returned 
home to find protests and civilian disgust at their participation, as well as difficulties finding 
employment.
3
 One key sign of trouble was the 30 April 1971 shooting death in Detroit of 
African-American Dwight ‘Skip’ Johnson, a Medal of Honour recipient killed by a grocery store 
owner during an attempted robbery.
4
  
A three-part New York Times special series on Johnson a month later, covered 
simultaneously in Canada by the Globe and Mail, attempted to explain how “a Medal of Honor 
winner ended up dead in a holdup.” Johnson, like myriad soldiers in many wars, was haunted at 
night by his wartime memories. He was especially troubled by the remembrance of a face-to-face 
encounter with a North Vietnamese soldier during which he shot the man at point-blank range 
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and killed him, only managing to avoid death because the man’s AK47 – drawn and ready before 
his – misfired.5 Stan Enders, a gunner in Johnson’s tank on the morning of 14 January 1968 
(fortune had placed Johnson away from his usual comrades in a different tank), recalled Johnson 
saving a friend from a burning tank. Unfortunately, Johnson was forced to watch the machine 
explode with the rest of his comrades inside after its artillery shells ignited within. Johnson, 
Enders remembered, “just sort of cracked up” and went into a berserker rage, hunting down all 
Vietnamese in the area with a pistol and sub-machine gun. He killed a number of them until 
running out of ammunition, and then used his machine gun stock to bludgeon another. When it 
was all over, Johnson, still in a rage, attempted to kill several Vietnamese prisoners rounded up 
after the battle. Enders recalled that it took “three men and three shots of morphine to hold 
Dwight down.”6 Johnson was taken away in a straitjacket and released from hospital the next 
day; his Vietnam tour was over. He was given the Medal of Honour for bravery by President 
Lyndon Johnson at the White House ten months later, in November 1968.  
Conflicted about his wartime deeds, Johnson mostly kept silent about his tour. A friend 
recalled him being “all jumpy and nervous” and having to “be doing something all the time.”7 
One of his cousins remembered him bringing back a series of coloured slides “of dead people.” 
A U.S. Army psychiatrist later wrote that Johnson suffered from “depression caused by post-
Vietnam adjustment problem.”8 He became increasingly disillusioned about his heroism and the 
divided nation he returned to, and confided to his psychiatrist that he had recurring bad dreams 
and “entertained a lot of moral judgements as to what had happened at Dakto [the 
aforementioned battle].” Johnson also experienced guilt about his survival and wondered if he 
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was sane, asking his psychiatrist: “What would happen if I lost control of myself in Detroit and 
behaved the way I did in Vietnam?”9  
Johnson was eventually committed to a U.S. Army hospital in Phoenixville, 
Pennsylvania, but after a short stay he used a three-day pass in March 1971 to abscond back to 
Detroit. The final year of his life was marked by increasing debts and isolation from others. On 
the evening of 30 April 1971, he visited his wife, who was in the hospital for removal of an 
infected cyst. Before leaving, he joked with her, asking if she was going to give him “a little kiss 
goodbye.” After leaving the hospital, he asked his family for a ride, claiming he needed to pick 
up money from someone who owed him. He rode with his mother, stepfather, and a friend to a 
predominantly white neighbourhood of Detroit, and asked them to stop. After leaving the car, he 
walked down the street out of sight. His family became nervous when thirty minutes went by 
without his return. At about 11:45pm, a police car appeared and two officers drew pistols on 
them, demanding to know the reason for their presence. After replying that they were waiting for 
Dwight Johnson, they were told by the officers that he was “[dead] on the floor of a grocery store 
around the corner.”10 His mother later wondered if “Skip tired of this life and needed someone 
else to pull the trigger.”11  
Johnson’s case was an extreme but nonetheless representative example of the importance 
of both medical and socio-economic concerns for returning soldiers. He returned traumatized and 
haunted by his wartime experiences; he also believed Vietnam had irrevocably changed him. His 
readjustment to civilian life was made more difficult by the fact that he returned home to a 
divided nation and could not square the heroism of his actions with the seeming senselessness of 
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it all, particularly in light of the War’s polarizing effect on American society.12 Unlike soldiers of 
the First and Second World War, Johnson could cite no definitive cause to alleviate his guilt, nor 
could he necessarily expect a warm reception from civilians, despite the official praises he 
received. Johnson and his comrades “were not given victory parades and church services; did not 
receive absolution. Because the war seemed to them to have no meaning, the killing was doubly 
sinful.”13 On a societal level, the shock of a Medal of Honour winner dying during a grocery 
store robbery, and the media coverage it received, put veterans’ issues on the map and once again 
raised public consciousness of war-related trauma.
14
 Johnson’s case was discussed in numerous 
newspapers and academic journals, and an off-Broadway play about his life was viewed around 
the United States and on television.
15
  
 
Psychiatry, Politics, and the War that Never Ended 
  
 
One year after Johnson’s death, on 6 May 1972, The New York Times published an article 
about Vietnam veterans’ troubles by Chaim Shatan, a radical psychiatrist and co-director of the 
psychoanalytic training clinic at New York University’s Graduate Department of Psychology.16 
Shatan’s article was based on numerous veterans’ “group rap” sessions he and his colleagues – 
all opponents of the war – had organized in New York, and the “commonly shared concerns” 
that emerged.
17
 The meetings began two years earlier in 1970 through the combined efforts of 
Shatan, VVAW president Jan Crumb, and Shatan’s colleague Robert Jay Lifton, a former Korean 
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War Air Force psychiatrist who wrote about survivors of the Hiroshima bombing.
18
 Crumb 
sought Shatan and Lifton because their careers “combined professional knowledge with antiwar 
advocacy.”19 Veterans attended the meetings because of a distrust of “establishment” psychiatric 
services, and also because their postwar disturbances “manifested themselves too late to prove 
the ‘service connection’ required for Veterans Administration [VA] treatment.” Shatan listed a 
number of basic themes revealed during the sessions, including: guilty feelings “for those killed 
and maimed on both sides;” feelings of being scape-goated and victimized, first by “inadequate” 
VA treatment and benefits, and then by society for using and betraying them; rage stemming 
from “the awareness of being duped and manipulated;” brutalization from being “chewed up in 
the Vietnam war machine” and “spit out unfeeling;” alienation from their feelings and other 
people; and doubt about their “continued ability to love others.”20  
Lifton noticed common effects among civilian and military trauma survivors, especially 
“intense expressions of psychic numbing.”21 In addition to numbing, there were also ongoing and 
spontaneous moments of terror. Shatan’s Times article cited individual cases of Vietnam veterans 
such as “Steve,” who eighteen months after discharge from Marine combat duty still suffered 
“unpredictable episodes of terror and disorientation,” even in familiar places like Times Square. 
Since the veterans’ shared concerns did not fit “any standard diagnostic label,” Shatan wrote that, 
“we refer to them loosely as the post-Vietnam syndrome.” The sum total effect of the syndrome 
was “impacted grief,” in which “an encapsulated, never-ending past deprives the present of 
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meaning.”22 Those group sessions further revealed that numerous veterans were dealing not just 
with war trauma, but a “changing sense of masculinity.”23 Session participants often discussed 
the “John Wayne thing,” and cited society’s emphasis on traditional “macho emotions,” feelings 
stoked by the military, and which often led to violent inclinations even once out of uniform.
24
 
Lifton recalled one particularly emotional session when a veteran described killing a Viet Cong 
soldier with a knife. The man expressed moral ambivalence about his actions, feeling sorry for 
killing another human being but failing to understand why, since it was in the line of duty, and 
“John Wayne never felt sorry.”25 Such emotional quandaries reflected Vietnam veterans’ desire 
to achieve a moral equilibrium amidst conflicting feelings about their own bravery, masculinity, 
and sense of duty, all set against the backdrop of a deeply divided American society.   
Like shell shock before it, post-Vietnam syndrome was an ambiguous but evocative term 
that metaphorically captured the troubles of many “lonely” soldiers, who, as during their time in 
Vietnam, were “unable to see their enemies” but nonetheless, felt anonymous and haunting 
threats.
26
 The term also became “a frightening buzz word among clinicians and journalists” and a 
“thinly veiled position of opposition to the war.”27 Despite the term’s use in popular discourse 
though, even within the Veterans Administration nomenclature for classifying and treating 
patients with war-related trauma remained largely idiosyncratic.
28
 Shatan and his colleagues, 
especially Lifton, were also influenced by a growing literature about Holocaust survivors.
29
 
Along with veterans’ advocacy, psychiatric work with post-Holocaust and other “survivor” 
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groups “created a new professional model: the psychiatrist as patients’ advocate, helping a group 
of wronged victims to win reparation. Their work also popularized the idea of a general, loosely-
defined ‘syndrome’ among a group of patients, made the idea of delayed emotional after-effects 
of trauma respectable and put guilt, particularly survivor guilt, on the agenda.”30 For critics of 
Shatan and his colleagues’ advocacy on behalf of veterans and other trauma victims, the key 
legacy of the new “syndrome” was that it created a shift in understandings of victimhood. The 
new term and its meaning placed much greater emphasis on victimhood than endurance, making 
even veterans who participated in atrocities victims of their own actions.
31
 
By the mid-1970s, Shatan, Lifton, and VVAW were still fighting to persuade the APA to 
revise their nomenclature and acknowledge veterans’ psychiatric problems.32 Shatan was 
dismayed since the late 1960s about the disappearance of a combat-stress diagnosis in DSM-II, 
and his 1972 Times article was part of a long campaign to ensure that situation was reversed.
33
 
Robert Lifton for his part attacked American psychiatry (namely the APA) and military 
psychiatry, particularly the latter for the primacy it placed on conserving the fighting strength at 
the expense of the individual soldier.
34
 Lifton and Shatan’s advocacy efforts also made them 
radical vis-à-vis their colleagues, with their vocal antiwar stance placing them outside the 
psychiatric mainstream. Lifton recalled in his 2011 memoir that “psychiatrists like Hy [Chaim] 
Shatan and myself were also experiencing war-related alienation from American society ... the 
rap groups, which functioned outside ordinary channels, were a product of this shared 
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alienation.”35 After establishing links with the National Council of Churches and various 
universities and publication outlets across the United States, they helped to form the National 
Veterans Resource Project, a group created to convince mainstream psychiatrists and the APA to 
recognize post-Vietnam syndrome.
36
  
Fortuitously, the APA was simultaneously under attack by gay rights activists because of 
the inclusion of homosexuality as a “disorder” in DSM-II.37 In December 1973, 20,000 APA 
psychiatrists voted on the heated issue, with 58% approving revisions to DSM-II.
38
 
Homosexuality was thus categorized as a “sexual orientation disturbance” instead of a 
“disorder,” and the Manual’s architects decided that homosexuality would only be considered a 
disorder if the individual in question experienced distressful feelings about their sexual 
orientation.
39
 With just one referendum the APA reversed a century-old position on 
homosexuality. In the short term, the effect slightly decreased pressure on the APA, which was 
fighting several battles at once. The long-term effect was bluntly but accurately stated by Edward 
Shorter: “Once it became known how easily the APA’s Nomenclature Committee had given way 
on homosexuality, it was clear that the psychiatrists could be rolled.”40 The homosexuality 
controversy demonstrated that socio-political pressure could be exerted on the APA to obtain the 
addition, alteration, or deletion of psychiatric syndromes from the DSM. Shatan and Lifton’s 
quest to gain mainstream psychiatric recognition for post-Vietnam syndrome fell in a similar 
pattern to the homosexuality controversy, and their well-intentioned efforts exposed that 
psychiatric classification was not a purely objective process.    
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In June 1974 Psychiatric News reported that a new DSM – DSM-III – was in the works.41 
Around that time, the head of the DSM-III task force, Robert Spitzer, during a phone 
conversation stated that “no change” was planned with regard to combat-stress disorders. 
Surprised and dismayed after hearing about Spitzer’s decision through word-of-mouth channels, 
Shatan and Lifton met with one another to discuss future plans.
42
 The decision was made to 
apply public pressure through a radio station in New York City. They arranged an all-day 
broadcast on Vietnam veterans, and were quite successful, encouraging listeners to phone in and 
discuss the issue.
43
 Next, they arranged a meeting with Spitzer at the APA’s annual convention 
in 1975. At the convention, Spitzer challenged Shatan and his colleagues to disprove works 
arguing against the separate classification of Vietnam veterans’ problems. Shatan once again 
took the lead, and organized a working group to research the issue and gather evidence. The 
group came up with the term “post-combat disorder,” but as time went on, and after consulting 
Holocaust literature, the group began to conceptualize the syndrome they envisioned as a more 
general disorder affecting both civilian survivors and combatants.
44
 Spitzer, still somewhat 
skeptical, nevertheless appointed a Committee on Reactive Disorders to proceed with research 
and report to the DSM-III task force. Spitzer gave the committee the assignment of working with 
Shatan and Lifton to justify and develop a diagnosis.
45
 
Shatan’s group received a significant intellectual boost when Mardi Horowitz joined the 
fight. Horowitz was a professor of psychiatry at the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute at 
the University of California, San Francisco, and was in the process of putting together a 
monograph on stress’ effects on the mind. The final product, his landmark 1976 book Stress 
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Response Syndromes, produced an overarching theory of the cognitive and emotional responses 
to stress, particularly traumatic stress. In the monograph, he discussed the thorny nature of 
enduring stress-related psychological difficulties, stating: “The crucial issue concerns the 
existence, nature, and etiological [causal] importance of general stress response tendencies as 
contrasted with idiosyncratic or person-specific types of variation in response to stress.”46 In 
spite of the evident difficulties in sorting cause from effect and general from specific, and the 
absence of something like Gross Stress Reaction in DSM-II, Horowitz nonetheless boldly 
predicted that DSM-III would  “probably take cognizance of such issues as will be discussed 
here, and return a stress response entity to the official list of diagnoses.”47 Horowitz’s work 
signalled a significant break from the past. He affirmed that with regard to long-term stress 
syndromes the issue of “how much is predisposition and how much is the effect of immediate 
stress is hard to elucidate because every syndrome will be composed of both sources of 
influence.”48 Such statements indicated the intellectual ground was shifting, and that 
predisposition was no longer thought of as the deciding factor in the mind’s long-term response 
to abnormally stressful events. 
Horowitz’s study was an amalgamation of theories and work by Freud, Kardiner and 
other World War Two authors, as well as Shatan and Lifton’s more recent work with Vietnam 
veterans and Hiroshima survivors.
49
 He utilized the vast literature available and surmised that 
there were eight common responses to highly stressful events: Fear of repetition of the event; 
shame over helplessness or emptiness; rage at the source; guilt or shame over aggressive 
impulses; fear of “aggressivity” toward others; survivor guilt; fear of identification or merger 
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with victims, that is assuming the self as victim, even when the reality was otherwise; and 
sadness in relation to loss of another person, or symbolically of “the self.”50 Several of those 
responses later became enshrined as PTSD symptoms. Horowitz, who was a “tireless builder of 
intellectual structures,” built a bridge between civilian trauma in events like natural disasters, 
serious car accidents, or shipwrecks, and the trauma of combat soldiers.
51
 He also delineated a 
coherent framework for important factors in chronic stress syndromes, including the concept of 
“phases of stress response.” Horowitz used World War Two, Holocaust, and Vietnam veterans’ 
literature to demonstrate that although such events produced incredible strain there were, “phases 
of response in which denial or intrusive symptoms and signs may predominate.”52 There was 
thus provision within his system for delayed symptoms, which was observed in previous wars 
and their aftermath but most often attributed to character weakness or neurosis rather than the 
mind’s attempt to suppress traumatic memories. With Horowitz’s theories as a framework, 
Shatan’s vague concept of post-Vietnam Syndrome was henceforth given intellectual coherence 
and academic credence.
53
 
Although resistance continued for another few years, by 1978 Shatan and his colleagues 
gathered enough evidence to convince Spitzer and the other two members of the APA’s 
Committee on Reactive Disorders to call a meeting and review the findings. In January 1978, 
Spitzer and the Committee finally acquiesced. They recommended a diagnosis under the label 
“post traumatic stress disorder,” that appeared in the DSM’s third edition.54 No longer, as in the 
past, would emotional distress after combat be lumped under standard psychiatric syndromes of 
depression, alcoholism, or schizophrenia, and considered a product of the individual’s 
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maladaptive capacities stemming from earlier life events.
55
 Wilbur Scott deftly elucidated the 
socio-political nature of Shatan and his colleagues’ campaign: “PTSD is in DSM-III because a 
core of psychiatrists and veterans worked consciously and deliberately for years to put it there. 
They ultimately succeeded because they were better organized, more politically active, and 
enjoyed more lucky breaks than their opposition.”56 Once again war proved a catalyst for altering 
psychiatric thought and practice.     
The PTSD concept drew a decisive line in the sand, and was the first time the presumed 
cause and persistence of the disorder was relocated from the patient’s life-history to the external 
trauma incurred during wartime (or for civilians during disasters or other traumatic events). The 
nomenclature was a key factor. “Post traumatic,” meaning “after injury,” made it clear that the 
disorder indicated a change in well-being as a result of the trauma, not because of emotional and 
psychological conflicts from earlier life, as was thought with neuroses.
57
 The prime criterion for 
diagnosing PTSD was “the existence of a recognizable stressor [stressful event] that would 
evoke significant symptoms of distress in almost everyone.”58 That criterion was crucial because 
it acknowledged that a high magnitude of stress was enough to evoke psychological trauma in 
“almost everyone,” making PTSD symptoms normal rather than aberrant manifestations of 
illness, even in the long term. Thus, the “uneasy compromise between [psychodynamic] doctrine 
and the empirical evidence of veterans suffering from war-related chronic neurosis” was finally 
shattered.
59
 The APA’s official recognition of PTSD was “a turning point, a major paradigm 
shift, in ideas about psychological trauma.”60 On a societal level, PTSD’s enshrinement helped 
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legitimize long-term psychological difficulties in Vietnam veterans and other trauma sufferers, 
and at least in principle, made diagnosing trauma symptoms an objective matter.  
 
Psychiatric Adventures 
 
Crucially, while traumatic stress and its effects were re-formulated in the 1970s, another 
paradigm shift was in the making. The 1960s, which saw the high-water mark of the 
psychoanalytic movement, as encapsulated in DSM-II, also saw the nascent rise of “biological 
psychiatry.”61 Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a small group of dedicated 
researchers from Washington University, St. Louis, interested in brain chemistry, biology, and 
disease classification, formed a “counterrevolution” against psychoanalysis.62 Psychodynamic 
theorists were largely uninterested in the classification of mental disorders. On the other hand 
Robert Spitzer, head of the DSM-III task force, and the “St. Louis group,” sought to make 
psychiatric diagnosis as accurate as possible, in order to reflect what were presumed to be 
biologically-rooted diseases.
63
 In 1972, John Feighner, a diagnostician at Washington University, 
and several colleagues, published what became known as the “Feighner criteria,” a list of 
diagnostic criteria for fourteen psychiatric illnesses.
64
 As a testament to the intellectual shift 
occurring in psychiatry, Feighner’s paper was the most cited psychiatric paper throughout the 
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1970s.
65
 Spitzer and a few colleagues refined Feighner’s work, and came up with the “Research 
Diagnostic Criteria (RDC),” which for the first time attempted to use standard, fixed criteria for 
diagnosing mental disorders, instead of clinical experience and intuition, as had been the case for 
several decades.
66
 Spitzer and his co-authors confidently wrote that, “The data presented ... 
indicate high reliability for diagnostic judgements made using these criteria.”67 
Whereas previously a psychiatrist was required to spend a significant amount of time 
with a patient to arrive at a diagnosis, using fixed criteria (i.e., a patient must have symptoms 
“A” and “B” to have disorder “C”), that determination could be made in hours or minutes.68 
Moreover, once diagnoses were standardized, research could be focused and targeted, and 
clinicians could communicate across universities and countries, a previously difficult task when 
almost all disorders were thought to stem from a patient’s idiosyncrasies and life-history.69 The 
RDC and its adherents’ position went against “decades of neglect” with regard to diagnosis and 
classification (sometimes termed “nosology”).70 Writing shortly after DSM-III’s release in 1980, 
psychiatrist Gerald Klerman, a specialist in depression and schizophrenia, argued that the DSM-
III approach was a clean break from psychodynamic attitudes toward diagnosis.
71
 He succinctly 
summarized the reason why most psychoanalysts ignored diagnosis and classification: “If all 
conditions [disorders] were indications for psychotherapy, then diagnosis and differential 
treatment were not necessary.”72 Stated another way, if psychoanalysis was always the 
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prescribed treatment, the diagnosis was of secondary importance or none at all. Luckily for 
Spitzer and like-minded colleagues, he was appointed head of the task force to revise DSM-II, 
and was keen to use the RDC during DSM-III’s editorial process.73    
Spitzer, who subsequently wrote extensively on his role in DSM-III’s creation, aimed to 
make the new edition a distinct refocusing of American psychiatry toward what has been called 
“descriptive psychiatry,” and more importantly, to have psychiatric diagnoses rooted in empirical 
data rather than individual case histories and clinical experience.
74
 In contrast to DSM-II’s 
editorial board, which consisted of many psychoanalytically-oriented members, the DSM-III task 
force was heavily “weighted against it [psychoanalysis]” and favoured the biological approach.75 
Spitzer, a deft politician, was careful to choose committee members whose research interests 
aligned with his own.
76
 The goal was to produce, for the first time a “science-driven document.” 
Thus, as much as possible, Spitzer’s task force used research evidence to verify and refine 
diagnoses placed in DSM-III.
77
 In a signal even prior to its publication that DSM-III was a 
revolutionary document, the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) sponsored a DSM-
III trial run between 1977 and 1979 during which time 500 psychiatrists from many different 
centres used the new edition drafts to diagnose over 12,000 patients. After the diagnoses, 
psychiatrists were paired and their assessments were compared for consistency.
78
 Such a large-
scale diagnostic test had never been undertaken before. As a further testament to its 
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revolutionary nature, upon its release in 1980 DSM-III was almost 500 pages long, with many 
pages containing long lists of diagnostic criteria. The new Manual’s bulk was a far cry from the 
first and second editions, which were 130 and 134 pages respectively.
79
 
With DSM-III, Spitzer and his colleagues were also aware of, and responding to, serious 
pressures on their profession in the 1960s and 1970s. The first challenge related to 
pharmaceutical drugs and drug research. With the widespread use of drug therapies for 
psychiatric patients by the 1960s, diagnosis became a practical and sometimes crucial matter for 
both treatment and targeted research.
80
 In addition, major sources of research money and funding 
for treatment, namely the NIMH and insurance companies, began to demand more reliable 
diagnoses, greater accountability, and evidence-based practice.
81
 Under those conditions, 
numerous psychiatrists retreated from the psychoanalytical approach and toward the biological 
one. Consequently, “psychoanalysis lost its identification with psychiatric reform.”82 
A second pressure came from a number of studies within and outside the profession 
which displayed the woeful state of psychiatric diagnoses and a lack of diagnostic uniformity. 
One example was a 1970 cross-national NIMH-funded British and American study on the 
diagnosis of patients in London and New York City psychiatric hospitals. Focusing exclusively 
on schizophrenia, the researchers studied 192 patients from New York and 174 from London. 
They concluded there was an evident lack of consensus – in fact, major discrepancies – in how 
schizophrenia was appraised and diagnosed in each country. The discrepancies, according to the 
study’s researchers, were, “primarily a result of differences in the way the two groups of hospital 
psychiatrists diagnose patients” and not the result of any differing psychopathology exhibited by 
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patients.
83
 Essentially, psychiatric diagnostics failed to achieve a uniform or “scientific” 
standard.
84
 That two groups, albeit from different countries, could not reach a consensus on a 
major mental illness like schizophrenia, left the impression that psychiatrists were using 
idiosyncratic rather than empirical considerations when making their determinations. 
The second and more troubling study was published in 1973 in the prominent journal 
Science under the title “On Being Sane in Insane Places.” Psychologist David Rosenhan, 
professor at Stanford University, sent a group of healthy individuals to twelve psychiatric 
hospitals across the United States, each feigning symptoms of schizophrenia. Claiming to need 
treatment, the “pseudo-patients” were voluntarily admitted and subsequently reported their 
experiences within the institution. They also described their unsuccessful attempts to achieve 
release upon claiming they had recovered from their illness.
85
 In all cases except one, the 
pseudo-patients were admitted, and once admitted, were forced to adopt a drug therapy regimen 
as a condition of their release. Rosenhan’s test drew attention to the power of “labels,” that is the 
power of diagnoses to “stick” and stigmatize, influencing patient and practitioner once given. 
The test also drew attention to the dehumanizing nature of large hospitals. But Rosenhan’s most 
powerful intellectual indictment related to the continued use of psychiatric diagnoses despite 
their evident unreliability: “The facts of the matter are that we have known for a long time that 
diagnoses are often not useful or reliable, but we have nevertheless continued to use them.”86 He 
delivered an even more scathing volley, affirming that, “We now know that we cannot 
distinguish insanity from sanity.”87 On top of the embarrassment for psychiatrists, such studies 
also fuelled the “antipsychiatry” movement, a misnomer applied to a diverse group of thinkers 
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that in the 1960s and 1970s published critiques whose common ground was that, “psychiatric 
illness is not medical in nature but social, political, and legal.”88     
Spitzer, who directly responded to Rosenhan’s study with his own 1976 article, was 
acutely aware of the popularity of critiques against diagnostic labels, but nonetheless affirmed 
that “when properly used, they have been shown to be of considerable value.”89 Spitzer’s aims 
with DSM-III were, among other things, to defeat critics like Rosenhan and place psychiatry on a 
more scientific footing. Thus, when DSM-III was finally released in 1980, the anticipation, 
controversy, and immediate impact were evident in the number sold. Within six months of its 
publication, more people ordered DSM-III than all previous editions combined, including their 
thirty-plus reprints.
90
 Whether critics or supporters, all noted that DSM-III signaled a new era in 
psychiatry; historians agreed. Edward Shorter called it: “[A]n event of capital importance, not 
just for American but for world psychiatry, a turning of the page on psychodynamics, a 
redirection of the discipline toward a scientific course, a reembrace of the positivistic principles 
of the nineteenth century, [and] a denial of the antipsychiatric doctrine of the myth of mental 
illness.”91 Psychoanalyst Mitchell Wilson called the DSM-III story “a story about the changing 
power base, as well as the changing knowledge base, within American psychiatry,” noting how 
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clinicians were replaced by biomedical researchers as the most influential voices in the field.
92
 
Psychopharmacologist and historian David Healy argued that DSM-III’s popularity indicated 
“the importance that psychiatry had assumed in the popular mind.”93 Although both DSM-III 
critics, political scientist Rick Mayes and sociologist Allan Horwitz  nonetheless pointed to its 
powerful impact, stating that “for the first time, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and 
counselors had one common language to define mental disorders.”94 
  
Politics, Trauma, and Popular Perceptions 
 
By providing a common language and symptom profile to conceptualize PTSD, DSM-III 
contributed to the monumental growth of research into psychological trauma in the 1980s and 
beyond. In medical circles and the popular mind PTSD created a common framework for how all 
humans responded to trauma, helping to build bridges between war trauma and the myriad ways 
civilians were also affected by harrowing events.
95
 Psychiatrist and researcher into the socio-
cultural underpinnings of PTSD Derek Summerfield stated that PTSD was “the flagship of this 
medicalized trauma discourse,” a discourse which spread rapidly in the United States after 
1980.
96
 But the PTSD concept’s osmosis into popular consciousness was uneven throughout the 
next few decades, and although immediately felt in the United States, PTSD’s entry was 
somewhat muted in Canada, a nation that in 1980 had not been at war for almost thirty years. 
Although the PTSD concept provided American Vietnam veterans with symbolic and 
literal compensation for their psychological injuries and social alienation, the estimated 12,000 
Canadians who fought with U.S. forces in Vietnam had their postwar troubles go unnoticed by 
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the Canadian public throughout the 1980s.
97
 There were a few key reasons for their invisibility: 
Since Canada was officially a non-belligerent during the conflict, many Canadians viewed those 
who volunteered to fight with the United States as morally questionable mercenaries.
98
 Others, 
sensitive to Canada’s role as a haven for thousands of American draft dodgers, horrified at the 
images brought to their living room through the relatively new medium of television, and attuned 
to antiwar sentiments prevalent across North America, viewed Vietnam veterans as “baby 
killers.”99 Doug Clark, a freelance writer researching a book on Canadian Vietnam veterans in 
1984, stated in a Globe and Mail article that there were “few charitable adjectives” used towards 
those who fought with the Americans.
100
 In addition, the Royal Canadian Legion denied 
Canadian Vietnam veterans full membership and denied them participation in Remembrance 
Day ceremonies.
101
 Lastly, due to the murky number of Canadians in the war and their unpopular 
decision to participate, newspaper coverage was strikingly sparse. The net effect was that most 
men opted to stay out of the public eye, preferring to keep their war service, and subsequent 
troubles, a secret known only to their closest family and friends.
102
 Canadian Vietnam veterans 
became in effect “Canada’s unknown warriors.”103  
Despite their relatively hidden existence within Canadian society throughout the 1970s 
and beyond, there were ephemeral signs numerous Canadian Vietnam veterans were suffering 
like their American counterparts.
104
 Doug Clark’s article argued that in a few key respects 
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Canadian veterans had a more difficult postwar adjustment, namely due to the “absence of a 
readily identifiable peer group and lack of competent medical help.”105 According to Clark, the 
roughly 20% of Canadian veterans afflicted with various mental disorders, the most common of 
which was PTSD, were “further disadvantaged by a [Canadian] medical profession that either 
cannot or will not address itself to medical concerns judged legitimate by U.S. colleagues.”106 
His article scathingly attacked not just the medical profession, but also the Canadian public, who 
had in the “finest Canadian tradition” denounced the Vietnam war and its veterans without 
acknowledging the profits accumulated by Canadian corporations that manufactured all varieties 
of war matériel for the United States, including green berets and defoliants.
107
 
Two years later the Toronto Star published an article about Canadian Vietnam veterans 
and the “void” they returned to after the war. Pointing to the differences between Canadian and 
American veterans, the author wrote that Canadians “were ignored” and “remained isolated, not 
even knowing each other.”108 One veteran reported having flashbacks of a terrified comrade’s 
face even ten years after the war’s end, something that caused him to “stay away from people.” 
Others expressed strong feelings of alienation, particularly since the Canadian government did 
not provide aid while the U.S. Department of Defense refused to admit any Canadians 
participated in the war.
109
 Alex Mills, nineteen-years-old when he volunteered to fight in 
Vietnam, lamented: “The experiences were brutal enough in the combat zones, but they seemed 
worse once we got home.”110 The article’s author demonstrated the relative lack of knowledge 
about PTSD among the public in the 1980s when he identified the stress-related disorder 
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numerous Canadian veterans displayed not as PTSD, but its former name: “post-Viet Nam 
syndrome.”111       
South of the border, in 1985 The New York Times also spotlighted Canadian Vietnam 
veterans’ plight in a two-page article.112 Utilizing several interviews, the article highlighted the 
socio-economic difficulties facing veterans, including limited access to benefits from the 
American government, none from the Canadian government, and being shunned by the Canadian 
public.
113
 Veterans’ anecdotal evidence pointed to the psychological troubles those men 
shouldered, including one veteran described as a “pill-popping former paratrooper who insisted 
on walking around Montreal armed.”114 Interviewees also drew attention to the dearth of 
knowledge among Canadian physicians about “post-Vietnam stress disorders that American 
doctors have begun to recognize.”115 One veteran laconically summed up the situation, saying 
that, “They [Canadian doctors] want to commit you or incarcerate you.” Another spoke of 
contemplating suicide before finally checking himself into a hospital for assessment.
116
 Tallying 
up the situation amongst his comrades, a Marine veteran appropriately named Teddy Canadian 
declared that, “Some of these guys are still [psychologically] in Vietnam…They are in bad shape 
but they won’t admit it.”117 Vern Murphy, spokesman for the DVA, bluntly declared that 
Canadian Vietnam veterans could not “be a burden on the Canadian taxpayer, because we 
weren’t involved in it [the war].”118 His comment displayed the distance both the public and 
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federal government placed between themselves and Vietnam.
119
 Unfortunately, fragmented but 
poignant testimony also showed the distance Vietnam veterans placed between themselves and 
Canadian society.  
Veterans’ anecdotes also raised the issue of the degree to which Canadian physicians 
ignored or dismissed veterans with PTSD symptoms. The answer, pieced together by examining 
Canadian medical publications in the 1980s and supporting works on PTSD outside of the United 
States, was that Canadian mental health professionals, save for a few researchers, were largely 
uninterested in PTSD and/or unaware of its existence. Colloquially put, PTSD was not a “hot” 
topic in Canada like it was in the United States during the 1980s. Joel Paris, prolific writer on 
psychiatric topics and current editor of the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry stated in 
correspondence: “Everybody [psychiatrists] accepted PTSD as a diagnosis after 1980, but I can’t 
think of anyone who studied it in those early years.”120 There were in fact no articles about PTSD 
in the Canadian Medical Association Journal during the 1980s. A 1985 editorial about Canadian 
physicians in the Second World War made passing references to battle exhaustion, but drew no 
links to postwar psychiatric problems and did not connect the term with later knowledge about 
PTSD.
121
 Likewise a 1987 article about Canadian prisoners of war from the Battle of Hong Kong 
(1941) cited almost 200 veterans who developed “psychiatric problems as a result of their 
imprisonment,” but the author made no mention of PTSD and never used the DSM-III concept of 
trauma.
122
  
The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, the CPA’s official journal, made only two specific 
mentions of PTSD throughout the entire decade, including in articles, editorials, and subscriber 
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letters.
123
 In the first instance, a 1985 short article focusing on PTSD after car accidents was 
conducted by a group of researchers at the University of Toronto.
124
 In the second instance, a 
1987 letter to the editor on “Management of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Ethnicity” cited 
the case of a Vietnamese immigrant who was committed to a provincial psychiatric hospital after 
threatening his apartment caretaker with a knife.
125
 Believing that communists from Vietnam 
were in Canada and plotting to kill him, the man also experienced recurring nightmares and 
appeared to be reliving traumatic moments from his past life. The article’s author, somewhat 
aware of current trauma literature, noted that “The catastrophic effect of the Vietnam War may 
have influenced the emergence of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as a distinct syndrome.”126  
One lone researcher, Robert Stretch, a psychologist and U.S. Army Major, studied the 
Vietnam War’s effects on Canadian personnel.127 Stretch published three articles, two in 1990 
and one in 1991, which examined the psychological and social adjustment of Canadian veterans 
who had served in combat and peacekeeping roles.
128
 With regard to the former group, he 
concluded that not only did Canadian Vietnam veterans have “significantly greater rates of 
posttraumatic stress disorder” compared with U.S. combat veterans, but that part of their illness 
stemmed from “prolonged isolation from other Vietnam veterans, lack of recognition, and no 
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readily available treatment for PTSD in Canada.”129 Presciently, Stretch’s 1990 study of 121 
Canadians who served in a peacekeeping role in Vietnam suggested that “one does not have to be 
a combatant to be traumatized by war,” and that social support (or lack of) after returning home 
had a marked effect on the prevalence of PTSD in the group studied.
130
 All three of Stretch’s 
articles pointed to the importance of social support for peacekeeping and combat missions. There 
was, however elusive, a crucial link between a participant’s ability to connect his acts and 
experiences to a tangible, supported cause, and his mental health after service.
131
  
The scarcity of research about PTSD and Canadian Vietnam veterans’ health problems 
were also related to another factor. Given the emergence of PTSD as a result of the Vietnam War 
and its political aftermath, many experts initially felt PTSD to be a disorder unique to that 
conflict and its veterans, rather than a universal phenomenon. Much like how shell shock and 
battle exhaustion became manifestations associated with the First and Second World Wars, 
PTSD became linked to the uniquely stressful experiences of Vietnam, a war often conducted in 
the jungle, where the enemy was an ephemeral, ghostly figure, rarely heard and even more rarely 
seen.
132
 Building on this view, others attributed the Vietnam War’s aftershocks to its polarizing 
nature and the divided American social climate, particularly since most veterans developed 
psychological difficulties at home as opposed to in theatre.
133
 Taken together, it was easy for 
researchers in Canada and elsewhere to dismiss PTSD as a primarily U.S., Vietnam-specific 
phenomenon.   
As a useful comparison, in the United Kingdom, like in Canada, PTSD had an initially 
slow entry into research circles and the public forum. A 1981 historical survey of trauma by 
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Michael Trimble, researcher and lecturer in neuropsychiatry at the National Hospital for Nervous 
Diseases in London, utilized the historical concept of “post-traumatic neurosis” rather than “post 
traumatic stress disorder” in its title, and never specifically mentioned the latter concept 
throughout.
134
 Trimble later revealed that when writing his book DSM-III had not yet been 
published and by its publication in 1981 PTSD, “concocted largely by political veterans was not 
within the general psychiatric community.”135 Trimble, as with numerous psychiatrists outside of 
the United States, believed PTSD to be a re-branding of “patterns” observed for hundreds of 
years, rather than a new and scientifically-based disorder.
136
  Thus, the PTSD concept was not 
granted immediate acceptance in Britain as it was in the United States.
137
 Anecdotal evidence, as 
well as PTSD’s absence from British psychiatric textbooks in the early- to mid-1980s also 
pointed to the disorder’s slow and muted entry into British civilian psychiatric circles.138 As in 
the United States, PTSD only became a front-page news item in the United Kingdom after the 
beginning of another war. 
Between the end of the Korean War and the 1980s, Britain was involved in only one 
major military campaign – the Suez Crisis of 1956. Consequently, when the Falklands War 
began in April 1982, British Royal Navy psychiatrists were aware of PTSD but deemed it a 
disorder specific to American Vietnam War conscripts.
139
 The Falklands War’s short duration, as 
well as – in contrast to the Vietnam veteran’s experience – the great honours and recognition its 
participants received upon their return to the United Kingdom, helped create the impression that, 
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as in the early stages of Vietnam, war-related mental disorders were a rare and insignificant 
problem.
140
 Psychiatric casualties during the Falklands War were reported as being only 2% of 
the total number of wounded; a far smaller figure than during past conflicts.
141
 Nevertheless, in a 
similar pattern to the Vietnam War, several years after their return numerous British veterans 
reported service-related psychological problems.
142
 While there was no consensus on the precise 
number of veterans with PTSD, comprehensive press coverage and widespread public interest in 
both the war and its consequences brought war-related mental disorder to the forefront in a 
manner unseen since the Second World War.
143
 
As government officials did in past conflicts, the British Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
initially denied PTSD or other psychiatric consequences were related to the war, and military 
physicians followed suit.
144
 But by 1986, with growing public pressure stemming from a number 
of news stories about suffering veterans, the MOD was forced to recognize PTSD as a disorder 
not limited to America. Nonetheless, in a testament to the strength of military culture and the 
traditional warrior ethos, British military physicians and officers were still divided on the issue, 
with some stubbornly viewing war-related trauma as indication of a weak character, and one 
Army college lecturer using the term “Compensation-itis” to describe PTSD.145 Despite the 
relatively low number of Falklands War casualties, it became difficult for the Ministry to 
maintain its position in the face of evidence that many men were witness to horrific scenes, such 
as one naval veteran injured by a bomb blast who returned below deck to find his best friend’s 
mutilated body.
146
 The MOD nevertheless maintained a hard stance on the issue, refusing to 
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carry out a large survey of Falklands veterans for fear of leaving the government open to 
litigation from ex-servicemen claiming the Ministry failed in its “duty of care.”147  
By the 1990s numerous veterans went ahead regardless and sued the MOD for medical 
negligence, on the grounds that inadequate care was given to detect and treat PTSD during and 
after the Falklands War.
148
 Their litigation culminated in a 2003 High Court decision which 
rejected the claims of more than 2000 military veterans from various wars that the MOD had 
failed in its duty of care.
149
 The Court’s decision, among other things, seemed to fly in the face 
of a 2002 article from The Mail on Sunday which claimed more Falklands veterans had 
committed suicide since 1982 than had died in combat.
150
 One of the main factors on which the 
Court’s decision hinged was that during the early 1980s British military authorities and 
psychiatrists believed that PTSD was a Vietnam-specific disorder. The judge ruled “it was 
reasonable for the MOD to assume that this [PTSD] was due to factors specific to that war 
[Vietnam], or indeed not so much the war itself, but America’s reaction to it.”151 The landmark 
trial highlighted that while the MOD was not obligated to provide a duty of care above and 
beyond that of any other employer, military authorities were now unable to deny the existence of 
war-related mental disorders or easily dismiss them as weakness of character.
152
 The Falklands 
War had, like Vietnam in America, brought war-related trauma into public consciousness in the 
United Kingdom. Although the Falklands War differed from Vietnam in some key respects, such 
as the great public adulations and societal support given to Falklands’ veterans, much of the 
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historical pattern was similar. After the Falklands, PTSD became a widely accepted consequence 
of war.
153
 Moreover, the Falklands War, like future peacekeeping operations in Canada during 
the 1990s, helped create the impression that PTSD was not an American, Vietnam-specific 
disorder, but a universal reaction to trauma.  
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CHAPTER 4: PEACEKEEPING, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTIONS 
 
It isn’t Sesame Street out there.1 
 
That [peacekeeping] is a bullshit word. In Cyprus, that was peacekeeping. You’ve got a buffer zone, a demilitarized 
zone keeping warring factions at bay. Bosnia-Herzegovina wasn’t peacekeeping – or Croatia or Kosovo or Somalia 
or Rwanda. None of those were peacekeeping missions. They’re war monitoring and you’re in it, baby, you’re right 
in the middle of it.
2
 
  
During his twenty years in the Canadian Armed Forces, from 1986 until retirement in 
2006, retired Warrant Officer Andrew Godin bore witness to historic changes in the nature of 
peacekeeping operations throughout the world.
3
 As with numerous CAF members during the 
1980s, Godin’s first overseas tour as part of the long-established (since 1964) United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, was one of relative calm.
4
 Although there were occasional 
incidents, UN peacekeepers occupied a well-established buffer zone between the opposing Greek 
and Turkish sides, and were generally able to carry on their duties without fear of injury or 
death.
5
 Many Canadian peacekeepers, Godin included, jokingly referred to the mission as a 
“Club Med” vacation, given the island’s generally relaxed atmosphere and balmy climate.6 
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Unfortunately, Cyprus was a benchmark that proved ill-suited to preparing peacekeepers for 
future operations. Testifying before the Croatia Board of Inquiry in September 1999, Chief 
Warrant Officer (ret.) M.B. McCarthy stated:  
 
I have done four tours there, Cyprus killed us. Cyprus was the worst thing that has ever 
happened to us. Cyprus put NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers], not so much soldiers, 
but NCOs in a mindset. Even though we were there for 20-some odd years and everyone 
knew it was a party and it was. Cyprus was a good time, a good tour. Seventy-four ('74) 
wasn't a good time, you know, but after that it was great. And some people, some NCOs 
went over, ‘We are going to Yugoslavia. Another UN mission. More partying.’ Things 
changed dramatically.
7
   
  
Thus when Godin and his regiment, 4 Combat Engineer Regiment, arrived in the former 
Yugoslavia in 1992 as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the sights, 
sounds, and events he witnessed affected him long after his tour ended. He learned early on that 
in conflicts fueled by ancient, ethnic hatreds, traditional ideas of respect for one’s foe, and even 
the sanctity of human remains, meant little to its participants. In Croatia he saw a dead Serbian 
soldier “dragged through the streets like a dog” and thrown into a river “like a piece of 
garbage.”8 He recalled seeing numerous “floating, bloating bodies” that moved downriver and at 
first glance reminded him of swans.
9
 On another occasion his unit came upon a local spa where 
the entire outdoor pool was filled with the bodies of Serbians who had not heeded Croatian 
threats to leave. And in several instances Godin saw Croat and Serb combatants’ skeletal remains 
on the side of the road, left to rot because they were in a sniper zone and no one from either side 
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dared venture out and risk being shot attempting a recovery.
10
 Appraising his tour, Godin bluntly 
stated, “That’s what you witnessed, that’s what you saw.”11 Making the situation even more 
difficult to process was the fact that Godin and his comrades were unable to intervene in 
tragedies they witnessed because it was not part of their UN mandate; a mandate which in 
Croatia often made them “incidental bystanders at someone else’s battle.”12 After relating the 
above events in an interview, Godin paused for a few moments and then quietly said, “Those are 
the things that eat away at you.”13 
 Upon his return from Croatia and Bosnia in late 1992, Godin sensed something was 
wrong when he experienced difficulty falling asleep, followed by nights filled with “massive 
nightmares.”14 He also felt increasingly jumpy and noticed that sudden noises jarred and 
unnerved him.
15
 Unable to put a name to his troubles, he began drinking heavily in his off time to 
forget about his experiences, and carried on with his work. A few years later, Godin sat in a 
military classroom during a pre-screening prior to a Bosnia deployment while a “suit” – CAF 
slang for a civilian Department of National Defence worker – discussed PTSD symptoms. 
Checking off most of the symptoms in his head, Godin later made an appointment with a social 
worker from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa while on a six month training 
course. He remembered sitting down and presenting his overseas experiences and subsequent 
psychological difficulties for “quite a few hours.” He was nonetheless told afterward that things 
would get better with time, and to carry on.
16
 So he did just that, returning to the former 
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Yugoslavia two more times, first to Bosnia in 1996, and again to Kosovo and Macedonia in 
1999-2000. 
 Godin likened his worsening situation to a bank vault: “What do you do with that stuff? 
[trauma] You package it up and say to yourself, ‘I’ll deal with this later,’ and you tuck it away in 
this bank vault, never to see the light of day again ... Because if you stop to think about it you’re 
going to shut down ... And you won’t be able to do your job ... Well, one day, your bank vault is 
full.”17 He knew his vault was full when one night during the Christmas season he found himself 
contemplating how to drive his car off the Bank Street Bridge in Ottawa and make it look like an 
accident. The next day, he went to the National Defence Medical Centre and spoke with his 
doctor. After sitting down with a social worker, psychologist, and finally a psychiatrist, he was 
diagnosed with PTSD in 2003, roughly ten years after his initial concerns.  
 Godin’s journey from health to illness, and his peacekeeping experiences, mirrored larger 
developments within the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian society during 
the 1990s. While Godin struggled with an individual, personal understanding of his 
psychological difficulties, at a macro level the CAF, DND, and Canadian public struggled with 
their own understanding and recognition of peacekeeping operations’ traumatic effects on 
soldiers. By the late 1990s, with numerous cases of peacekeepers’ trauma coming to light in 
military circles and the press, Canadians were, for the first time, exposed to what journalist Carol 
Off retrospectively called “Canadian post-traumatic stress disorder that comes from 
peacekeeping.”18 The Canadian experience was unique because unlike in Britain and the United 
States, it was not war per se, but “military operations other than war” that brought attention to 
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psychological trauma.
19
 By the new millennium, peacekeepers’ trauma had not only shattered 
many Canadian soldiers’ minds, it also challenged traditional myths and attitudes about mental 
illness and masculinity, and demonstrated that in many instances there was little peace involved 
in peacekeeping. 
 
Peacekeeping – The Suez Crisis, a Nobel Prize, and National Identity 
 
 Three years after the end of the Korean War in 1956, the Suez Crisis erupted after Israel, 
Britain, and France invaded Egypt, in the British case as a response to Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser nationalizing the Suez Canal Company.
20
 The tense months that followed after the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada, among others, pressured the Israelis, French, and 
British to withdraw have been described as one of the death throes of the British Empire and 
some of the darkest hours after the Second World War.
21
 Suez was, put simply, when “the 
[British] lion roared for the last time.”22 For Canada though, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Lester Pearson’s prominent role in helping to defuse the situation and create a United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to quell further violence led to a new Canadian specialty - 
peacekeeping.
23
 The “Pearsonian” model of peacekeeping, in which neutral UN troops deployed 
to a buffer zone with conflicting parties’ consent to enforce an accepted ceasefire, was the 
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standard model for subsequent peacekeeping missions throughout the next several decades.
24
 
While Pearson’s actions and rhetoric were criticized by some Canadians who felt he had 
betrayed the motherland with his critique of British actions during Suez, he was nonetheless 
internationally praised for his efforts during the Crisis, and for his role became the first Canadian 
to win a Nobel Peace Prize, in 1957.
25
 Gunnar Jahn, chairman of the Nobel award committee, 
stated during the award ceremony that Pearson was “the man who contributed more than anyone 
else to save the world at that time.”26 
 Pearson was rather humble about his achievements during his Nobel Lecture, praising the 
UN and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold for the mission’s success. He also expressed 
caution about expecting any long-term political successes or solutions, stating, “I do not 
exaggerate the significance of what has been done. There is no peace in the area [the Middle 
East]. There is no unanimity at the United Nations about the functions and future of this [UNEF] 
force.”27 Nevertheless, the UN mission’s success and adulations Pearson received convinced 
both Canadian politicians and the public that peacekeeping was a way for Canada to play an 
important role on the world stage.
28
 Despite the evident pride expressed about Canada’s efforts 
during the First and Second World Wars, in the half-century after the 1950s participation in UN 
missions allowed Canadians to define themselves more by their ability to keep the peace than to 
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win wars.
29
 For several decades after Pearson’s UNEF mission, Canada contributed more 
soldiers to peacekeeping operations than any other nation in the world.
30
  
As a middle power, peacekeeping allowed Canada to punch above its weight in 
international politics; it also symbolically contributed to a sense that Canada was, as Governor 
General Adrienne Clarkson later stated, a “peaceable kingdom.”31 By the late 1980s, 100,000 
Canadian troops had been deployed to more than thirty peacekeeping missions under UN and 
non-UN authority.
32
 It was Canadians’ consistent willingness to engage in peacekeeping efforts 
that led Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Paul Manson in 1988 to affirm: “The image of 
a Canadian soldier wearing his blue [UN] beret, standing watch at some lonely outpost in a 
strife-torn land, is part of the modern Canadian mosaic, and a proud tradition.”33 The same year, 
when the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeepers, many Canadians felt that it 
was their prize; a notion reinforced by a Defence White Paper several years later which espoused 
that more than thirty years after Pearson’s Nobel win, “Canadians could once again take pride in 
their contribution to peace as the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in recognition of the work of 
peacekeeping personnel.”34 The same paper reported that both Pearson’s and the 1988 prize were 
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an important reflection of Canada’s “evolving international personality.”35 By 1989, 
peacekeeping was considered postwar Canada’s major contribution to world politics, with 
Canadian Defence Quarterly, the official publication of the Canadian Army, dedicating an entire 
issue to peacekeeping.
36
 In 1992, General Manson’s evocative vision of the peacekeeping 
tradition was enshrined through the creation of a large monument to peacekeepers in Ottawa 
entitled Reconciliation. At the monument three UN peacekeepers – two men and one woman – 
stand with binoculars and radios, calmly observing an imaginary scene. Below, a quotation from 
Lester Pearson invokes history to remind viewers of Canada’s pioneering role in peacekeeping.37 
When the monument itself was commemorated on the 1995 one dollar coin, it was evident 
peacekeeping had become part of the Canadian national psyche. 
 Scholars on both sides of the political spectrum have recognized peacekeeping’s 
contribution to a Canadian national identity. Political scientist and feminist scholar Sandra 
Whitworth, for example, whose work has analyzed some of the more controversial and gendered 
behaviour of peacekeeping troops, acknowledged that peacekeeping was a major factor in the 
construction of a distinctly Canadian identity.  Invoking Benedict Anderson she stated that the 
peacekeeping tradition and its symbolism were a crucial part of the “‘imagined community’ that 
is the nation.”38 On the other side of the spectrum, political and military historian Jack 
Granatstein claimed peacekeeping was detrimental to the Canadian military because of its 
encouragement of “do-goodism writ large.”39 Nevertheless, in his bestselling 2004 work Who 
Killed the Canadian Military? he too acknowledged the large role peacekeeping played since 
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1956 in, for better or worse, differentiating Canadian military efforts and identity from that of its 
southern neighbour.
40
 Thus, while academics have interpreted its effects and meaning in different 
ways, there is a general consensus that peacekeeping contributed to Canadians viewing 
themselves as peaceful, reticent warriors whose efforts brought stability to embattled parts of the 
globe.
41
 At the end of the twentieth century, the peacekeeping tradition was one of the most 
prominent threads in the national tapestry.
42
 Along with the Mounties, the canoe, and visions of 
the great white North, peacekeeping was one of Canada’s enduring “national dreams;” a symbol 
that expressed some of the fundamental beliefs Canadians held about their national character.
43
 
 
Peacekeeping Changes, Budget Cuts, and Cover-Ups 
 
Unfortunately, just as peacekeeping became a national symbol, “peacekeeping” itself 
morphed into a vague and often euphemistic concept. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
by 1991, a proliferation of local ethnic and nationalist conflicts sprung up across the globe, 
resulting in an increased need for peacekeeping operations.
44
 In 1991 there were only 11,000 UN 
“Blue Helmets” on eleven peacekeeping operations, but by late 1994 there were 76,000 deployed 
at seventeen different sites around the world.
45
 What had previously been an activity largely “full 
of subtleties for the governments involved and a bit of romantic adventure for the participating 
soldiers” became one of almost metaphysical complexity.46 UN forces in the early- to mid-1990s 
were expected to, among other things, intervene in civil wars, patrol dangerous areas, organize 
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elections, engage with and disarm militias, help to rebuild infrastructure, and create and reinforce 
new borders.
47
 In some instances, as in Somalia, UN peacekeepers were given mandates that 
allowed them to be both heavily armed and legally sanctioned in the use of force against warring 
parties.
48
  
The Pearsonian peacekeeping model that served the world well in the postwar period 
proved to be antiquated, and “peacekeeping” changed into something often more akin to peace 
building or peace enforcement.
49
 The 1994 Defence White Paper hinted at such changes when it 
acknowledged the “changing face of peacekeeping” and noted that the nature of UN missions 
“now poses far more risk to our personnel.”50 That view was mirrored by UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, and 1995 follow-up report, both 
produced for the UN Security Council. Boutros-Ghali described a “new breed of intra-state 
conflicts” that were “often guerrilla wars without clear front lines,” and cautioned that, 
“Peacekeeping today can involve constant danger.”51 His assessment of the heightened danger 
was reflected in casualty figures. While 400 peacekeepers were killed between 1948 and 1990, 
most often in accidents, in just four years between 1991 and 1995, 460 were killed, usually in 
combat or attacks on UN personnel.
52
 As it had done since the UN’s creation, Canada dutifully 
participated in numerous peacekeeping missions throughout the 1990s despite the increased 
danger and complexity of many operations. In late 1992, Canada had peacekeeping troops under 
UN authority in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Cambodia, El Salvador, Kuwait, the Western 
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Sahara, Nicaragua, and the former Yugoslavia.
53
 Moreover, while Canadian soldiers participated 
in harrowing missions during the 1990s, they also operated under socio-economic turmoil. 
 The 1990s was, in many respects, the most difficult decade for the CAF and DND since 
the end of the Second World War. An increased operational tempo and series of major scandals 
coincided with successive rounds of budget cuts running throughout the decade, leading one 
senior figure to retrospectively deem the 1990s “The Decade of Darkness.”54 Both organizations 
struggled to weather the storm as they went from “disaster to calamity.”55 While the decade 
began with a large CAF presence in Europe and a manageable number of peacekeeping 
operations, the situation rapidly changed after the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a new, post-
Cold War world.
56
 In spite of a rising national debt crisis during the early 1990s, Canadians felt 
obligated to do their part once again. Beginning with the Progressive Conservative cabinet of 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, successive governments committed the CAF to a plethora of 
peacekeeping operations while concurrently decreasing its resources and personnel levels.
57
 The 
first difficulty related to the Forces Reduction Program (FRP). Begun in 1991, the FRP aimed to 
decrease the total strength of CAF Regular Force members from approximately 89,000 to 60,000 
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by the decade’s end.58 What this reduction meant for the CAF was essentially “do more with 
less.” Budgetary cutbacks also affected equipment, something made evident during operations in 
subsequent years.
59
  
 Although finances were an ongoing concern for senior leaders, inside the walls of 
National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, DND and CAF officials also battled with numerous 
scandals that tarnished both organizations’ reputation. One source of embarrassment related to 
sexual harassment and assault in the military. In August 1993 the Globe and Mail published an 
exposé about the harassment of female CAF members, drawing attention to the fact that more 
harassment claims were filed in 1992 with the Canadian Human Rights Commission against the 
CAF than against any other single institution.
60
 That statistic was a significant concern for an 
institution in which women made up 11% of its 80,000 members by 1993.
61
 Though the CAF did 
not keep statistics on sexual harassment, a DND study released a few months prior to the Globe 
article stated that one in every four female soldiers reported incidents of sexual harassment, with 
a small number even claiming they had been raped or subjected to attempted sexual assault.
62
 
One retired Major-General chalked the problem up to men’s resentment toward women entering 
an historically male preserve, but a 1998 Maclean’s magazine article titled “Rape in the 
Military,” followed by two more articles later that year in which numerous former military 
women reported “flagrant hostility” and sexual harassment, hinted the problem went deeper than 
just male posturing.
63
 Under pressure after the June 1998 exposé, CDS Maurice Baril asked 
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women who had been sexually assaulted to come forward and tell their story, insisting their case 
would be quickly and thoroughly investigated.
64
 Despite Baril’s admission that a problem 
existed, a December 1998 Maclean’s follow-up piece, which stated that almost all thirty women 
who came forward to the magazine were disappointed with how their case had been handled, 
implied that CAF and DND leaders were more concerned with their public image than with a 
radical expunging of the problem.
65
  
                                                
The Somalia Affair 
 
 Sexual harassment in the military was a significant flashpoint throughout the decade, but 
above all else it was events in Belet Huen, Somalia, on 16 March 1993 that overshadowed the 
CAF for the remainder of the 1990s. That night, two members of the Canadian Airborne 
Regiment (CAR), in Somalia as part of Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a UN-sanctioned, US-led 
peace-enforcement contingent, viciously tortured and murdered a Somali teenager caught hiding 
in a portable toilet on the Canadian compound.
66
 The shock of the crime was matched only by its 
brutality. For over two hours Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and Private Kyle Brown, 
unhindered by numerous witnesses who saw the crime in progress, blindfolded their prisoner, 
beat him repeatedly, and burned his feet with cigarettes, at several points stopping to take 
“trophy photos” of themselves with the victim.67 Another CAR member later found the dying 
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teenager, Shidane Arone, and sounded the alarm, but Arone was declared dead as a result of 
injuries when taken to a medical unit. Future testimony revealed that Arone had repeatedly 
screamed “Canada! Canada!” shortly before his death.68 Military police were not informed until 
19 March, at which time Matchee was arrested. Perhaps finally sensing the gravity of his crime, 
he tried to commit suicide. He was found hanging in his cell a few hours later, alive but in a 
coma. He was then taken to an Ottawa hospital and subsequently declared unfit for trial on 
account of severe brain damage.
69
 Private Brown was court-martialed, dishonourably discharged, 
and sentenced to five years in prison, but was released after serving less than two years.
70
 
Ottawa ordered a full military police investigation within three days of the 16 March 
crime, but details were kept hidden.
71
 A Globe and Mail article published two weeks after 
Arone’s murder, laconically titled “4 Soldiers Held in Somali’s Death,” revealed the duration of 
time and extent to which the media and public had been kept in the dark.
72
 But such secrets could 
not be kept indefinitely. By 20 April the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was the first 
to allege a cover-up regarding the Somali teen’s death.73 The parliamentary opposition accused 
Minister of National Defence (MND) Kim Campbell, an aspirant to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
of failing to bring the matter to light sooner; a criticism that was given credence when it took 
until 27 April for Campbell to announce the creation of a military board of inquiry into the 
CAR’s activities in Somalia.74 Worse was still to come when a Canadian military physician’s 
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testimony revealed that less than two weeks before Arone’s murder, on 4 March, a Somali was 
killed under suspicious circumstances when attempting to enter the Canadian’s Belet Huen 
compound. According to the medic, the Somali man was killed execution style, with a bullet in 
the back before someone “finished him off” with another in the head.75 The doctor reported 
being subsequently pressured to destroy his medical files related to the shooting.
76
 By the end of 
April a media blitz began, with various outlets reporting that documents related to Somalia had 
repeatedly gone missing.
77
 As public outrage escalated over the next few years, the magnitude of 
inquiries grew along with it. The flames of public anger were stoked in November 1994 when a 
publication ban on the “trophy” photos taken during Arone’s murder was lifted, leading to the 
pictures’ printing in newspapers across the country.78 In 1995, a Parliamentary inquiry was 
created to get at the full truth, take some heat off of the Jean Chrétien Liberal government, and 
provide much needed transparency to the public.
79
 The Commission of Inquiry into the 
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, itself cut short in January 1997 by MND Doug 
Young just before it began to investigate Arone’s death and alleged cover-up attempts by DND 
officials, nonetheless brought forth a litany of problems.
80
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The Inquiry, broadcast nightly on national television, revealed deep structural problems 
within the CAR and at times questioned CAF/DND leadership as a whole. In an over 1500 page 
final report the Inquiry spotlighted numerous disciplinary issues within the 2 Commando 
battalion prior to its deployment: “Several witnesses testified that members of the CAR ... among 
other things, misused pyrotechnics, ammunition, and weapons; engaged in antisocial activities ... 
and abused Red Cross workers in CFB Petawawa.”81 The “most serious and alarming” sign of 
trouble was the burning of the unit orderly sergeant’s car; a crime which led to no charges.82 
Matters were made worse when two disturbing videos surfaced. The first, aired in early 1994, 
showed 2 Commando members in Somalia making several racist comments.
83
 A year later, the 
CBC aired a homemade video of 1 Commando hazing rituals from 1992 that included verbal 
abuse and extreme degradation, such as soldiers being forced to eat feces.
84
 On 19 January 1995 
prominent CBC political commentator Rex Murphy’s Point of View program highlighted not just 
the “trophy photos” taken during Arone’s murder, but also video released a day earlier, which 
showed the lone black member of a unit being tied to a tree and then forced to crawl on all fours 
with “I ♥ KKK” written on his back.85 Murphy ended his segment by stating that the Somalia 
Affair, as it became known, cast a “pall of hypocrisy” over Canadians’ “much-trumpeted image 
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as peacekeepers.”86 An equally powerful statement of the Somalia Affair’s effects was provided 
by the Inquiry when it stated that, “certain events transpired in Somalia that impugned the 
reputations of various individuals, Canada’s military, and the nation itself.”87   
The Somalia Affair, dubbed “Canada’s national shame,” sent ripple effects across all of 
Canadian society.
88
 Canadians expressed disgust at what they saw as a tarnishing of the 
country’s hard-earned reputation as the foremost peacekeeping nation on earth, and one with a 
proud military tradition.
89
 In the midst of the crisis Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was forced to 
respond to embarrassing statements, such as those made by Haitian Prime Minister Marc Bazin, 
that Canadian peacekeepers were “a pack of Nazis.”90 The Affair was also the catalyst for several 
ignominious “firsts:” Matchee’s crime was the first time that any Canadian soldier had been 
charged with torture or murder during a UN operation.
91
 Although the Commission of Inquiry 
placed much of the blame at the CAF/DND leadership level, public outcry and media pressure, 
especially over the images of Arone’s torture, caused a defensive and reactionary posture by 
DND officials that took aim at the CAF’s lower ranks.92 A subsequent “cover your ass” approach 
developed in both organizations, with leaders blaming subordinates, who in turn passed the 
blame further down the chain of command to their subordinates.
93
 Identification of the entire 
CAR with antisocial behaviour and Arone’s murder, instead of the smaller group of soldiers 
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responsible for it, led MND David Collenette to decide upon disbanding the whole Regiment in 
March 1995.
94
 Given the timing and circumstances, Collenette’s actions were seen by some as a 
“political expedient to take the heat off the Forces as a whole.”95 Louise Frechette, Deputy 
Minister of National Defence acknowledged as much when she called the Regiment’s dissolution 
a “political decision to change the conversation.”96 The CAR’s disbanding was the first instance 
of a Canadian regiment’s dissolution under disgraceful circumstances.97   
Public reactions against events in Somalia were consistently strong from 1993-1997. The 
contradiction between Canadians’ usually honourable character as humanitarian peacekeepers, 
and Arone’s torture and murder, tainted the entire CAF in much of the public’s mind.98 Anger 
took the form of soldiers being spat on in public, and in some cases CAR soldiers’ children and 
spouses being harassed.
99
 At one point, public backlash and media pressure were so strong that a 
CANFORGEN order – a Canadian Forces General Order from the Chief of the Defence Staff to 
all branches/members of the CAF – advised CAF members not to wear their uniforms to and 
from work, for fear of the sight of a man or woman in uniform upsetting the public.
100
 As 
politicians, military leaders, and the public distanced themselves from the Somalia Affair, a 
sense of distrust developed between civilians and soldiers. Canadians simply could not reconcile 
displays of racism, brutality, and injustice with views of the “peaceable kingdom” that pervaded 
the national consciousness.      
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 Sergeant James Davis, a CAR veteran who participated in peacekeeping missions in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda during the 1990s, recalled the fallout from Arone’s murder and 
the hazing videos in his 1997 memoir The Sharp End: “Immediately we were all branded as 
racists. This was news to the blacks, Asians, and Native Canadians serving in the Regiment.”101 
Davis admitted there were “some bad characters” in the CAR during the early 1990s, but 
affirmed that they were just “a couple of double-y-chromosome types” exclusively in the 2 
Commando unit, the unit from which Matchee and Brown stemmed.
102
 Regarding hazing rituals, 
Davis wrote that the only hazing which occurred in his unit, 3 Commando, involved “new guys 
running down to the village and buying a case of beer.”103 Davis, along with other former CAR 
members, lamented the public and politicians’ inability to recognize the Regiment’s 
predominantly honourable nature and its good deeds performed on numerous peacekeeping 
missions. Particular anger was directed at MND David Collenette: “The minister didn’t realize 
the extent of what he had done to the soldiers, their families and the community ... Because he 
never apologized to the members of the unit that were untainted by scandal, about ninety-nine 
percent of us, for the pain this [the CAR’s disbanding] would cause, he branded all of us as 
dishonourable murderers and rebels. His failure to separate the bad from the much larger good 
left us all painted by the same brush.”104 Retired Master Warrant Officer Barry Westholm agreed 
with the spirit of Davis’ assessment, calling the Somalia Inquiry and disbanding of the Regiment 
“a real disaster” for morale.105 
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 Although politicians, military members, and the public argued over the Somalia Affair’s 
root causes, a consensus nonetheless developed that Shidane Arone’s murder was a defining 
moment for the CAF and Canadian society.
106
 Scholars and journalists, also divided on the 
Affair’s causes, agreed that Somalia cast a far-reaching shadow, particularly over the CAF. 
Military historian David Bercuson called Somalia “the deepest crisis of confidence in the history 
of the Canadian Armed Forces.”107 Journalist Carol Off described Somalia as the “worst 
peacetime crisis in Canadian military history.”108 Sandra Whitworth argued that Somalia forced 
Canadians into a type of cultural reflection, similar to how the My Lai Massacre perpetrated by 
US soldiers during the Vietnam War shocked American sensibilities.
109
   
But while the Somalia Affair laid bare perceived problems within the CAF and alarmed 
the Canadian public, retrospectively it was evident that Somalia and its aftershocks concealed as 
much as they revealed. Specifically, the immense attention Somalia received, combined with a 
subsequent desire amongst government and military officials to distance themselves from any 
potential scandal, caused several other peacekeeping operations to go largely unnoticed.
110
 Still 
mired in a Cold War mindset and unused to criticism or scrutiny, CAF and DND leaders “did 
what they had always done: simply ignore the noise in the expectation that it would go away.”111 
In military terminology, they “bunkered.” Colonel John Calvin recalled his soldiers returning 
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from Croatia in 1993 and feeling the great weight of the Somalia Affair: “When we came home 
in October of 1993, Somalia was just breaking and the focus was all on what had happened with 
that particular tour. I think it’s fair to say that for the next two years Somalia consumed most of 
the focus of the public’s attention on the military, and all of the other things that had happened, 
including our tour, were cast into the background.”112 Unfortunately, as the media and public 
focused on Somalia, Canadian troops experienced the changing face of peacekeeping across the 
globe, and in numerous cases returned home traumatized by the danger faced and atrocities 
witnessed. But in the divided climate of the time their difficulties were swept under the socio-
political rug by CAF/DND leaders unwilling to risk anymore scandal and a historically low 
civilian approval of the nation’s military.  
 
The New Face of Peacekeeping 
 
 Somalia was one of several UN missions Canada contributed to during the 1990s which 
fell outside of traditional peacekeeping operations. Many of the “new” UN operations forced 
peacekeepers to confront an entirely different type of mission than they had trained for or 
expected. With the Soviet Union’s dissolution, a series of ethnic civil wars, retrospectively 
termed the Yugoslav Wars, occurred within the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
As the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) fought to retake territory lost after the secession of its 
former constituent republics, both military and civilian casualties mounted. In late 1991, UN 
envoy and former American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposed to Serb and Croat forces 
the establishment of a peacekeeping force in Croat territories under Serb control.
113
 Both sides 
accepted, and on 21 February 1992 the UN Security Council authorized the creation of 
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UNPROFOR, a force consisting of 15,000 UN Blue Helmets.
114
 The UNPROFOR was thus 
deployed to three regions of Croatia – all designated United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). 
The force’s mission was, among other things, to ensure the withdrawal of JNA troops from all 
Croat territory, monitor demilitarized zones, ensure the protection of civilians, and facilitate the 
return of displaced persons.
115
 All of these tasks were to be accomplished as a neutral party, with 
the belligerents’ consent, and without the use of force.116 Canada, which initially contributed an 
infantry battalion of 900 troops and a combat engineering unit in March 1992, rotated thousands 
of soldiers through the UNPROFRO and subsequent missions, “leaving hardly a Canadian 
soldier who had not served at least once in the former Yugoslavia.”117 
 Despite UN presence, throughout the UNPROFOR’s existence and subsequent 
UN/NATO operations, nascent national armies and paramilitary forces fought against 
neighbouring states, ethnic militias, and local warlords, with all sides perpetrating ethnic 
cleansing at various points over the decade.
118
 The level of violence employed to expel or 
eradicate perceived enemies was “on a scale not seen since World War II.”119 Canadian 
peacekeepers, with very little peace in the Balkans to keep, found themselves in a morass where 
traditional, linear missions were no guide. On the surface, the mission resembled previous 
operations like Cyprus, with peacekeepers wearing blue helmets and riding in painted “UN” 
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vehicles. But unlike in Cyprus, Canadian peacekeepers delivered humanitarian aid while armed, 
deployed anti-tank vehicles, and at times used snipers to kill belligerents.
120
     
Corporal Gregory Prodaniuk was just twenty-one-years-old and only recently completed 
his training as an infantry soldier when he deployed to Croatia as part of 1 Royal Canadian 
Regiment in 1994. Prior to deployment, his unit was given training appropriate for “normal” 
peacekeeping operations. He summarized his training in the following manner: “Man an OP 
[observation post]; write a log; come to a riot; search a building for weapons.”121 Nevertheless, 
aware through word-of-mouth channels about what Canadian soldiers had experienced thus far in 
the former Yugoslavia, Prodaniuk sensed he was entering a mission “irregular to the 
peacekeeping experience up to that point.”122 He recalled: 
 
When we got over there [to Croatia] it sort of started immediately. We got into theatre 
and we had to stand in line and exchange equipment with the guys that were coming out. 
And you noticed the guys that were coming out looked pretty bad, pretty haggard. They 
definitely didn’t look like ... the sort of clean cut Cyprus pictures that you’d seen. You 
saw guys that hadn’t cleaned [themselves] in a few days, had bags under their eyes. Their 
equipment was all dirty ... At that point we didn’t even have our own helmets so we were 
exchanging helmets. So we were looking for a guy that had the same head size ... to grab 
a helmet off him. It was a very sort of weird way to be introduced into theatre, and as 
we’re getting off a certain commercial airline we can hear the [artillery] shelling going on 
in the background.
123
 
 
 
 Prodaniuk’s unit spent most of its time isolated across various outposts in a zone of 
separation between Serbs and Croats. Much of their time was also spent wondering if and when 
the situation might erupt, while occasionally being shot at, shelled by artillery, and coming upon 
“a lot of gruesome events that had taken place just before we got there.”124 As his tour 
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progressed things started to “ramp up.” NATO planes bombed around them. In several instances 
he was sent with only two or three comrades to inspect Serb or Croat-held buildings for weapons 
and explosives. In groups often numbering fifty or more, both belligerent forces were unhappy 
about the UN presence and employed posturing and threats to intimidate Canadian forces. Their 
tactics included, among other things, “cocking weapons, putting it at your head, that kind of 
stuff.”125 Prodaniuk characterized the mission as a “really messed up police operation,” stating 
matter-of-factly that “it really wasn’t something we trained for.” Like numerous comrades, he 
felt at a loss to grasp the reality of what his “peacekeeping” duties entailed: “That disconnect 
between what you thought you were going to be doing, and what you ended up doing, was pretty 
profound.”126 
 The biggest testament to how peacekeeping had changed came in September 1993, when 
members of the Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (2PPCLI) 
were involved in heavy fighting with Croatian forces during what was later termed the Battle of 
Medak Pocket.
127
 That month, Croatian forces attacked Serb-held territory in Sector South, one 
of the UN’s Protected Areas. After five days of battle, a UN-brokered ceasefire led to 875 
soldiers from 2PPCLI being interposed between the warring parties.
128
 Their mandate was to 
supervise the removal of Croat troops back to their original lines, and likewise to remove Serb 
troops from a “pocket” that formed during the Croatian offensive.129 As the Canadian 
peacekeepers took up positions, local Croat forces refused to let them enter the area and fired on 
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their UN vehicles. A fifteen-hour firefight ensued, during which four Canadians were wounded 
and an estimated twenty-seven Croats killed, with many more wounded.
130
 
 Worse was still to come. After negotiations brought fighting to a close, Canadian 
peacekeepers moved into the Croats’ previously held areas to find a plethora of gruesome sights. 
In numerous villages Serbian civilians had been murdered, and there were many signs of rape, 
livestock destruction, and local wells being poisoned. Sergeant-Major Mike Spellen, a member 
of 2PPCLI’s Delta Company assigned to a “sweep team” searching the area, found a 
wheelbarrow in the middle of a swamp. Thinking it a strange sight, he investigated further and 
found the body of an eighty-four-year-old woman who had been shot at least six times.
131
 
Warrant Officer Matt Stopford recalled seeing a Croatian sergeant throw a “bundle” into a 
burning house while dancing around with a bloody pair of child’s training underwear on his 
head. Stopford realized after a few moments that the bundle was a dead child who had been 
thrown into the burning building.
132
 Echoing Stopford’s experience, Master Corporal Jordie Yeo 
lamented: “The number of times that I saw graves that were only three or four feet long was too 
many.”133 Traumatic sights were common in the aftermath of the Medak Pocket battle, and were 
witnessed by numerous Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. 
In an interview, Mike Spellen stated there was a pervasive mental and physical exhaustion 
amongst his comrades, further exacerbated by “being aware that there are atrocities going on 
around you, [and] seeing some of those atrocities.”134 The UNPROFOR’s inability to prevent 
civilian deaths led Fred Doucette, a Canadian UN Military Observer in Bosnia in 1995, to argue 
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that the UNPROFOR was as useless as “eunuchs in a whorehouse.”135 The myriad mental and 
physical challenges peacekeeping presented took a heavy toll on Canadian soldiers’ minds, but 
recognition of that fact was slow to come because of military leaders’ willful blindness about 
war-related mental disorder. 
 
Early Signs (of PTSD) 
 
 From the beginning of the UNPROFOR and other non-standard peacekeeping missions 
during the early 1990s, there were whispers within and outside military circles that the “new” 
peacekeeping significantly impacted its participants. The first publicly visible sign of the 
aftermath came in September 1993 when a twenty-six-year-old member of 2PPCLI was found 
dead in full uniform after shooting himself in his apartment.
136
 His suicide came shortly after 
returning from peacekeeping in Croatia. Throughout the 1990s there were widespread rumours 
and stories about suicides and attempted suicides by peacekeepers after their return from the 
former Yugoslavia, but higher authorities made a concerted effort to downplay the problem’s 
extent.
137
 A soldier who fought at Medak recalled his superiors telling him he was the only one 
from his unit with mental health problems.
138
 In addition to suicides, there were a number of 
soldiers who took up heavy drinking, in large part to rationalize their experiences or drown out 
nightmares. Many troops felt they simply could not relate what happened, or their feelings about 
it, to comrades or family who were not with them in theatre.
139
 It took a number of years before 
the prevalence of health issues amongst peacekeepers was known to both the public and soldiers 
themselves. 
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 Although CAF leaders and medical officers during the early 1990s were aware of the 
effects of combat stress on soldiers, due to peacekeeping’s traditionally lower tempo and 
ostensibly less stressful character, authorities initially made a strict separation between the stress 
of “war” and difficulties encountered in “military operations other than war.”140 Peacekeeping 
operations, not held in the same high regard among military members as war tours, were viewed 
through the prism of Cold War UN missions, and as such, deemed largely mundane in 
character.
141
 It was for that reason the CAF sent psychiatric resident Greg Passey, a psychiatric 
nurse, and a social worker with the Canadian Naval Task Group during the Gulf War in 1991, 
but did not send a team during the initial stages of the UNPROFOR mission a year later.
142
 A 
1991 Globe and Mail article written in the midst of the Gulf conflict optimistically stated that 
rather than being treated as cowards or malingerers as they were in the past, CAF personnel 
suffering from combat stress were “treated as victims of a ‘combat-related, critical incident, 
stress event.’”143 Lieutenant-Colonel James Jamieson, Director of Social-Development Services 
for the Surgeon-General in Ottawa, affirmed that “The whole philosophy [toward psychological 
difficulties from war] has changed,” and that the military no longer considered traumatized 
soldiers to be “cowardly or crazy.”144 Captain Judith Pinch, a social worker employed at 
Canadian military headquarters in Bahrain, mirrored Jamieson’s optimism, painting a brighter 
picture for soldiers: “They can show their feelings now ... They don’t have to be always appear 
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brave and strong and keep their feelings to themselves. It’s not what it used to be, that’s for 
sure.”145  
  But war was regarded as qualitatively different from peacekeeping, and there were no 
similar articles describing a new day for traumatized peacekeepers when Canadians were sent to 
Croatia and Bosnia in 1992. The idea that Canadian soldiers could become psychologically 
debilitated from peacekeeping duty went against decades of understanding about war trauma and 
common sense approaches to military operations. The distinction between war and 
peacekeeping’s effects were neatly encapsulated in the terms themselves: “Combat Stress 
Reaction,” the 1990’s intellectual successor to “shell shock,” described the effects that occurred 
as a result of combat, while peacekeeping, due to its ostensibly peaceful nature, seemed to 
preclude any instances of trauma or psychological disorders.
146
 Thus, throughout the early- to 
mid-1990s Canadian military leaders were in a state of “blissful ignorance” regarding 
peacekeeping trauma.
147
 In their 2015 book about CAF leadership culture during the 1990s, 
Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley described the situation thus: “Due to their myopic focus and 
isolation, as well as their anti-intellectual mindset, the senior leadership of the DND and the CAF 
had been unable to anticipate, adapt, or change to the myriad of changes that swept over 
Canadian society and the globe.”148                           
 One of the few voices penetrating preconceived notions of war trauma in the early 1990s 
was that of naval Lieutenant-Commander Greg Passey.
149
 Passey, a psychiatric resident (from 
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the University of British Columbia) sent to the Gulf War in 1991, was the first, along with his 
supervisor David Crockett, to quantify the psychological impact of peacekeeping on Canadian 
soldiers.
150
 In 1992-1993, Passey, who made weekly visits to CFB Chilliwack to help medical 
staff treat CAF psychiatric patients, discovered a number of soldiers displaying signs of 
PTSD.
151
 He had become familiar with trauma symptoms a few years earlier while in charge of a 
hospital in the small community of Masset, British Columbia. During a 2015 conversation he 
recalled a particular case of a two-year-old child dying after being burned in a house fire, and the 
devastating impact the event had on the child’s family.152 Passey was also an avid reader of 
military history and from his readings was familiar with shell shock and battle exhaustion.
153
 
Lastly, at a trauma studies conference in Amsterdam in June 1992 he discussed the subject with 
several researchers from America, and from hearing about a particular study on trauma in 
Russian veterans from the Soviet-Afghan War he became convinced PTSD could also stem from 
non-traditional combat and/or operations resembling war.
154
  
 Thus, seeing common symptom patterns in Canadian peacekeepers, Passey 
commissioned a study of Regular Force soldiers and Reservists from three peacekeeping 
regiments: Combat Engineers in Chilliwack; troops from the Royal Canadian Regiment in 
Gagetown, New Brunswick; and members of PPCLI in Winnipeg.
155
 Study participants filled out 
confidential questionnaires that measured their stress and depression level, in order to determine 
the prevalence of debilitating psychological symptoms among former peacekeepers. The results, 
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published in the Winnipeg Free Press and Globe and Mail in December 1993, confirmed 
Passey’s suspicions: One Canadian peacekeeper in nine (11%) was returning from the former 
Yugoslavia suffering from combat stress.
156
 Amongst the many symptoms soldiers reported, the 
most prevalent were anxiety or panic attacks, irritability, difficulty falling asleep or staying 
asleep, diminished interest in work, family or friends, and “curtailed emotions.”157 A twenty-
five-year-old soldier stationed in Winnipeg agreed with the study’s conclusion, stating, “I’m a 
different person. I have changed for the rest of my life. Over there you’re staring at dead kids and 
starving people and little old ladies who run beside your vehicle so they won’t get hit by 
snipers.”158 Passey ominously inferred that as time passed and new symptoms such as alcoholism 
and flashbacks manifested, the number of peacekeepers experiencing psychological difficulties 
might increase.
159
  
 Passey and Crockett’s study was the first to demonstrate something unique about the 
CAF’s historical experience with psychological trauma. They espoused that, contrary to 
contemporary beliefs about combat stress and trauma, peacekeeping missions also exposed 
soldiers to overwhelmingly traumatic experiences.
160
 In a 1994 Canadian Medical Association 
Journal article, Passey further explained the implications of his 1993 study. He espoused that, 
“our people [peacekeepers] are under horrendous stress,” and that, although “[p]eacekeeping 
may not be more stressful than battle ... it is certainly more stressful than anyone thought.”161 
Unlike war, which often had tangible goals, ways to measure the success or failure of a mission, 
and clearly defined sides, peacekeeping  “success” was judged according to more Spartan 
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considerations like “how many people got food or were not killed.”162 Peacekeeping stresses and 
trauma were often different in kind from combat stresses, but the effect was similar. Passey and 
Crockett’s study was the first powerful piece of evidence that there was such a thing as 
peacekeeping trauma, and also helped confirm that the word “peacekeeping” was in many cases 
a euphemism for something more menacing. 
 On the surface, the CAF leadership’s response to Passey and Crockett’s study, and 
trauma in general, was one of action. In 1991 the CAF had taken a proactive approach to combat 
stress during the Gulf War when it sent Passey and the rest of his team to educate personnel 
about the stresses of war and help them deal with separation from loved ones.
163
 A team of 
specialists were also on hand to provide “Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD),” a process 
developed in the 1980s, initially targeting emergency response workers, to help them deal with 
acute stress and traumatic incidents.
164
 Beginning in the 1990s, in part due to the efforts of social 
worker Lieutenant-Colonel Rick McLellan, who likewise saw a need to pay more attention to 
intense stress’ effect on troops, the CAF implemented CISD.165 CISD was one of the military’s 
methods for preventing long-term psychological impacts in soldiers exposed to a “critical 
incident,” an event defined as “outside the range of normal experience that is sudden, unusual, 
and unexpected, disrupts one’s sense of control, involves the perception of a threat to life, and 
may include elements of physical or emotional loss.”166 CISD’s purpose was not professional 
                                                          
162
 Ibid., 1486.  
163
 The Globe and Mail, 16 February 1991. 
164
 Developed by Dr. Jeffrey Mitchell in the early 1980s, the approach was first laid out in a 1983 article. See J.T. 
Mitchell, “When Disaster Strikes … The Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Process,” Journal of Emergency 
Medical Services 8, no. 1 (1983): 36-39; CISD seems to have been first utilized by the CAF in 1993 after a C-130 
Hercules transport plane crashed at CFB Wainwright (Alberta) on 22 July 1993. See Testimony of Captain John 
Organ, Croatia Board of Inquiry, September 24, 1999, vol. XIII, 6; For media coverage of the crash see The Globe 
and Mail, 23 July 1993.  
165
 Passey interview.  
166
 This definition was taken in large part from the DSM-III, which defined a traumatic event as one “outside the 
range of usual human experience” and one that likewise involved a threat to the person, such as war, torture, rape, or 
natural disaster. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
  
175 
 
counseling, but rather “to provide a safe opportunity [for soldiers] to deal with reactions to a 
stressful traumatic event.”167 Ideally taking place within a few days after the event, the goal of 
Critical Incident Stress (CIS) teams, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Jamieson, was to deal with 
traumatized troops as quickly as possible and “as close as possible to [the] event.”168 Soldiers 
were encouraged to express their feelings and emotions, and reassured by the CIS team their 
reactions were “experienced by normal people following an abnormal event.”169  
 While based on good intentions, CISD and information about critical incidents were 
inconsistently applied during the early 1990s and went up against a closed culture that taught 
soldiers to spurn outsiders, especially “suits” who did not understand life at the front line. Mike 
Spellen could not recall any conversations about stress or trauma prior to and during his time in 
theatre. He espoused that before Croatia there were “no concerns of that [PTSD] whatsoever,” 
and that he did not even know what “PTSD” meant.170 Andrew Godin remembered a CIS team 
arriving from Ottawa during the tail end of his 1992 Croatia tour. They asked Godin and others 
“a bunch of questions about what we did and saw during the tour,” but because the CIS team had 
no frontline soldiers on it, “getting answers out of us was like pulling teeth from a chicken.”171 
James Davis wrote that he and his comrades instituted an informal type of CIS therapy: “If 
someone seemed to be walking too fine a line, the Warrant [Officer] would have a couple of the 
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boys get him drunk and encourage him to let it out.”172 While aware of the existence of CIS 
teams, Davis maintained that no team visited during his 1992 Croatia tour, and even if they had, 
“Every soldier knows not to talk to these clowns.”173 He cited an instance when a friend admitted 
being troubled by his operational experiences, only later to be identified as “an emotionally 
unstable character.”174 Regardless of its authenticity, such stories ensured that soldiers kept a 
tight lid on their experiences and sought comrades’ ears rather than risk divulging too much to a 
“suit.”                
CISD proved incapable of preventing long-term mental health problems for many 
Canadian peacekeepers returning from the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The reasons 
included: a culture of toughness and masculine prowess that inhibited soldiers from speaking out 
about their psychological difficulties – a type of collective and self-stigmatization which 
produced outright denial; fears of how reporting a mental illness might affect their military 
career; a conscious attempt by an “old guard” among CAF leadership to deny PTSD’s existence; 
and a socio-political milieu that left many soldiers feeling abandoned by both their unit and their 
country. Living within a culture of denial and suppression, and unable to attach their 
peacekeeping experiences to any tangible or nationally-supported cause, psychologically injured 
soldiers suffered in silence. It required several keys events across the 1990s, and a board of 
inquiry into the seemingly high rate of illness among Balkans peacekeepers, to begin a large-
scale shift in consciousness about the links between peacekeeping and mental trauma.  
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CHAPTER 5: BREAKING DOWN THE WALL 
 
I mean my personal sense is that … psychological trauma in these kinds of situations is one of the toxic exposures 
that occurs. And it is as valid, if not more valid, than many of the other types of toxic exposures that veterans 
concern themselves with. But that is -- it is more than just an awareness issue. PTSD has baggage with the veterans 
community.
1
 
 
People were afraid to talk about it [PTSD, stress symptoms], you know. Fear of looking weak or whatever ... Fear of 
being released from the Forces because, you know, you are either … a weak sister or you have got something wrong 
with you so we will kick you out ... You would hear here and there about things like, you know, guys wondering if 
they are ever going to have a solid stool again or if they are ever going to sleep the night again without waking up … 
or flying into a towering rage at their wife or their family about nothing at all. Guys don't really want to talk about 
that … unless they are with their really trusted confidantes. I think a lot of guys kept things inside and guys wouldn't 
say much ... The system does not reward weakness ... It punishes weakness and … throws it away.2 
 
 
 
When Corporal Prodaniuk returned from UNPROFOR peacekeeping duties in April 1995 
he encountered a “wall of silence” surrounding discussions about what Canadian peacekeepers 
witnessed or actions they took against hostile forces.
3
 He noticed that military leaders only 
wanted troops to cite the positive side of peacekeeping: 
 
They wanted us to sort of address what was making the nightly news – show Canadian 
peacekeepers saving kids, handing out humanitarian aid, something ... But they didn’t 
really want to know about us being in actions where we were taking positions or moving 
belligerents off a hill ... sometimes engaging a belligerent force to get them to move, or to 
do something we wanted them to do. That wasn’t something they wanted discussed. And 
so the command didn’t really want to bring it up ... So there was this kind of weird 
repression of what we did and experiences we were involved in ... And so when you 
came home, it was just sort of a ‘shut up’ culture ... So what ended up happening was, 
you came back and you just moved on with life. You didn’t really talk about things.”4 
 
 
 Prodaniuk initially felt no signs of psychological difficulties, so he channeled his energy 
into becoming an even better soldier, following the culture that encouraged him to “soldier on.” 
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Several years went by as he gradually became more “emotionally unstable.”5 He had difficulty 
sleeping and was troubled by memories of harrowing incidents that continued to repeatedly play 
in his mind.
6
 Prodaniuk felt that since he had not been in a traditional combat zone, he “shouldn’t 
have any reason to have a [psychological] problem.”7 Like numerous comrades during the 1990s, 
Prodaniuk’s knowledge of psychological trauma was “razor thin” and consisted of what he saw 
in Vietnam War films.
8
 Thus, he did not make a link between war trauma and his own 
difficulties.
9
 Feeling disaffected, he decided to make a change, and became a Materials 
Technician with the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers corps in 1999. Shortly thereafter, he 
crashed. He recalled: “I went to a different part of the Army, then, all of a sudden everything sort 
of unpacked. It was almost as if the social conditions of the battalion were sort of keeping me 
wired, or keeping me compressed in a way. And once I left, that social support sort of dissolved, 
and everything became unpacked.”10 Prodaniuk became depressed and sometimes resorted to 
alcohol to cope. He found himself “losing perspective all the time,” and just as his psychological 
difficulties became almost too much, he decided to finally get help.
11
 He went for numerous 
rounds of counseling, and in 2000-2001 was medically released with PTSD. Reflecting on his 
journey, Prodaniuk affirmed that the key factor in his gradual deterioration was the “failed 
processing” of what he experienced in theatre. He declared that above all else, “that in the end is 
what did me in.”12 
 Prodaniuk’s poignant recollections and eventual realization about the effects 
peacekeeping incidents had on his mind are crucial because they highlight several of the key 
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factors which shaped conceptualizations of trauma in the CAF during the 1990s. The wall of 
silence Prodaniuk encountered in his battalion was a microcosm of a much larger wall raised by 
DND and CAF leaders to prevent scandal and downplay peacekeeping’s effects on Canadian 
soldiers. That silence had profound consequences for numerous soldiers as they returned to a 
military that seemed indifferent about their accomplishments and a country that seemed to care 
little for the sacrifices they made. For those whose experiences proved debilitating, military 
leaders’ refusal to acknowledge peacekeeping trauma also ensured that numerous soldiers were 
released from the Forces and denied a pension.  
At a social level this chapter examines the loss and abandonment many peacekeepers felt 
when they returned home, and how those feelings affected their psychological state in a manner 
that was all too real despite being difficult to quantifiably measure. Moreover, Prodaniuk’s 
trouble coming to terms with what ailed him was reflective of a masculine fitness culture that 
discouraged succumbing to injuries and was especially critical of psychological difficulties. 
Military culture produced a self- and group-disciplining among its members, causing injured 
soldiers to deny any problem for fear of being ostracized by comrades or released from the 
Forces. The situation finally came to a head in July 1999 when the Croatia Board of Inquiry 
(BOI) was called to determine the cause of a high number of casualties stemming from the 
UNPROFOR mission. The BOI spotlighted the existence of altered though still present ideas of 
mental disorder that in fact resembled discussions from the First and Second World Wars. 
 
Under Somalia’s Shadow 
 
 CAF and DND leaders had little desire to discuss the possibility of peacekeeping trauma 
during the 1990s. As discussed in the previous chapter, the shadow of Somalia, and the sense of 
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distrust it created between the CAF/DND and the Canadian public, loomed large over any 
military-related issues for most of the decade: “If Canadians were thinking of the military at all,” 
their attention was largely focused on the Somalia Affair and its aftermath.
13
 In his retrospective 
assessment of the 1990s, Brigadier-General (ret.) G.E. “Joe” Sharpe wrote that “senior 
Department of National Defence officials were not in the mood to disclose anything about 
operations that was not absolutely necessary.”14 Their reticence extended not just to operation 
specifics (e.g. Canadians fighting at Medak), but also to any after-effects, including 
peacekeepers’ mental difficulties. Thus, for much of the 1990s the problems soldiers and 
veterans faced were known to few Canadians outside of the military, and even some within it. 
 Nevertheless, there were several events throughout the decade that slowly put pressure on 
the CAF and DND to acknowledge an evidently growing problem. In addition to Passey’s 
peacekeeping trauma research, other signs of trouble arose in March 1995 when a distraught 
mother confronted MND David Collenette outside the House of Commons. The woman’s son, a 
member of the Royal 22nd Regiment (the “Van Doos”) committed suicide a year earlier.15 
Although his death was not linked to service in the former Yugoslavia, she confronted Collenette 
on a day when he was responding to allegations that a “rash” of suicides among Quebec-based 
soldiers was connected to peacekeeping trauma.
16
 While CFB Valcartier spokesperson Jocelyn 
Laroche admitted the base had seen nine suicides in the previous two years – the timeline 
coinciding with the beginning of the UNPROFOR mission – he affirmed that only three 
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 G.E. Sharpe, Croatia Board of Inquiry: Leadership (and Other) Lessons Learned (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces 
Leadership Institute, 2002), 3.  
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 Ibid., 4. 
15
 The “Van Doos” are so designated because of the French pronunciation of the Regiment’s name.  
16
 The Toronto Star, 31 March 1995; For another article that examined the issue of suicides in the Van Doos see The 
Globe and Mail, 8 April 1995.  
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instances involved soldiers who served in the former Yugoslavia.
17
 Nevertheless, in the same 
Toronto Star article the base hospital’s chief psychiatrist, Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Berard, said 
he had seen over thirty cases of PTSD directly linked to UNPROFOR service, hinting at a much 
larger problem. Berard, like Lieutenant-Commander Passey, acknowledged that Canadian 
peacekeepers had been “exposed to extremely traumatic experiences overseas.”18 The article 
highlighted what became an all-too-familiar refrain later in the decade: peacekeeping veterans 
were “afraid to seek counselling for fear of hurting their military careers.”19 
 A second, more publicized event throughout the second half of the 1990s was Lieutenant-
General Roméo Dallaire’s personal struggles with PTSD following his ill-fated tenure as Force 
Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993-1994. 
Although most Canadians later became acquainted with Dallaire’s story because of his 
bestselling 2003 book Shake Hands with the Devil, like numerous soldiers, his battle with PTSD 
developed much earlier, and over a number of years.
20
 Dallaire acknowledged the great 
emotional toll UNAMIR service had on its participants, and took the unprecedented step of 
requesting mental health assistance for himself, his UN Military Observer officers, and their 
spouses or partners.
21
 In July 1995, Lieutenant-Commander Passey, Major Lamontigny (a social 
worker), and a mental health team spent two days at CFB St. Jean conducting CISD and 
                                                          
17
 Ibid.; A 1996 independent study by a team at Toronto’s Clarke Institute of Psychiatry into suicides in the military 
found “few direct links” between peacekeeping duties and any of the sixty-six suicides in the CAF from 1990 to 
1995. Nevertheless the study highlighted the “macho military culture” that prevented many from coming forward. 
The CAF responded by implementing (at least in theory) a plan whereby peacekeepers were given at least a year at 
home between deployments. See The Globe and Mail, 8 November 1996. 
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 Toronto Star, 31 March 1995 
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 
2004 [2003]). 
21
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educating officers and their families about stress disorders.
22
 Those sessions represented an 
historic first, as they were the first CAF initiatives specifically designed to address PTSD and its 
effects on soldiers and their families.
23
 
 Dallaire’s experience with PTSD mirrored many subordinates’ struggles during the 
1990s.
24
 Although he took steps to raise awareness of operational stress, and spoke publicly after 
his return from Rwanda about his struggle, nonetheless, “Camouflage was the order of the 
day.”25 In a manner akin to Barry Westholm, Greg Prodaniuk, and Andrew Godin, Dallaire 
soldiered on and became a workaholic. He accepted all tasks sent his way and kept busy to avoid 
troubling memories.
26
 Unfortunately, also like Westholm et al., Dallaire’s attempts to suppress 
his inner demons were in vain. Four years after returning from Rwanda, in September 1998, his 
mind “decided to give up” and he was ordered by CDS Maurice Baril to take a month’s sick 
leave.
27
 In an internal e-mail quoted by the Globe and Mail, Dallaire cited his “operational 
experiences” and their effect on his health as the reason for his imposed leave.28 
 Throughout his struggle with PTSD in the 1990s, Dallaire worked with others of a like 
mind to raise awareness of what troubled numerous peacekeepers. One such ally was Captain 
Stéphane Grenier, a military officer who served in Rwanda in 1994-1995 as UNAMIR 
Spokesperson. Like numerous peacekeepers, Grenier returned to Canada “very messed up.”29 In 
                                                          
22Brock and Passey, “The Canadian Military and Veteran Experience,” 92; Passey and Lamontigny were deployed 
to Rwanda in 1994, along with a mental health team, to appraise the mental health impact of UNAMIR service on 
Canadian participants.   
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Although it cannot be doubted that Dallaire’s rank helped him avoid many of the problems his subordinates faced, 
what this dissertation suggests is that his slow, gradual decline and mental processing of his situation, as well as his 
attempts to stave off the inevitable crash, were similar in kind to those lower in rank.   
25
 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, xi.  
26
 Ibid., xii.  
27
Ibid; Dallaire’s “final straw” came when he testified before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
1998: “The memories, the smells and the sense of evil returned with a vengeance.” See ibid.    
28
Ibid.  
29
 Grenier, Stéphane.  Interview by author. Telephone. Toronto, September 25, 2014; Grenier was later diagnosed 
with PTSD.  
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an e-mail to Grenier in 1997, Dallaire espoused the need to produce a video about events in 
Rwanda and how they affected Canadian UNAMIR participants.
30
 Unable to obtain government 
funding unless the video had a tangible purpose, Grenier devised the idea of focusing on the 
“human cost” of peacekeeping missions, thus making it useful as a training video.31 Dallaire 
liked the idea and gave him the go ahead to produce it. Over the next several months Grenier put 
together something unlike past CAF videos, utilizing candid interviews with UNAMIR 
peacekeepers affected by their Rwanda deployment. When it came time for Dallaire to be 
interviewed, he was unsure of what to say about his experiences, and consulted Grenier about 
different options. Together, they decided it was necessary for both Dallaire and his subordinates 
to “lay it all down.”32  
In the final 1998 video, titled Witness the Evil, Dallaire and other Canadian peacekeepers 
provided an uncensored report of what they experienced in Rwanda. Dallaire described his 
thoughts of suicide after Rwanda and encouraged other sufferers to come forward. Nonetheless 
he also candidly highlighted the barriers for those with mental illness: “Sometimes I wish I had 
lost a leg, instead of having all those brain cells screwed up. You lose a leg, it’s obvious, you’ve 
got therapy; you’ve got all kinds of stuff. You lose your marbles ... very, very difficult to 
explain; very difficult to gain that support that you need. But those who don’t recognize it and go 
get the help [they need], are going to be a risk to themselves and to us.”33 The image of a high-
ranking CAF officer in his UN uniform almost breaking down on camera was unprecedented. 
The video struck a chord with the public, and excerpts were aired by the CBC on both radio and 
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184 
 
The National television program in November 1998.
34
 Given the wide reach of CBC 
programming, Witness the Evil did much to bring Canadians’ attention to peacekeeping trauma 
and forced the military “to actually pay more attention.”35           
 Although Dallaire’s rank allowed him the privilege of being spared an ignominious 
release from the CAF – a fate which befell many rank-and-file soldiers throughout the 1990s – 
even he encountered resistance to his open advocacy for soldiers suffering from PTSD and other 
stress-related illnesses. Brigadier-General (then Colonel) Sharpe, future Chair of the Croatia 
Board of Inquiry, recalled that during the 1990s “many senior CAF officers ... felt Roméo was 
out of line when he started this approach.”36 Sharpe’s appraisal was bolstered by a high-ranking 
officer diagnosed with PTSD, who reported that, “When Roméo Dallaire came forward, some 
senior officer said of him that he’s ‘always been emotional,’ and to them ‘emotional’ is 
considered a weakness.”37 Dallaire’s openness about mental disorders ran up against a “strong 
lobby from an old guard” who, like numerous military leaders across the century, dismissed 
stress disorders as a sign of weakness and personal failings.
38
 The conflict between traditional 
and novel approaches to mental trauma in the CAF represented an “ongoing major difference of 
opinion” between men like Dallaire, and others like Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, from the 
“suck it up buttercup” school of thought, who believed that publicizing the PTSD issue actually 
                                                          
34“Canada’s Veterans: Veterans and Post-Traumatic Stress.” The National. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
Digital Archives, Toronto: CBC, November 25, 1998, 
http://www.cbc.ca/player/Digital+Archives/War+and+Conflict/Veterans/ID/1842315607/ (accessed August 1, 
2014); “Witness the Evil.” As It Happens. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Digital Archives, Toronto: CBC, 
November 26, 1998, http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/blue-berets-shell-shock (accessed August 1, 2014). 
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 Grenier interview.  
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 G.E. Sharpe, e-mail message to author, October 14, 2014. 
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 Quoted in André Marin, Ombudsman, National Defence and Canadian Forces, Report to the Minister of National 
Defence, Special Report: Systemic Treatment of CF Members with PTSD, Complainant: Christian McEachern. 
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002), 65.  
38
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created more mental health casualties.
39
 For much of the 1990s the latter group held the upper 
hand. 
 A third crack in the wall of silence came in October 1998 when the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs (SCONDVA) produced a 
Parliamentary Report, titled Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements 
in the Canadian Forces.
40
 The main catalyst for the Committee’s investigation was a consistent 
stream of news reports, many similar to the 1995 article, which expressed injured military 
personnel and their families’ anger at the DND’s “apparent indifference to their situation.”41 As 
one example of that indifference the Report cited instances when medals earned by those killed 
in action were simply mailed to family members and spouses.
42
 The Report was based on a year 
of hearings focused on major issues affecting the daily lives of men and women in the CAF. Its 
conclusions were less than flattering for military leaders. Among other things, the Report 
provided an unveiled critique of the CAF’s handling of psychological casualties, admonishing 
military leaders that psychologically injured soldiers required “as much care and especially 
                                                          
39
 Sharpe, e-mail message, October, 14, 2014; One cannot help but notice the similarity of the latter’s view to that 
expressed by historic military figures such as American General George Patton. It also resembles the “contagion” 
theory espoused by some military leaders in the First World War.     
40
 Parliament of Canada, Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements in the Canadian 
Forces. Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs, October 1998. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1031525&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses
=1&File=6 (accessed August 4, 2014); The CAF had undertaken its own internal investigation in response to bad 
press in 1997 under chief social worker Lieutenant-Colonel Rick McLellan. His report, The Care of Injured 
Personnel and their Families Review, was aimed at determining the extent to which the CAF/DND were succeeding 
or failing in their care of injured personnel and families. Made public in 1998, the Review concluded, inter alia, that 
the problems experienced by those physically or psychologically wounded as a result of service were symptomatic 
of a larger, systemic problem with how the CAF and VAC handled injured personnel. The strongly worded tone of 
the Review reflected McLellan’s anger at what was evidently an antiquated system and one which left many Regular 
Force soldiers and Reservists without proper care. See Canada, Department of National Defence. Injured Personnel 
and Family Review Team, R.G. McLellan, Care of Injured Personnel and their Families Review: A Final Report 
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997); For an example of McLellan’s public outspokenness about the 
issue see The Globe and Mail, 1 May 1998; An even less publicized report was also prepared earlier in 1997 that 
focused on CAF members released on medical grounds. See Canada. Department of National Defence. J.W. Stow, A 
Study of the Treatment of Members Released on Medical Grounds (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997).    
41
 House of Commons, Moving Forward.  
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understanding as those injured physically.”43 The Committee also contacted serving and former 
members of the CAF injured during service. Firsthand accounts from former peacekeepers 
confirmed what many injured CAF members felt – namely that the Forces and DND had “lost 
touch with the realities faced by injured personnel.”44  
 Another important step towards reform came with the June 1998 creation of a CAF/DND 
Ombudsman. In the wake of the Somalia Affair and sexual harassment scandals, calls for greater 
transparency and accountability placed pressure on the DND and MND Art Eggleton to take 
tangible steps toward breaking down the insularity plaguing both organizations.
45
 The first 
Ombudsman, André Marin, was a former Crown attorney and Director of Ontario’s Special 
Investigations Unit. Marin’s “insistence on openness” and “penchant for news conferences” 
during his SIU tenure drew displeasure from police leaders and demonstrated he was unafraid of 
eschewing political niceties to achieve results.
46
 Commenting on Marin’s appointment, military 
historian Jack Granatstein told the Globe and Mail that Marin’s openness and insistence on 
accountability was “just what the Canadian military needs right now.”47 Despite Marin’s 
appointment though, more than a few eyebrows were raised when Eggleton announced Marin 
(and future Ombudsmen) would report directly to the MND, leaving many wondering whether 
the position really had the means to conduct “independent” investigations.48  
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Nevertheless, Marin quickly moved forward, and true to his pugnacious reputation 
became a “burr under their [CAF/DND leaders’] saddle” from 1998 to 2005.49 According to 
Ottawa Citizen reporter David Pugliese, who covered numerous CAF/DND topics throughout the 
1990s, although the Ombudsman position was created as somewhat of an “escape valve” to 
deflect criticism, “they [the CAF/DND] got more than they bargained for, because he [Marin] 
wasn’t worried about what the Generals thought. He conducted a pretty high profile campaign. I 
don’t think they expected that.”50 Throughout the length of his seven-year tenure, Marin 
publicized and investigated numerous systemic issues within the CAF, on several occasions 
drawing attention to the treatment of soldiers with PTSD.
51
 He also, as during his Ontario SIU 
Directorship, became a polarizing figure. A federal report commissioned by his successor Yves 
Coté declared that Marin’s staff expressed “overwhelming relief” at his departure.52 The report 
moreover stated that 150 staff left during Marin’s tenure, an ostensibly higher than normal 
turnover rate.
53
 Marin’s spokesperson countered that he handled 2000 cases a year, published 
twenty-six special reports, and was a transformative figure who initiated positive changes for 
soldiers and their families.
54
 A 2005 Toronto Star article about Marin’s departure agreed, stating 
that his office was “a welcome arbitrator able to break through the red tape and bureaucratic 
intransigence that could make life hell” for soldiers.55              
Beginning in 1992, American – and later British and Canadian – Gulf War veterans 
began to present a wide array of symptoms ranging from fatigue to cancer.
56
 The symptoms’ 
inexplicable nature led to investigations into physical exposures to toxins, particularly focused 
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on insect repellents and nerve-gas antidotes administered to Gulf War participants.
57
 Despite the 
fact that none of the approximately 5000 Canadians who served in the Gulf War reported serious 
illnesses from toxins during the conflict, numerous men and women subsequently complained of 
fatigue, depression, digestive problems, and a myriad of other symptoms.
58
 Pressure was put on 
all three governments to act after media reports gave the impression that the problem was 
transnational and therefore had its roots in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, although the 
commonality of certain symptoms led some to refer to the manifestations as “Gulf War 
Syndrome (GWS),” no single problem was identified as the culprit.59 GWS, like shell shock and 
battle exhaustion before it, symbolized and captured the stresses of “a unique war with unique 
stresses.”60 It was, a military study affirmed, the psychological stress of being under constant 
threat of biological or chemical weapons that produced GWS, rather than the weapons 
themselves.
61
 Colonel Cameron Scott, who reported on the CAF’s findings after sending out 
6000 questionnaires to Gulf War veterans, concluded that “the strongest association to adverse 
health outcomes was [related to] psychological stressors.”62  
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In June 1998, when Dallaire, then Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), agreed with the 
questionnaire’s conclusions and demanded that GWS sufferers be treated in the same manner as 
physical casualties, it was evident that a small but noticeable shift was occurring within the halls 
of National Defence Headquarters.
63
 The belief that psychological stresses alone could be 
responsible for causing debilitating symptoms in Gulf War veterans would have been 
unthinkable at the beginning of the decade, but it was abundantly clear to a small cadre of 
military leaders by the late 1990s that traditional ideas of combat stress must be cast off. Several 
factors combined to break through traditionalists’ attempts to ignore, downplay, or deny the 
existence of numerous psychological casualties: New research into peacekeeping trauma; 
consistent media reports of soldiers’ problems after service; public inquiries into those problems; 
Dallaire’s public battle with PTSD and subsequent advocacy; and the GWS controversy.64 In 
July 1999, a military board of inquiry was called which became the culmination of all the 
previous struggles over the past decade. The Croatia Board of Inquiry (BOI) finally exposed the 
extent – both numerically and qualitatively – of problems Canadian peacekeepers faced during 
and after service. The BOI became a flashpoint that changed the way many military leaders 
viewed psychological trauma, and highlighted the human cost of peacekeeping for all Canadians 
to see. It also provided historians with a unique look behind the wall of silence that existed 
throughout the 1990s. Looking beyond that wall highlights the continuation of altered, though 
still present ideas of proper manliness and soldierly behaviour, the connection made between 
psychological trauma and personal weakness, and the very real effect that a perceived lack of 
social support – à la Vietnam – had on Canadian peacekeepers.  
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The Croatia Board of Inquiry 
 
 Two key events occurred in 1998-1999 and precipitated the military calling the BOI. The 
first was the case of retired Warrant Officer Matt Stopford, a Medak veteran discharged in 
October 1998 after becoming partially blind and suffering from a myriad of symptoms ranging 
from aching joints to intestinal bleeding.
65
 Stopford’s case made national news after he, along 
with two other injured peacekeepers, personally confronted MND Art Eggleton outside the 
House of Commons about problems soldiers faced obtaining a pension for injuries.
66
 Stopford’s 
case was particularly mystifying and created a storm of controversy after a book published in 
1998 by journalists Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan noted that Canadian peacekeepers at Medak 
had been forced to use soil “tailings” found around an abandoned mineshaft to make protective 
sandbags.
67
 When it was alleged the soil contained trace amounts of bauxite and uranium, Taylor 
and Nolan as well as Canadian newspapers implied a link between Stopford’s illness and the 
“red dirt.”68 Connected to this story were reports that Lieutenant (Navy) Eric Smith, a physician 
who served on a 1994 tour in the Medak region and noticed the red soil, wrote a memo in 
January 1995 warning of possible toxic exposure and had a copy placed in the file of every 
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soldier who served in Croatia and Bosnia from 1992-1993.
69
 The media revealed that Smith’s 
letter was surreptitiously removed from most soldiers’ files, and accusations of a cover-up 
quickly became national news.
70
 The media scrum surrounding the Stopford case, soldiers’ 
ostensible exposure to harmful substances, and an inexplicably high number of peacekeeping 
casualties proved to be the straws that broke the camel’s back, and in July 1999 MND Art 
Eggleton ordered a board of inquiry into the matter.
71
 Retrospectively, the “red dirt” scare 
demonstrated the extent to which the media, rank-and-file soldiers, and military leaders still 
looked to physical causes to explain mysterious peacekeeping injuries, despite the piecemeal but 
nevertheless growing evidence that the cause of many injuries was a more insidious one.         
Thus, amidst numerous scandals across the decade and under public scrutiny, the BOI 
was called to investigate the high number of peacekeeping injuries stemming from UNPROFOR 
service.
72
 The Board’s initial (and official) mandate was to examine whether from 1993 to 1995 
CAF members in the area of Croatia designated Sector South were subjected to “environmental 
contaminants” in quantities strong enough to pose a health hazard.73 The Board’s very narrow 
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 Sharpe, Croatia Board of Inquiry, 1; The Board consisted of: Chairman (and Air Force officer) Colonel Joe 
Sharpe; RCMP Inspector Reg Bonvie; Major J.P. Caron from the Van Doos, also a Croatia veteran; Lieutenant-
  
192 
 
mandate mirrored the desire of most soldiers – and their chain of command – to find a tangible, 
physical cause for troops’ inexplicable health problems. By not responding to early concerns 
about the “red dirt” and removing Smith’s letter, the military inadvertently encouraged the belief 
that soldiers’ problems were of a physical nature.74 Throughout the Board’s existence, its 
members met and spoke with approximately 2000 soldiers and their families.
75
 From the 
beginning, Chairman Sharpe was convinced the only way to gain soldiers’ trust was to 
demonstrate the Board had front-line veterans’ confidence. To achieve that trust Mike Spellen, a 
retired Master Warrant Officer and Croatia (Medak) veteran was asked to participate as a Board 
member. Sharpe kept Spellen close at hand throughout the process, especially when speaking at 
press conferences or with the rank and file.
76
   
It was the plethora of face-to-face discussions and initial days of testimony that 
convinced Sharpe and the other Board members that “there was a much larger issue” than 
potential contaminant exposure.
77
 When asked to recall the Inquiry’s initial stages, Spellen 
focused on how surprised he was to see former comrades arriving to testify with their wives, and 
in a few cases, their mothers.
78
 After testimonies began, it was clear why. Spellen stated: “I had 
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no idea some of these guys were horrifically sick ... and they’re showing up with their wives or 
their mother in a couple of cases, due to the fact that they were so emotionally unstable ... Best of 
my recollection, there wasn’t one testimony from troops where they didn’t break down. 
Everyone broke down, and that’s from colonel down.”79 Sharpe noticed a distinct pattern 
emerging in discussions both on and off the record. Soldiers reported digestive problems, wild 
mood swings, and great difficulty sleeping, as well as nightmares.
80
  
Hence, the Board sensed early on it was only viewing 10% of the iceberg, and decided, 
with permission from Convening Authority Lieutenant-General Mike Caines, to expand its 
mandate to include “the much broader issue of how the Canadian Forces and Canada care for 
military personnel who are injured in the course of their duties.”81 The Board was also influenced 
by military historian Allan English’s work on combat stress among Canadian aircrew during the 
Second World War.
82
 Board member Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Sutherland previously took a 
Royal Military College course offered by English in 1997. At various points in the course 
English discussed his PhD thesis work on “flying stress.”83 Thus when the Board sensed that 
stress might be a factor in peacekeepers’ health problems, Sutherland mentioned English’s work 
to Chairman Sharpe. The latter, who knew English from previous work conducted for the Air 
Force, telephoned English to discuss the matter.
84
 From that conversation Sharpe decided the 
Board could use English’s help, and commissioned him in the fall of 1999 to produce a meta-
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analysis paper on the historical dimensions and interpretations of combat stress and PTSD.
85
 
English submitted his paper in October 1999, and it constituted one of several factors that 
encouraged Sharpe and his colleagues to change their direction and mandate. The Board’s 
decision to enlarge the scope of its investigation was “not universally accepted and understood 
within the department [of National Defence],” but it proved an historic one, as the enlarged 
mandate and subsequent testimonies brought forth themes which had not been thoroughly 
discussed in Canadian military circles since the First and Second World Wars.
86
 From August 
1999 until its final report in January 2000, the BOI’s proceedings were closely followed by the 
Canadian media, soldiers, and public, through both traditional mediums (excerpts aired on 
nightly newscasts) and a Croatia Board of Inquiry website kept up to date with all proceedings.
87
         
 
The Forgotten Past 
 
 Despite the Canadian military’s experience with shell shock in the First World War, and 
battle exhaustion during the Second World War and Korean War, it was clear when Board 
testimonies began that the CAF was unprepared for the onslaught of psychological trauma faced 
in peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s. Captain Kelly Brett, a physician and one of 
two Senior Medical Officers who oversaw Canadian medical staff in Croatia in 1993, testified 
there was considerable confusion regarding how to handle stress casualties: “There was 
confusion as to we don’t know what to really do with them. We have social workers, we have 
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civilian psychologists. We don’t really know what to do with it. People try, you know ... But I 
think it was just so foreign ... and we just weren’t ready to deal with the post-deployment stuff 
that was going to fall out of these tours.”88 Both military leaders and medical staff were largely 
unaware of traumatic stress or PTSD, and those who knew about combat stress did not associate 
such concepts with a peacekeeping milieu. That institutional blind spot was best encapsulated in 
the testimony of Major Dan Drew, 2PPCLI Officer Commanding, Delta Company during the 
Medak Pocket operation of September 1993. Drew summarized the situation thus: 
 
Stress itself [was] not understood. It was a dead science in the Canadian army. We 
had not seen combat fatigue probably since Korea. So there was nobody around, no 
experts to be able to do deal with this issue. I don't know – I cannot speak on behalf of 
everybody else, but for myself I could not accept that we would have some sort of 
combat fatigue or, you know, some sort of posttraumatic stress syndrome or disorder 
because in our minds we had not been at war, okay. And yeah, we saw some bodies and 
we saw destruction and things like this. But probably I did not understand the 
significance of what this was -- the consequences that that would have on all of us later 
on.
89
 
 
 
 Drew’s conceptualization of combat stress and trauma, as with comrades from all ranks, 
reflected the fact that much of the Canadian military’s acquired knowledge about psychological 
casualties was forgotten after the Korean War.
90
 Colonel Ray Wlasichuk, a veteran of two 
Bosnia tours, maintained that, “I above anybody should have known everything I needed to 
know about post-traumatic stress disorder, and how a human being reacts to the situations we 
were faced with ... but we just didn’t have that basic knowledge. It was available in psychiatric 
journals but it wasn’t something that the military focused on.”91 There were, despite Drew and 
Wlasichuk’s assertions, experts like Passey, up to date with current civilian psychiatric thinking 
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about trauma, but they were few in number. Passey himself testified a week prior that the extent 
of the CAF’s psychiatric team was five psychiatrists for over 60,000 troops, spread across bases 
all over Canada, with numerous bases having none.
92
 That problem was compounded, Passey 
said, by the reality that “not all of us [psychiatrists] have got training in this area [PTSD].”93 He 
further expressed incredulity at the general lack of knowledge about PTSD in the CAF, even 
among medical staff. He declared: “I am still amazed there is people on the medical side that 
don’t know anything about this situation, this disorder. And it is like, well, geez if we 
[physicians] don’t know anything about it, what about the front line supervisors.”94 Confirmation 
of Passey’s statement was provided by numerous other testimonies throughout the BOI. When 
asked about formal mechanisms for dealing with combat stress or PTSD, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Paul Wynnyk, a “G3” officer responsible for all aspects of training and operations within 
western Canada, could recall no programs in place during the early 1990s.
95
 He chalked the 
situation up to the fact that the CAF had not “experienced it [PTSD] to the magnitude that we 
were experiencing it at the time.”96 Beyond revealing a dearth of understanding about 
psychological trauma, Board testimonies also demonstrated that decades-old ideas about mental 
illness signifying a weakness of character and femininity persisted.  
 The CAF of the 1990s, consisting of a modest-sized Regular Force and smaller Reservist 
element, was far different in character than the large citizen-soldier armies created in 1914 and 
1939. Nonetheless, as in the past, Canadian soldiers in the post-Cold War period looked to 
military leaders for behavioural cues and adopted CAF cultural attitudes toward topics like 
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proper manliness and soldiering.
97
 Far more so than in civilian society, the chain of command 
ensured that doctrine and attitudes were shaped from the top down. Military culture also gave 
officers at all levels significant power to resist change and punish thoughts and actions outside 
the norm.
98
 Creating the proverbial “band of brothers” required a starker delineation between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour than that used in civilian society. Use of the term “suit,” 
utilized by CAF members to separate those in the CAF/DND who were part of the organization 
but not one of “us,” provided just one example of how military members defined who was inside 
and outside of that band.
99
 Board testimonies confirmed that despite numerous changes in 
Canadian society and the military post-1945, members of all ranks held beliefs about mental 
illness akin to their forebears several decades prior. Those afflicted with psychological 
difficulties were urged to suffer in silence, lest they face ostracism for stepping outside of 
accepted ideals. But as the number of ill and disaffected soldiers increased, the Board gave them 
a forum through which to finally break their silence and reveal how psychological trauma and 
CAF cultural attitudes about mental illness had affected their lives. The “shut up” culture had 
been so effective that for many soldiers, as with Mike Spellen, it was the first time they saw the 
true extent of the problem, and how many of their comrades were likewise unduly affected by 
peacekeeping experiences. 
 
Stigma 
 
 
Numerous discussions throughout the Croatia Board revolved around the stigma attached 
to illness of any sort – and particularly mental illness – in the military. Similar to militaries 
                                                          
97
 As Allan English argued in Understanding Military Culture, “Subordinates look to leaders for cues to appropriate 
behaviour and often emulate leader behaviour.” See English, Understanding Military Culture, 22.  
98
 Ibid., 14. 
99
 One other example is “REMF,” short for “rear echelon mother fucker,” a term used in the US and Canadian 
militaries to identify those who never leave the forward operating base and/or those who work in ostensibly 
comfortable circumstances, instead of “in the field.”  
  
198 
 
around the world, the CAF prided itself on members’ fitness and ability to deploy at a moment’s 
notice, as well as their resilience under even the most extreme circumstances. That preparedness 
was how militaries ensured they were up to the difficult tasks dictated by civilian governments, 
including operations assigned with little forewarning. The strong sense of self determination that 
drove men and women in uniform, and the Forces as a whole, also acted as a shield against 
anything that deterred operational readiness.
100
 That fitness culture had two inadvertent effects 
on traumatized peacekeepers in the 1990s. The first was that it created in many soldiers’ minds a 
self-imposed stigma regarding their illness, leading them to deny or ignore a health problem until 
a “crash” occurred.101 During his Board testimony, Captain Bob Sparks, Chaplain and Senior 
Stress Coordinator with 2PPCLI in 1993, highlighted the hesitancy soldiers displayed about 
discussing mental health problems: “The ones that I would see would be ones that the problem 
had gotten so big that they couldn’t hold on to it any more, where the wife was complaining 
about them waking up in the middle of the night and this kind of thing.”102  
Greg Prodaniuk supported Spark’s testimony and highlighted how the fitness culture and 
notions of loyalty to the regiment worked against illness, persuading soldiers to carry on despite 
mental difficulties: “‘[Y]our behaviours are outside the norm. Your efforts are outside the norm. 
Get back on it. Get back in the run. Get back into the pack’ ... [T]he shame ... that we bring upon 
ourselves, those stigmas that we put on ourselves, those self-imposed stigmas, were pretty 
powerful. You were pretty conditioned to do that.”103 Mike Spellen likewise emphasized the 
immense power of military culture to shape soldiers’ mental processes. The voluminous number 
of testimonies and off-the-record discussions revealed to the Board that, “Most of these guys 
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initially didn’t know that there was something going on with them; or they were in denial.”104 
The stigma attached to mental illness was sufficiently strong enough to prevent many from 
seeking help, even despite losing their family and career, ending up on the street, or deciding 
upon suicide.
105
   
 Beyond the self-imposed stigma soldiers attached to their condition, the fitness culture’s 
second consequence extended to how CAF members perceived their comrades’ vulnerability. 
Board testimonies indicated that many decades after Sir Andrew Macphail described shell shock 
as a display of femininity, an altered but still powerful military masculinity operated against 
psychological “weakness” and PTSD. Captain Kelly Brett summarized the situation thus: “The 
military still has a very macho attitude and certainly in the army it is a male dominated culture 
and people don’t want to come forward. They just don’t want to come forward and admit a 
weakness ... And it is [both] the men and officers, it doesn’t matter.”106 In other words, weakness 
was not tolerated. Greg Prodaniuk described the language used in the 1990s against those 
showing signs of vulnerability as “blunt” and sometimes “brutal,” implying that a soldier 
reporting psychological problems was just a “weak piece of shit.”107 As stated in the quotation at 
this chapter’s beginning, military parlance was also infused with gendered terms such as “weak 
sister” to describe those who displayed physical or psychological vulnerability.108 Dr. Mark 
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Tysiaczny, Regional Surgeon at Air Command Headquarters in Winnipeg in 1993, described the 
reticence soldiers of all ranks displayed about undergoing CISD or discussing mental illness. 
Tysiaczny faced an “uphill battle” when he attempted to organize CISD sessions with 2PPCLI a 
month after its return from Croatia.
109
 The reason, he said, was that “it [CISD] was seen by some 
as a sort of ... airy-fairy, not very macho thing.”110 Like the John Wayne figure, “real” men 
embraced stoicism when facing adversity, instead of resorting to “feminine” behaviour such as 
venting their feelings. When queried about whether resistance came from both the “the combat 
arms side” and the “medical side,” Tysiaczny responded that, “It was every side.”111 Mike 
Spellen further probed the source of resistance, asking Tysiaczny about the participation rate he 
received from “upper management, senior NCOs and officers.”112 In a sign that military leaders 
were less than enthusiastic about encouraging the rank and file to express their feelings or 
problems, Tysiaczny affirmed that, “We [CISD specialists, social workers, etc.] handled more 
the [lower] ranks than the officers. We had had a couple of officer groups and tended to have 
only junior officers present.”113 
 The stigma attached to psychological vulnerability was present in all ranks and trades. 
Mike Spellen recalled that the few soldiers who had the courage to come forward about mental 
difficulties were quickly cast off by their peers.
114
 Those diagnosed with a mental disorder found 
themselves on the outside of the circle, as their friends “all of a sudden wouldn’t socialize with 
them.”115 Higher up, many in the upper chain of command quite simply “thought it [PTSD] was 
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all bullshit.”116 Passey testified that when he started working with the PPCLI “some senior 
people” thought PTSD “was all garbage,” arguing instead that a high level of discipline and 
morale made their companies impervious to psychological casualties.
117
 Spellen remembered a 
private meeting with Chairman Sharpe and an anonymous colonel from the Van Doos 
Regiment.
118
 During the discussion, the colonel informed Spellen and Sharpe he had been 
diagnosed with PTSD by a civilian physician and was paying for treatment out of his own pocket 
so that he did not have to reveal the condition to his superiors.
119
 Passey testified that even 
amongst the infantry battalions, where there were considerable numbers of soldiers diagnosed 
with PTSD, “they are not very tolerant of this disorder. It’s like you get ostracized, you get 
marginalized.”120 Master Warrant Officer Ed Larabie, a Reconnaissance Platoon Warrant Officer 
in Croatia in 1993, echoed Passey’s sentiments: “[T]here are loads of people out there that will 
not come forward because they are worried about ... the stigma attached to it and having to put 
up with their peers ... I still sit in the mess [hall] now and they start talking about ... ‘Oh, this guy 
is a loser.’ ‘He is an idiot.’ ‘He has lost his marbles.’”121    
For those unwilling to accept the existence or extent of PTSD within the military, the 
issue was often perceived as a matter of honour. PTSD and mental illness were deemed a literal 
attack on manpower, operational effectiveness, and unit cohesion, but equally important, they 
were also a metaphorical attack on the Forces’ prestige. Sergeant Chris Byrne, 2PPCLI member 
who served in Croatia in 1993, explained how notions of honour encouraged hostility against 
health problems that implied cowardice or weakness: “You see the people that are the cause of 
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what is wrong with the system are afraid that the honour of the soldiers of the past or regiment 
itself or the battalion itself is going to be dishonoured in some way.”122 Ed Larabie’s testimony 
before the Board likewise demonstrated that penetrating internalized cultural values about duty 
to the regiment was a herculean task. He affirmed: “It’s a stigma that I don’t know you can ever 
get over ... I guess it is a soldier’s honour or whatever but you can’t be perceived to be weak.”123 
PTSD, like other afflictions, tainted both individual and regimental honour, and, as expressed by 
many soldiers throughout the centuries, “those that weren’t there have no idea what it [soldier’s 
honour] is about.”124      
CAF members were reluctant to do anything to jeopardize their honour, or that of the 
military, and quickly closed ranks when approached by those from outside the circle. A soldier’s 
loyalty was (and is) first and foremost to the battalion, and more specifically to those with whom 
they shared front-line experiences — colloquially put, their “buddies.”125 According to Kelly 
Brett, when a Critical Incident Stress team arrived in Croatia, a colonel forbade them from seeing 
his soldiers; a move Brett approved of, even as a doctor, because “we understood ... you can’t 
just fly a team in from Canada without any [front-line/military] experience.”126 Back in Canada, 
Mark Tysiaczny knew that CISD was most effective at penetrating soldiers’ reluctance to speak 
out when conducted by “a peer counsellor who is from the group,” but lamented that “it took 
some time before that philosophy was accepted.”127 Master Warrant Officer Randy Northrup, 
2PPCLI Combat Support Company Sergeant Major in Croatia in1993, recalled that a few 
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soldiers were willing to speak with CISD counsellors but, “a lot of guys, pure rebuff. [They 
declared] ‘Didn’t bother me at all.’”128 Northrup indicated that most men in uniform simply did 
not trust CIS teams, and that treatment success was more likely to come “behind their house 
having a barbecue with a beer,” rather than trying to discuss something perceived as a “manhood 
problem” in a formal setting.129  
 
Pension and Career Concerns 
 
 In addition to concerns about social shunning, dishonouring the regiment, or being 
viewed as a lesser man, many soldiers’ desire to hide their injury was further fuelled by career 
concerns. The military constituted not just soldiers’ social world, it encompassed their economic 
one as well. Those with families, in particular, wore several hats as husband, father, and 
provider.
130
 Similar to their civilian counterparts, Forces members sought job stability and a 
future retirement life secured by a pension. But unlike civilians, CAF members were subject to 
the “universality of service” principle. Also known as the “soldier first principle,” universality of 
service made it the requirement of military members to be “operationally employable” and 
“operationally deployable,” as well as able to perform the functions of their specific occupation 
or “the more generic type functions of their environment.”131 Soldiers had to be physically and 
mentally fit to serve their country at a moment’s notice and able to carry on their trade. Bosnia 
veteran Fred Doucette laconically summarized the universality principle as, “No deploy, no 
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employ.”132 In a military undergoing significant funding and troop reductions throughout the 
1990s, those deemed in violation of the universality principle were at greater risk of being 
released. Those suffering from psychological injuries were thus between the proverbial rock and 
a hard place as they battled both inner demons and fears over losing their career and calling. 
 Chairman Sharpe and the Croatia Board members sensed early in the proceedings that not 
only were many soldiers suffering in silence, but that numerous others were being – and had 
been – released from the Forces early and denied a pension.133 Sharpe, later described by Carol 
Off as a “guardian angel” to injured soldiers and veterans, made no secret of his disgust at what 
he deemed an archaic and broken system.
134
 He did not tread lightly, and placed his career on the 
line in a number of public criticisms about how ill soldiers were treated.
135
 In a December 1999 
Globe and Mail article, the Board’s report was quoted as terming the treatment of ill soldiers “a 
disgrace.”136 The report affirmed that the situation “cannot be allowed to continue,” and 
reiterated the Board’s belief that stress illnesses were neither a fabrication nor a sign of 
weakness.
137
 According to Sharpe, for his outspokenness the DND Assistant Deputy Minister of 
Public Affairs sought, without success, a court martial against him for bringing disrepute to the 
military.
138
       
 As it did with its investigation into the CAF’s socio-cultural milieu, the Board delved into 
the organizational factors that shaped how and why psychological injuries were treated as 
unworthy of monetary restitution by the CAF and Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC). Sharpe and 
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his colleagues discovered that the traditional medical model persisted within both organizations, 
emphasizing the legitimacy of physical over mental problems.
139
 Since the type of injuries 
stemming from peacekeeping repeatedly did not fit that model, numerous soldiers were treated as 
malingerers unqualified for a military pension.
140
 Mental injuries were also sidestepped by VAC 
as something not on the list of injuries covered, and afflictions that soldiers could not prove were 
sustained in a “special duty area.”141 Lastly, the disability insurance program CAF members paid 
into, the Service Income Security Insurance Plan (SISIP), had a different definition of “medically 
unfit” than the CAF. The result was that soldiers could be released from the Forces on medical 
grounds, but still denied a pension by SISIP with the justification that they were not proven 
“sufficiently disabled.”142 In short, the organizational deck was stacked against injured troops, 
and especially those whose injuries were not necessarily visible to the naked eye. 
 Board testimonies also revealed that troops faced a labyrinthine and slow-moving process 
in their fight for restitution. Bernard Butler, acting Director of Pension and Operational Services 
for VAC, testified before the Board that prior to 1995 veterans making a pension claim waited an 
average of eighteen months for a decision in their case.
143
 After a series of reforms, Butler 
happily reported that the turnaround time was down to approximately five to six months.
144
 
Nevertheless, whatever improvements were made in response times were offset by the 
organizational factors that made proving a claim, according to retired Colonel George Oehring, 
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“a very, very big uphill battle to fight.”145 Suspicions about VAC’s willingness to help 
psychologically injured veterans were further supported by specialists’ anecdotal evidence. 
Passey related to the Board a story of a peacekeeping veteran with PTSD who became an 
alcoholic after his diagnosis, ostensibly in part because of his illness. Passey indignantly testified 
that, “Veterans Affairs basically said, ‘Well, he has got an alcohol problem. We are not paying 
for that.’ And it is like ... The person has got PTSD. He is abusing the alcohol.”146  
 One particularly poignant testimony regarding problems with “the system” came from 
Master Seaman Wade Kelloway, a Preventive Medical Technician in the Balkans from April to 
October 1994. Kelloway bluntly told Board member Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland early in the 
proceedings that when dealing with health issues “I prefer to deal with [the] civilian side of the 
house, rather than the system.”147 Later in his testimony Kelloway further expounded on his 
discontent, saying that after experiencing health problems “over in the Medical Unit ... they 
didn’t give two rats about me.”148 But the most scathing comments about the CAF medical 
system came during the last moments of Kelloway’s appearance. When Chairman Sharpe 
reiterated that “part of our mandate here is to try and make sure that we take care of people 
properly when they come back,” Kelloway quickly interjected “And they don’t sir ... I see it all 
the time ... I’m a medical person in a medical system and I’m not even taken care – I’m pushed 
aside.”149 Coming from a member intimately knowledgeable of the CAF medical milieu, 
Kelloway’s statement was all the more indicative of systemic problems. Consequently, many in 
the Forces chose a similar route as Kelloway and the anonymous Van Doo colonel, seeking 
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treatment away from their posted base. Major Darrell Menard, a doctor who worked in the 
Directorate of Medical Policy at the National Defence Medical Centre in the 1990s, argued that 
given the financial implications and his belief that “there is no accommodation left in the system 
for them [soldiers] if they have a problem that won’t allow them to deploy,” it was “not hard to 
understand” why many troops sought help outside of the military.150       
 More than any other testimony, that of Colonel Oehring, former Commander of Sector 
South in Croatia from September 1993 to August 1994, summarized numerous soldiers’ 
problems with the CAF medical system and VAC’s treatment of injured veterans. Late in his 
Board testimony Oehring lamented:  
 
We subject each embarking soldier to a medical screening and/or examination as 
a precondition to deployment, and then when they return in other than the physical or 
mental shape in which they left we seem not to accept that the cause is attributable to that 
deployment. This is not only unfair; it is immoral. We seem to be so frightened that one 
man or one woman will cheat the system that we make it very difficult for any to receive 
the compensation and/or treatment the country owes them. In this regard, we have made 
our otherwise excellent medical system the watchdogs and agents of the Pension Board 
rather than the advocates of the soldiers that they should be.
151
 
 
 
Oehring’s testimony, and the testimonies from soldiers of all ranks, spotlighted certain 
issues such as “attributability” that remained a problem eighty years after the end of the Great 
War. For all of the changes during the intervening decades and conflicts, the onus was still on 
soldiers and veterans to definitively prove their injury was attributable to service; a task made 
immensely more challenging for those who, like their First and Second World War counterparts, 
brought home seemingly invisible wounds. Fear of individuals “cheating” the system, foremost 
in pension officials’ minds during the post-1918 and 1945 periods, were still present in military 
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leaders’ and VAC officials’ minds in the 1990s. CAF doctors were also reluctant to acknowledge 
psychological illnesses. Sharpe explained in his retrospective book about the Croatia Board 
proceedings that “Doctors in uniform, particularly senior officers, are far more sceptical than 
civilians when it comes to stress-related injuries.”152 Fear and scepticism mixed with traditional 
understandings of combat stress, proper soldiering, and manhood to ensure that psychologically 
injured peacekeepers and veterans encountered many of the same difficulties as their forebears 
when seeking medical treatment or a pension.   
A sadly informative case was that of Phil Tobicoe, First Nations member and Croatia 
veteran with a long family history of military service in the American, British, and Canadian 
armies.
153
 Tobicoe, who developed inexplicable psychosomatic symptoms after Croatia, was 
turned down for a pension.
154
 He spoke for many soldiers when he expressed that he simply 
wanted to serve his country and be granted a pension for injuries incurred as a result of that 
service: “I want to do my 20 years [in the military]. I want to do it proudly because I am 
Missassaugas [sic] of the Credit [River] ... and a First Nations Indian. I am very proud of my 
service and ... have family [history] in the American army, the British army, the Canadian army 
and we are very proud. We just want to make sure we are looked after.”155 Tobicoe’s 
circumspect response to his predicament reflected the mixture of anger, disappointment, and 
confusion many soldiers felt towards the military and VAC.  
As the Board of Inquiry progressed, it was not just front-line soldiers and officers who 
expressed anger at how the system was failing men and women in uniform. During SISIP 
President W.D. Roberts’ testimony, Chairman Sharpe became so angry at the former’s “callous 
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and uncaring attitude” and “pride in the fact that he was able to save the insurance company 
money by denying soldiers’ claims” that he was unable to thank Roberts for his Board 
appearance; the only time during the Board’s proceedings in which such an event occurred.156 
Sharpe’s anger was partially fuelled by Roberts’ appearance before the Board in a “thousand 
dollar suit and Italian leather shoes,” as well as his apparent mirth shown when “denigrating the 
‘unwarranted’ requests from near destitute soldiers.”157 Sharpe firmly believed that Roberts was 
“proud of his ability to find ways to deny [pension] coverage.”158 Mike Spellen described 
Roberts as akin to a “washed up used car salesman” and stated that he had never seen Sharpe 
mad in many years, “except for that day.”159 For his part, Spellen stated matter-of-factly that if 
he was not a Board member he “might have” punched Roberts.160 
 
Social Support  
 
After returning to Canadian soil most troops were preoccupied with getting back to the 
basic comforts of life and seeing loved ones. Sergeant Gregory Goudie’s thoughts reflected what 
numerous colleagues felt: “[W]e just want to see the wife, you know, get a bottle of bourbon 
down range.”161 Above all else, they were happy “just to get home.”162 The initial euphoria of 
being home caused most troops to ignore or suppress thoughts about the tour. Nevertheless, after 
settling in they discovered they were relatively invisible both on- and off-base. Given the 
                                                          
156
 G.E. Sharpe, e-mail message to author, November 4, 2014; Sharpe’s recollection of Roberts’ testimony is 
supported by the testimony document, which indeed shows that Major Caron, rather than Chairman Sharpe thanked 
Roberts for his Board appearance. See Testimony of W.D. Roberts, Croatia Board of Inquiry, November 25, 1999, 
vol. XXVII, 25.   
157
 Ibid.  
158
 Ibid.  
159
 Mike Spellen interview; Spellen stated to the author that part of the Board’s frustration lay in the fact that Roberts 
seemed to have almost dictatorial power over the outcome of veterans’ cases (a point also supported by the 
testimony transcript), and that he also seemed to revel in it.  
160
 Ibid.  
161
 Testimony of Sergeant Gregory Goudie, Croatia Board of Inquiry, November 25, 1999, vol. XXIX, 8. 
162
 Ibid.  
  
210 
 
aforementioned socio-political climate and “shut up” culture pervading the CAF during the 
1990s, soldiers returning from peacekeeping tours often found that nobody knew or cared about 
what they had been through.
163
 Despite the fact that senior UN commanders praised the 
performance of Canadian peacekeepers in the Balkans, and UNPROFOR Commander (June 
1993 to March 1994) General Jean Cot awarded the PPCLI a special UN citation, most 
Canadians in and out of uniform knew little about the UNPROFOR mission and its challenges.
164
 
In fact, it was not until nine years after the Medak Pocket battle, on 1 December 2002, that 
Governor General Adrienne Clarkson finally presented 2PPCLI members with a special citation, 
admitting that “your country did not recognize you at the time.”165 BOI testimonies captured the 
manner in which stigma and CAF culture created socio-economic difficulties for injured soldiers. 
They also revealed the intangible but nonetheless important ways that a lack of military and 
civilian support exacerbated psychological injuries as well. Psychological trauma and PTSD had 
significant medical and financial dimensions. But there were also moral and spiritual dimensions 
to how peacekeeping experiences were rationalized by troops returning to a Canada that looked 
different after witnessing the horrors of ethnic cleansing and other traumatic events. Board 
testimonies and the modest primary literature on 1990s Canadian peacekeeping provide a 
window into how soldiers experienced the psychological aftermath of service, and how a 
perceived lack of support affected the meanings they attached to that service. 
One of the biggest obstacles Canadian peacekeeping veterans faced, especially those 
suffering from psychological difficulties, was finding a comrade or close friend with whom to 
rationalize their experiences. Croatia and Bosnia veteran Sergeant Peter Vallée from the Van 
Doos found it difficult to speak about his experiences, especially because most civilians were “so 
                                                          
163
 Sharpe, Croatia Board of Inquiry, 3-4. 
164
 Ibid; Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket, 231-232. 
165
 Quoted in Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket, 274. 
  
211 
 
clueless about all of it it’s almost laughable.”166 Occasionally people asked Vallée what it was 
really like to participate in peacekeeping operations, but he discovered that few thought of it as 
anything more than a “flash on the news.”167 Vallée decided the best course of action was to just 
avoid the subject entirely: “I won’t talk about it, ever, because immediately you’re the outcast. 
It’s not a great icebreaker at parties.”168 Similar to other peacekeeping veterans, Vallée felt a vast 
gulf between the civilian and military worlds, since for the former group peacekeeping 
operations were, simply put, “not part of their reality.”169 
Master Warrant Officer Randy Northrup noticed a “tell-tale sign” that numerous soldiers 
were attempting to stave off the traumatic memories haunting them. Unable to rationalize the 
immensely troubling evidence of ethnic cleansing and other scenes in the Balkans, many turned 
to black humour to downplay the effect such experiences had on their mind.
170
 One example of 
that humour in action during the UNPROFOR mission occurred when Canadian soldiers spray 
painted the words “UN Protected” in UN blue on a group of chickens from a destroyed farm.171 
While their actions symbolically – and sarcastically – expressed what many soldiers felt about 
the mission’s effectiveness at protecting civilians, the joke’s darker implication was that the 
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chickens were literally “the only signs of life” in the area.172 Many troops brought that dark 
humour tactic home with them. Northrup described to the Board how soldiers, several years after 
the events, still used humour to shrug off evidently troubling thoughts: “When you talk to 
individuals that were in the mortar groups and the sweep teams and when you talk about certain 
[events] ... they go right to black humour. It’s immediate defense ... the black humour, for people 
who are still fighting off the issue ... They try to laugh it away. But you can tell it still bothers 
them.”173            
Given the social, financial, and career risks associated with venting to the wrong person, 
most soldiers simply kept quiet about their thoughts except in the presence of someone who had 
“been there.” Naval Lieutenant Michael Brown, a Roman Catholic Chaplain to 2PPCLI from 
April to October 1993, testified about the emotional weight peacekeeping veterans carried long 
after their return: “I have had guys over the past six years who have – I guess maybe it is a 
typical thing. When you get together, you meet in the airport ... or whatever it is and you go off 
for a beer and they just – it starts to come out. Because they actually found someone who they 
can tell the story [to] and the person’s eyes don’t glaze over.”174 As with numerous comrades, 
Brown felt he could not speak about his experiences to someone who had not been in theatre, 
because they did not “get it.”175  
In Brown’s estimation, honouring peacekeepers was a moral responsibility the military 
and Canada failed in; a failure that carried psychological consequences for veterans. He angrily 
testified: “Have we honoured what they have gone through? No ... We have not honoured their 
sacrifice. We have not given them what they need ... [P]art of that process in honouring what 
                                                          
172
 Ibid.  
173
 Testimony of MWO Randy Northrup, 21. 
174
 Testimony of Lieutenant (Navy) M.J. Brown, 55.  
175
 Ibid.  
  
213 
 
they have done is to normalize it for them ... And by doing that [not honouring them] we have 
added ... to their stress.”176 Colonel Jim Calvin, Commanding Officer of 2PPCLI during the 
Medak Pocket battle, likewise believed the dearth of attention paid to peacekeepers’ efforts made 
an already difficult psychological situation worse. He stated that “when we came home, there 
was no recognition of what we had achieved even though if you talked to anybody [other 
national contingents] in UNPROFOR ... they thought we were all bloody heroes ... We came 
back here and it was just you are done ... There was very little assistance and I would have to say 
a certain amount of an uncaring attitude that was put toward us.”177  
Calvin knew firsthand how little the military and DND seemed to want to know about the 
Medak Pocket, since it was not until April 1998, almost five years after the battle, that a 
delegation of his soldiers was finally allowed to conduct a presentation about Medak to a 
Parliamentary committee on defence.
178
 Calvin was also ordered a year earlier to break off a 
promised interview about Medak with Ottawa Citizen reporter David Pugliese; an order that was 
only rescinded because Pugliese threatened to change his story to reflect Calvin’s forced 
silence.
179
 Like Lieutenant Brown, Calvin attributed harmful effects to the CAF/DND’s attempts 
to shield the public from any unpalatable peacekeeping experiences. He argued that the 
“uncaring attitude” demonstrated by both departments and lack of recognition “certainly might 
have exacerbated things.”180 Calvin believed his soldiers had lived “ten years in that six months 
[of UN service],” a belief given credence by Sergeant Chris Byrne’s affirmation that “what I 
witnessed during our stay in Medak would haunt me forever.”181 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Craig King, 2PPCLI Alpha Company Commander in Croatia from 
July to September 1993, discussed peacekeeping’s moral quandaries and the existential questions 
soldiers battled with during and after their tour. One of the most troubling questions was whether 
or not Canadian soldiers had done all they could for civilians caught in the crossfire and targeted 
for ethnic cleansing. Since Canadian troops ostensibly operated as part of a “protection force,” 
some felt they had in fact failed to protect anyone.
182
 King testified before the BOI that certain 
questions, such as “What were we doing? Could we have done more for these people?” plagued 
soldiers’ minds.183 King told the Board that “there is a sort of moral plane that you start to look at 
these things and start to ask yourself these sorts of questions.”184 For numerous soldiers such as 
Sergeant Byrne, witnessing the aftermath of ethnic cleansing caused them to question the entire 
purpose of their mission and sacrifices. He declared: “We were not peacekeepers. We were not 
soldiers. We were nothing over there. Nobody knew exactly what we were supposed to be doing 
and what we weren’t supposed to be doing ... We weren’t to establish peace because there was 
no peace to begin with.”185 Captain Bob Organ, a CISD trained Regimental Chaplain to 2PPCLI, 
emphasized the spiritual and existential dilemmas that disturbed numerous soldiers after 
returning from the Balkans: “I think you call into question what it means to be human ... if 
there’s a God and if there’s a God, what is that God doing? You’re confronted with evil and I 
think you’ve got to work that through in order to regain an equilibrium and feel that you can re-
invest in life.”186 Unfortunately, challenging spiritual and moral questions were made all the 
more difficult to rationalize when peacekeepers returned home to find their missions were 
neither widely known nor honoured by the military and civilian society. 
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Reserves 
 
Although Regular Force members encountered difficulties finding comrades to trust with 
their most intimate thoughts and troubles, Reservists, who made up a significant number of the 
Canadian UNPROFOR contingent (and other peacekeeping contingents), were up against even 
greater challenges if they developed psychological problems or simply needed a colleague’s ear. 
Budget concerns were foremost in military leaders’ minds, so upon a Reservist’s return from 
peacekeeping duties they were hurriedly rushed through post-deployment medical checks and 
sent home before their contractual time elapsed.
187
 Colonel Calvin said that troops were, for the 
most part, “scattered to the winds.”188 Chief Warrant Officer D.F. DesBarres, a platoon Second 
in Command with 2PPCLI in Croatia in 1993, described the post-deployment situation thus: “A 
reservist arrived in Winnipeg, walked by somebody who was filling out a medical questionnaire 
to make sure you had your ten toes and ten fingers and that your head was on the top of your 
body ... and a day or two later you found yourself in an airport in Halifax, St. John’s, 
Newfoundland, Vancouver and all the way across the country.”189 When the Croatia Board first 
convened several years later, it quickly became evident that the CAF did not even have a central 
information source on which Reservists had served in the Balkans.
190
 Such embarrassing 
revelations seemed to indicate that Reservists and post-deployment issues were not at the top of 
the military’s priority list, and added to many soldiers’ suspicions about “the system.”191 
From evidence provided during the BOI about Regular Force members’ psychological 
difficulties, it stood to reason that Reservists must also be facing similar issues. Mike Spellen 
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described how Reservists were provided even fewer opportunities to rationalize their tour and 
seek comrades’ support before being sent home. He recalled: “Now we’re going home ... before 
the second plane [with Regular Force members] lands, some of these guys [Reservists] are 
already sent home to Pump Handle Junction, Alberta and Tuna Lake, Newfoundland. And they 
never got to see each other or socialize with each other ... and that had an effect on guys.”192 
Retired Master Warrant Officer Gerald Boyle echoed Spellen’s assessment, saying that 
Reservists were “just dispersed,” and “some people were on flights that night or the next day and 
you never [sic] seen them again.”193 Even Regular Force members were not necessarily 
guaranteed time to readjust and work through their experiences with colleagues before dispersal. 
Warrant Officer Geoff Crossman, member of a mortar platoon and sweep team that cleaned up 
civilian bodies after Croatian ethnic cleansing in 1993, was quickly posted from Calgary to 
Toronto after his homecoming. His rapid dispersal meant that, like many Reservists, he found 
himself far from his comrades and “with no one to talk to” about the harrowing experiences he 
endured.
194
 
Corporal Anita Kwasnicki, a Reservist from Saskatoon who served with 2PPCLI in 
Croatia in 1993, was in a uniquely challenging social position as the only female infanteer in her 
battalion. She too, like her male colleagues, remained in Winnipeg less than a week after 
returning before being sent home to Saskatchewan. Although describing herself as in good 
health, Kwasnicki stated to the Board that she was unable to access any formal (or informal) 
social or medical support if necessary, since both were only available at CFB Moose Jaw, over 
two hours’ drive from Saskatoon.195 After joining the Regular Force and moving back to 
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Winnipeg in 1997, Kwasnicki was still unable to discuss her experiences or socialize with her 
peers, since most were “a whole bunch of 18-year-old guys” she could not relate to.196 Even after 
another woman joined the battalion in 1999, Kwasnicki still felt unable to socialize because her 
colleague was younger and “at a different point in her life.”197 Her testimony demonstrated how 
geography as well as age and gender affected Reservists’ ability to discuss peacekeeping tours 
and seek help if needed. Although Kwasnicki ostensibly escaped her peacekeeping tours without 
any serious health issues, many of her comrades were not so fortunate.    
      Captain Kelly Brett, a physician who saw firsthand the effects of trauma on returning 
soldiers, described how social and medical issues were intimately linked. The problem with 
immediately disbanding Reservists was that “there is some guy in rural Newfoundland who has 
been exposed to that [trauma] and no one around him understands what he was exposed to and 
he is just not the same guy he used to be and the civilian physician there that is trying to deal 
with him doesn’t have a clue what is wrong with this guy either.”198 Soldiers who had only a few 
weeks prior been witness to horrific events or involved in firefights with belligerent forces 
suddenly found themselves transported back to their living room “with absolutely no support 
network.”199As a psychiatrist who had seen the fallout of Canada’s peacekeeping efforts, Greg 
Passey echoed Brett’s arguments about Reservists’ post-tour dispersal. Passey espoused that in 
the future “the whole issue about the reserves is something that needs to be addressed” because 
after being sent home without adequate time to be assessed and vent with colleagues, “they 
didn’t have the unit or the normal sort of comradeship that you would expect that would help 
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dissipate some of the PTSD stressors.”200 In most cases, Reservists were “sent off to nowhere, 
wherever that happened to be, often without a job or any employment and often without any sort 
of medical resources to help them deal with the situation.”201 Master Warrant Officer Larabie 
echoed Passey’s appraisal, lamenting that “we came back, we handed our rifles in and we sent 
the reservists off on their merry way, never to be seen or heard from again ... and that ... in my 
mind, is criminal.”202 
 
Anger and Disillusionment 
 
 Two of the most common feelings soldiers expressed during the Board of Inquiry were 
anger and disillusionment. The biggest target of their frustration was, unsurprisingly, the military 
itself. Throughout the Board’s proceedings, numerous soldiers testified they felt ignored or 
shunned by their battalion, regiment, and the Forces as a whole. For Lieutenant and Padre 
Michael Brown, the issue was one of responsibility. From his experiences as a peer and 
confidante to soldiers during the Medak aftermath, Brown knew many took “a lot of rage, 
disappointment, and loathing” back home.203 Brown himself also struggled with what he 
witnessed overseas, and told the Board that for months after returning from Croatia his wife said 
nighttimes were “like sleeping with a boxer.”204 Brown had numerous nightmares during which 
he crawled out of bed or rolled under it, often being unaware of his actions the next day when his 
wife informed him.
205
 He, like his peers, was angry that the CAF and DND seemed unwilling to 
shoulder their share of responsibility for soldiers’ health problems stemming from service: 
“Responsibility is, if I ask you to go do something ... I accept the consequence that you may 
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come back not the same as you left. I will own what I am responsible for. So that when you come 
back, I will hopefully be able to put you back together the way you were before you left. We do 
not do it.”206 Major Darrell Menard’s testimony also highlighted the theme of responsibility. He 
argued that, “when they [soldiers] are destroyed by doing a mission like that, I think the people 
that sent them there have a responsibility to take care of them.”207  
   Kelly Brett expressed anger at how the CAF and politicians seemed willing to send 
Canadian troops anywhere at any time, and without considering how many deployments they 
already shouldered. He angrily stated that once soldiers signed up “we somehow feel we have 
this right to expose them to whatever we feel like we can expose them to.”208 Brett felt it was 
“simply wrong” to send soldiers, in some cases, on eight or nine tours.209 The physical and 
mental weight of multiple tours caused many to collapse under the strain. Brett reported to the 
Board what the results were: “I do their release medicals in Calgary and it is the same story. 
[Soldiers said] I can’t take it. I just can’t go away again. There are huge family problems. There 
is alcoholism. There is drug abuse. There is all this stuff because guys aren’t given a break.”210 
Brett’s candid assessment reflected his belief that the number of operations and subsequent 
treatment soldiers received was, plainly put, “ruining people’s lives.”211 Captain Alain 
Guevremont, Padre and Croatia veteran, agreed with Brett, testifying that the situation was 
“burning our people, big time.”212 One particularly moving assessment came from Matt 
Stopford, himself a medically released soldier whose career was cut short by a litany of 
inexplicable physical and mental symptoms. He sorrowfully explained that, “When that faith is 
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broken by them [the CAF/DND], it’s like somebody’s torn your heart out and just tossed it away. 
That was my life. You guys talk about it as a career. That was my soul, my life. I love what I did. 
I still would love to do it.”213      
  Soldiers also directed their sorrow and frustration at the federal government and 
Canadian public. Civilian indifference led some CAF members to believe their country betrayed 
them. Major Dan Drew lamented that although Canadian troops had represented Canada “in the 
finest possible fashion” in the Balkans, many civilians did not know about their experiences.214 
Worse still, the Canadian government, more concerned about actual or potential scandals had 
“not acknowledged or even cared about their [soldiers’] sacrifices.”215 Retired Master Warrant 
Officer M.B. McCarthy, a Regimental Sergeant Major with 2PPCLI who served in Croatia in 
1993, echoed Drew’s appraisal. After noting citations Canadian peacekeepers received from the 
UN during the UNPROFOR Mission, and much earlier during the Korean War, when the 
regiment received the United States Presidential Unit Citation, McCarthy asked the Board: “And 
what has Canada given us? Absolutely nothing. Whether it is ... Canadian Forces, country, 
whatever, we have gotten nothing from the country.”216     
 Sergeant James Davis likewise vocalized frustration and disillusionment about how 
Canadian peacekeepers were treated upon their return. He recalled that while overseas soldiers 
sometimes received supportive letters from schoolchildren; letters that “were like gold” for 
troops bearing the brunt of Canada’s foreign policy decisions.217 Sadly, such kind actions 
inadvertently created a belief among troops that the Canadian public was deeply aware of current 
peacekeeping missions. Davis noticed a “huge gap” after he returned from Yugoslavia between 
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what he thought people knew and the actual reality.
218
 He affirmed: “The Canadian public just 
doesn’t seem to know what’s going on in these places, what’s going on with this military.”219 A 
lack of awareness and societal support caused Davis and other soldiers to question the reasons 
for their service. Davis candidly expressed his frustration at the public’s seeming indifference: 
“So am I dedicating my life to the Canadian public?  At least the government has the decency to 
abuse you in the open. The Canadian public just doesn’t seem to care and that’s even harder to 
take.”220 Instead of worrying about what troops were doing overseas, he argued, Canadians were 
more concerned with “where we’re putting our investments and what’s the new plot on Ally 
McBeal.”221 The trouble, Davis said, of being too caught up in day-to-day matters was that, “We 
forget that out there, in the real world, there are real Canadian troops who are doing a damn fine 
job for Canada. But no one seems to know that.”222          
Andrew Godin further expounded on what Davis and a number of injured peacekeepers 
thought about public indifference. He argued that although Canadians were quite willing to 
honour fallen soldiers, the injured were forgotten: 
 
Once a year ... we gather at cenotaphs all across the country to celebrate the fallen 
... How many are actually injured?  Probably about five times as many, but no thought is 
given to that. We honour the dead, because they made the ultimate sacrifice, but we don’t 
honour the injured. We don’t honour the people that are still alive and functioning. But 
we feel in our hearts and minds, ‘Yeah, I took a moment’ ... Well, sorry to say, that’s not 
quite enough.
223
  
 
 
Sergeant Peter Vallée, a Croatia and Bosnia veteran from the Van Doos Regiment, 
believed the problem related to education; a point made evident by the fact that, “Some 
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Canadians don’t know that Canada was even in Korea.”224 He felt the situation could be vastly 
improved if education was provided about what the military “actually” did.225 Vallée affirmed 
that the public, when informed, was “very supportive” and interested, but simply put, “They 
don’t know.”226      
There were, despite numerous veterans’ assertions, ephemeral examples of public interest 
and support. Master Corporal Phil Tobicoe’s Croatia Board testimony revealed the bolstering 
effect public showings of support had on returning peacekeepers. He described to the Board the 
welcoming atmosphere soldiers encountered after landing in Winnipeg: “I loved the greeting that 
the Winnipeg people gave us. My God there was – when we arrived in Winnipeg, we felt like 
something. There were ribbons on trees, signs, a hall greeted us, people. My God I didn’t even 
know some of these families and they greeted us like they knew us. They sort of loved us and 
shook your hand. It was like the whole city came out for us.”227 Regrettably, the moment was 
short lived. When Tobicoe and his comrades arrived in Calgary twenty-four hours later “there 
was nothing. There was a six foot table, a box of doughnuts and a coffee urn and there was only 
maybe one or two families there ... and the CO [Commanding Officer].”228      
One of the strongest criticisms of the public and federal government came from Master 
Corporal Jordie Yeo, a Balkans veteran physically injured by shrapnel who, like numerous 
comrades, had many sleeps filled with nightmares after his return.
229
 Yeo invoked the United 
States’ Vietnam experience in his evaluation of Canadian peacekeepers’ predicament:  
 
I can truly understand what soldiers from the United States who were in Vietnam 
have gone through. They came back and people hated them or just ignored them. That’s 
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what happened to a lot of Canadian soldiers. Just about every single guy that’s in the 
Canadian Armed Forces has done some sort of tour of duty in Yugoslavia, Haiti, 
Rwanda, Somalia and we’re doing this because the Canadian people and our politicians 
believe that it’s the right thing. If it’s the right thing, then how come when we come back 
home nobody says, ‘Good job’? I would really like somebody to sit down and explain to 
me why.
230
 
 
Reminding Canadians, “It’s your country and your soldiers are your people,” Yeo 
challenged citizens unhappy with overseas operations to discuss the matter with politicians.
231
 In 
Yeo’s mind, the only worse thing than criticism was indifference. He exhorted Canadians to take 
action: “Stop sitting on your hands eating your Pringles.”232  
 
New Millennium, New Dawn? 
 
 
Yeo’s invocation of Vietnam demonstrated the historical links between traumatized 
Canadian peacekeeping veterans’ experiences and soldiers’ treatment after earlier conflicts. 
What made the Canadian experience unique, though, was that unlike in Britain and the United 
States, the CAF’s first large-scale encounter with PTSD and “combat” stress in the late twentieth 
century came not from war but ostensibly innocuous peacekeeping operations. As the Board of 
Inquiry came to a close and issued its final report in January 2000, it was clear that several 
traditional notions were under siege. First, while never discounting the possibility of toxic 
exposure, after scientific tests and expert testimony the Board concluded that the predominant 
factor in Canadian soldiers’ illnesses was the overwhelming psychological stress they endured.233 
The Board, the CAF, and the Canadian public learned – or more accurately put, relearned – as 
Canadians had during the First and Second World Wars, that every combatant, or in this case 
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peacekeeper, had a breaking point. Moreover, they learned that soldiers debilitated by traumatic 
events or plagued with recurring nightmares were not lesser men, but simply traumatized by 
witnessing horrific scenes and living in conditions that, for all intents and purposes, resembled a 
war zone.
234
 Nevertheless, as the many testimonies highlighted, a CAF culture dominated by 
ideals of heightened masculinity and traditional views of the stoic soldier ensured that those 
suffering from psychological problems kept it to themselves, for fear of social ostracism, and 
equally important, to prevent an early release from the Forces. 
Although the Canadian experience was unique in a few key respects, there was one 
important link between 1990s peacekeepers and soldiers in earlier conflicts. As with the First and 
Second World Wars, and most prominently the Vietnam War, there was an intangible but 
nevertheless important connection between the level of medical and social support troops 
received upon their return home, and their ability to rationalize and overcome operational 
experiences. Chairman Sharpe and the Board concluded, unsurprisingly given the numerous 
testimonies expressing fear, anger, disillusionment, and sorrow, that the low level of public 
awareness and departmental prevarications “contributed to the problems suffered by returning 
soldiers.”235 Worse still, a significant number of CAF members – especially Reservists – were 
dispersed almost immediately after their return, leaving them unable to normalize their 
experiences and seek informal comfort from comrades. As with Corporal Prodaniuk’s story 
indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the “social conditions of the battalion” had a salutary 
effect on both the social life and mental health of troops.
236
 Without that support, some already 
suffering with psychological difficulties collapsed under the strain. There were a number of 
previous methods for bringing soldiers home, but Master Warrant Officer Ed Larabie, trained in 
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CISD, cited the First and Second World War methods as a potential solution. He mused that 
“maybe they had the right idea during the [World] wars, you put them on a nice slow boat, a 
chance to [informally] debrief each other on the way home.”237 Whatever the solution, it was 
evident to the Board that the quick disbanding of units after peacekeeping operations contributed, 
however difficult to measure, to an already stressful reintegration.       
Canadian UNPROFOR troops, at the worst forced to clean up the aftermath of ethnic 
cleansing, and at best living under constant threat of enemy action, also returned to find their 
mission unknown among civilians and unacknowledged by the governments that sent them. 
Consequently, many men and women in uniform suffered in silence, another point made 
abundantly clear by the anecdotal evidence provided during the BOI. About 300 soldiers who 
served in Croatia from 1993 to 1995 reported illness from service, but the Board inferred that 
“many more” were staying in the shadows.238 Innumerable troops, like Prodaniuk, soldiered on, 
only to later succumb to the “failed processing” of their experiences and traumatic memories.239 
Although it was impossible to put a figure on the number of soldiers psychologically affected 
who did not come forward, if Kelly Brett and Greg Passey’s testimonies were any indication, 
that number was likely in the thousands.
240
    
As the new millennium approached, the Croatia Board of Inquiry’s conclusions cast a 
light on sweeping changes needed within the CAF. The Board’s enlarged mandate – from 
investigating toxic exposure to overall treatment of injured soldiers – displayed the “frustrations 
and humiliating treatment experienced by injured soldiers,” many of whom served on multiple 
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tours with only twelve months at home between deployments.
241
 Chairman Sharpe, critical 
throughout the Inquiry of how the CAF and VAC handled injured soldiers, declared to the 
Canadian media that, “We don’t take as good care of our soldiers as our airplanes.”242 Sharpe 
and Mike Spellen also noted the difficulties that a historically persistent and unwavering macho 
culture caused for injured soldiers, and especially the psychologically injured, who were 
encouraged to stoically bear pain and suffering.
243
 At a news conference Sharpe plainly stated 
the issue: “The macho image is [still] a major problem for our people.”244 Contrary to what 
predominant CAF cultural beliefs argued about PTSD and other psychological illnesses, BOI 
testimonies proved to Sharpe and the Board that most soldiers reporting problems were not 
“whinging and whining” malingerers, but genuinely injured troops who deserved the benefit of 
any doubts.
245
 Unfortunately, the Board exposed a recurring theme in Canadian military and 
medical history – the burden of proof still lay with injured soldiers and veterans to prove their 
illness was service-related. Sharpe affirmed that the primary way to tackle that problem was to 
“focus on the patient, not the illness.”246 In January 2000, it remained to be seen whether or not 
CAF and DND leaders would heed that advice.  
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CHAPTER 6: NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW REFORMS, OLD PROBLEMS 
 
The soldier is alone in his war with terror and we have to recognize the first signs of defeat that we may come in 
time to his rescue.
1
 
 
 
 During the early morning of 15 March 2001, thirty-one-year-old Corporal Christian 
McEachern, a 1PPCLI member, drove his sport utility vehicle through the doors of Garrison 
Headquarters at Canadian Forces Base Edmonton.
2
 He subsequently drove in circles through 
empty personnel offices, knocking over desks and causing significant property damage.
3
 
McEachern was discovered, still behind the wheel, weeping and incoherent. After his arrest he 
assaulted a member of the Military Police.
4
 For his actions, the Crown laid five charges against 
him, including impaired driving, mischief, and assaulting a peace officer.
5
 He was released from 
the military in July 2001. 
 Like numerous colleagues, McEachern participated in difficult peacekeeping operations 
during the early to mid-1990s, including missions in Croatia and Uganda. In the former country, 
he was deeply affected after a fellow soldier died in a land-mine explosion.
6
 Later, in Uganda, 
operational restrictions forced him to helplessly watch as a woman was raped outside a military 
compound.
7
 Adding to his trauma, McEachern saw a man beaten to death and was once again 
forced to stand by as the man’s disfigured body was dragged away.8 By 1997, McEachern 
struggled heavily with what he witnessed overseas, and in September 1997 psychiatrist 
Lieutenant-Commander Greg Passey diagnosed him with PTSD.
9
 For the next two-and-a-half 
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years he was on sick leave and under Passey’s care until Passey resigned from his twenty-two-
year career in the Forces in September 2000, due to what he saw as Ottawa’s mishandling of 
soldiers’ mental illness.10 McEachern’s weekly appointments were cut down to one every three 
months after Passey’s retirement, and, in combination with a lack of social support, contributed 
to his unraveling.
11
 Just a day before he drove his vehicle into Garrison Headquarters, 
McEachern privately received a medal for his peacekeeping efforts in Africa.
12
 His defence 
counsel later argued that the belated medal was bittersweet, since he was on sick leave for two 
years and felt ostracized from his unit.
13
 
McEachern’s mother, Paula Richmond, travelled to Ottawa shortly after the incident in 
April 2001 to plead for help from the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defence 
and Veterans Affairs, but a Liberal committee member prevaricated and refused to hear her 
grievances, claiming he was unprepared.
14
 Undeterred, Richmond wrote a letter to the National 
Post, which subsequently published excerpts and highlighted McEachern’s case, as well as 
Richmond’s claims that the Chrétien government was not doing enough to alleviate a PTSD 
“crisis” in the Canadian Forces.15 She then, along with her local MP Leon Benoit, approached 
the office of CAF/DND Ombudsman André Marin. After meeting with Richmond and Corporal 
McEachern in Edmonton on 4 April 2001, Marin agreed to investigate McEachern’s claim that 
soldiers with PTSD were treated unfairly by the military.
16
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 McEachern’s story was recounted on television news broadcasts and in national 
newspapers. His trial and Marin’s 2002 report on the systemic treatment of soldiers with PTSD, 
the latter published as a result of McEachern’s complaint and numerous similar claims, once 
again drew attention to the plight of soldiers psychologically affected by military service. 
McEachern’s case divided military members and, like the Croatia Board of Inquiry, framed 
discussions throughout the first decade of the new millennium. McEachern’s trial, covered by the 
Globe and Mail and National Post, hinged on whether his actions were deemed voluntary or an 
involuntary result of his illness. The defence’s case pitted Greg Passey’s clinical experience and 
research on PTSD amongst Canadian peacekeepers against Randy Boddam, chief of psychiatry 
and mental health for the CAF.
17
 Boddam testified that McEachern was “distraught, suicidal and 
intoxicated” during the morning of 15 March 2001, and undertook his destructive actions 
willingly and voluntarily.
18
 In a later 2008 article for Criminal Law Quarterly, Benjamin Kormos 
examined the case and disapproved of the fact that Boddam testified despite admitting during 
cross-examination that he “had not reviewed any of McEachern’s personnel or medical files” and 
in Kormos’ opinion “had a tremendously limited foundation upon which to base any professional 
opinion.”19 For his part, Passey testified that McEachern was in a “robotic” state of dissociation, 
a phenomenon he witnessed on several occasions during their weekly appointments.
20
 
McEachern testified that he remembered little of that night except vague memories of drinking 
scotch and later seeing a woman looking down at him behind the wheel of his vehicle.
21
 Passey 
also used the trial as a forum to raise awareness of what he judged to be systemic problems 
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within the CAF. He testified that senior officers and DND officials knew PTSD was an 
increasing problem throughout the 1990s and early 2000s but did little to alleviate it, citing 
overwork and frustration at their indifference as the primary reasons for his retirement.
22
  
Much of Passey’s testimony during McEachern’s trial echoed his October 1999 
testimony at the Croatia Board of Inquiry. He affirmed that CAF and DND leaders in Ottawa 
kept resources and information centralized in the capital, rather than encouraging an open 
dialogue and providing adequate services at bases nationwide. He likened the CAF’s handling of 
PTSD to “having a fire brigade in Ottawa and, if you have a forest fire [in the form of suffering 
of soldiers], trying to bring all the trees to Ottawa to put them out.”23 Ultimately, Madame 
Justice Doreen Sulyma sided with the CAF’s take on events, rejecting McEachern’s PTSD as a 
defence for his actions.
24
 On 3 February 2003 she ruled that “His actions were voluntary.”25 The 
Crown sought six to nine months in jail, but Sulyma opted instead for a fourteen-month 
conditional sentence.
26
 McEachern calmly hung his head when the verdict was read.
27
 While still 
in the court room his mother sobbed and declared, “It’s his whole life they [the CAF] took from 
him.”28 
Although McEachern was found guilty at the Court of Queen’s Bench, a different form of 
vindication nonetheless came a year earlier in the guise of Marin’s February 2002 Ombudsman’s 
Report. Marin’s investigative team, headed by Lead Investigator Gareth Jones, and with advisory 
assistance from former Croatia Board Chairman Joe Sharpe, interviewed approximately 200 
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soldiers, of whom about half had been diagnosed with PTSD.
29
 The team discovered a culture 
that by and large, even after the events of the past decade and the Croatia Board’s January 2000 
conclusions, still refused to countenance the existence and prevalence of mental difficulties 
among Canadian soldiers. Marin’s team found “overwhelming evidence that many within the CF 
are sceptical about whether PTSD is a legitimate illness” and a “distressingly common belief 
among both peers and leaders that those diagnosed with PTSD were ‘fakers,’ ‘malingerers,’ or 
simply ‘poor soldiers.’” That belief persisted despite evidence from medical professionals and 
caregivers that instances of soldiers exaggerating or faking PTSD symptoms were rare — 
somewhere around 1 to 3%.
30
  
Marin’s report contained aspects that were, according to one newspaper columnist, 
“blatantly self-serving and self-congratulating,” but his team nevertheless provided a vast array 
of evidence demonstrating that the CAF was still split between those who deemed PTSD a 
legitimate illness and an “old guard” who argued otherwise.31 The Report also demonstrated that 
several past issues, such as stigma, lack of social support, problems with bureaucracy, and 
soldiers’ career concerns, were still a problem in the new millennium, and that any attitudinal 
changes would be slow to come. Marin concluded that McEachern’s complaints were justified 
and CAF problems were systemic in nature. His Report stated: “As is the case for many CF 
members who suffer from PTSD, he was stigmatized and isolated from his unit, without the 
support from his peers that could have sustained him.”32 Unbeknownst to McEachern at the time 
                                                          
29
 Marin, Report to the Minister of National Defence, v; Marin’s team interviewed numerous people within and 
outside the military for its report, including: PTSD sufferers’ families; members of McEachern’s chain of command; 
senior personnel at NDHQ; staff members at three Operational Trauma and Stress Centres; members of the 
International Red Cross; and foreign military members. They also consulted Roméo Dallaire and Chief of the 
Defence Staff Maurice Baril. See ibid. 
30
 Ibid., vi.  
31
 Quotation from a Toronto Star article on the subject by longtime Star columnist Rosie DiManno. See The Toronto 
Star, 21 June 2002.   
32
 Marin, Report to the Minister of National Defence, ix. 
  
232 
 
was that his case would become a catalyst for change within the CAF. With the McEachern case 
receiving national media coverage, and Marin’s Ombudsman’s report confirming the findings of 
earlier inquiries, Defence Minister Art Eggleton vowed in February 2002 to eliminate the stigma 
surrounding PTSD and mental health discussions.
33
 With Canada then engaged in a new war in 
Afghanistan and the number of PTSD sufferers expected to climb, it remained to be seen whether 
Eggleton’s promise could be implemented. 
 
The Call to Arms 
 
The events of 11 September 2001 were, according to political scientist Patrick James, “a 
huge domino, with others toppling over after it.”34 With Canadian troops already deployed in 
numerous peacekeeping missions around the world, the call nonetheless came for the CAF to 
participate in a US-led war effort in Afghanistan. Although the military was tightly stretched, 
Canadian military leaders dutifully sent a battalion of soldiers in January 2002, preceded a month 
earlier by elite commandos of Joint Task Force 2.
35
 Ultimately over 40,000 CAF members 
served in Afghanistan between 2001 and March 2014, when the final army and police trainers 
returned to Canada. It was the largest Canadian military operation since the Second World 
War.
36
 In addition to enduring summer temperatures reaching as high as 50 degrees Celsius, and 
a constant sense of danger from both the environment and populace, Canadian troops also 
participated in extensive combat, including Operation Medusa, a 2006 Canadian-led offensive in 
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Kandahar province that was the nation’s largest offensive operation since Korea.37 The 
Afghanistan War’s character, a difficult mixture of combat and stabilization efforts, 
metaphorically symbolized Canadians’ ambivalence about the nation’s appropriate role in both 
the conflict and international affairs.  
In his 2010 book on Operation Medusa, retired Colonel and military historian Bernd 
Horn argued that with Medusa, Canada “finally put to rest the peacekeeping myth that it had 
acquired in national and international psyches since the 1950s and once again overtly proved 
itself as a warfighting [sic] nation within the international defence community.”38 Canadian 
troops certainly once again proved the nation’s military prowess, but Canadians’ attachment to a 
peacekeeping identity remained, even if tempered by Afghanistan. Although Canadian civilians 
broadly supported the Afghanistan War, as recently as 2012 an EKOS survey reported that 63% 
of civilians still identified peacekeeping as the CAF’s primary role on the world stage.39 In their 
2013 essay on public opinion and soldier identity, Stéphanie Bélanger and Michelle Moore 
argued such surveys indicated that even after Afghanistan, Canadian civilians still wished “to be 
perceived as peacekeepers.”40 Canadians were agreeable about the use of force in Afghanistan to 
fight a “war on terror,” but an ingrained sense of peacekeeping as the nation’s raison d’être in 
international politics was reflected in intense reactions to every Canadian fatality.
41
 There was 
particular outrage nationwide in April 2002 when a US Air Force fighter pilot mistakenly 
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bombed Canadians participating in a live-fire exercise, killing four soldiers from the Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.42 War casualties “signalled activity that many had assumed to 
be a thing of the past.”43   
The Afghanistan conflict brought home the realization that the military was participating 
in something inherently different from peacekeeping operations; something which by its very 
nature involved inflicting and sustaining casualties. Canadians were supportive, but cautious and 
watchful of what a shifting role in international affairs entailed.
44
 Unlike previous operations 
during the 1990s, all aspects of the Afghanistan War were intensely scrutinized by politicians, 
the media, and Canadian public.
45
 The conflict was in many ways a “national preoccupation” 
throughout the first decade of the new millennium and at the centre of debates over Canada’s 
role in world events after 11 September 2001.
46
 As part of that preoccupation, heated discussions 
surrounded the effect Afghanistan service, and CAF operations as a whole, had on not just the 
bodies, but also the minds of Canadian troops. 
 
Responses to PTSD and Mental Health  
 
 In the late 1990s and early in the new millennium, CAF and DND leaders responded to 
concerns about PTSD and systemic treatment of mentally affected soldiers in numerous ways. 
Given the media coverage the subject received in the late 1990s, the CAF, DND, and politicians 
realized tangible actions were necessary to demonstrate something was being done to combat the 
problem. In November 1998 the first definitive step came with the announcement of five 
Operational Trauma and Stress Support Centres (OTSSCs) at CFBs Halifax, Esquimalt, 
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Valcartier, Edmonton, and CAF Headquarters in Ottawa.
47
 Implemented in late 1999, each 
OTSSC consisted of a military psychiatrist, a military mental health nurse, a military social 
worker, CAF chaplain, and one or more civilian psychologists.
48
 OTSSCs provided CAF 
members suffering from service-related psychological difficulties with diagnostic assessments, 
individual treatment (psychotherapy and/or pharmacotherapy), group treatment, and family 
therapy.
49
 They also provided outreach programs, helping to educate military and civilian 
healthcare workers about the unique aspects of psychological problems caused by military 
service.
50
  
Aside from the benefits for CAF members and their families, OTSSCs also helped 
decrease the CAF’s reliance on a “very limited number” of civilian psychologists and 
psychiatrists with experience treating soldiers.
51
 That reliance was, as discussed during the 
Croatia BOI, a particular problem throughout the mid- to late-1990s, since soldiers were 
uncomfortable discussing psychological problems with civilian practitioners unfamiliar with 
military life and its challenges. But while the OTSSCs helped to treat mentally injured soldiers, 
they also revealed the intricacies of dealing with old stigmas. The location of OTSSCs – on- or 
off-base – became a particularly controversial subject, even amongst those dedicated to 
aggressively attacking mental illness. In his December 2002 follow-up to the McEachern report, 
André Marin criticized the CAF’s decision to place all OTSSCs on-base, arguing that locating 
them on-base made psychologically injured soldiers reluctant to come forward.
52
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Marin’s February 2002 report recommended a pilot project involving the establishment of one 
OTSSC in “more anonymous premises off-base.”53 His rationale was simple. Marin cited an 
example where an OTSSC was located on the second floor of a base hospital – soldiers 
colloquially termed the stairway leading up to the Centre the “stairway of shame.”54 
Canadian Forces leaders working to combat stigma saw the OTSSC location issue in a 
different light. Major Stéphane Grenier, the lead on the 1998 video about Rwanda peacekeeping 
trauma, disagreed with Marin’s assessment. He believed that locating OTSSCs off-base was 
“short sighted” and helped maintain current stigmas.55 While increasing access to care and 
potentially encouraging more soldiers to seek treatment in the short term, Grenier nonetheless 
argued that off-base OTSSCs would cost significant tax-payer money and imply to CAF 
members that psychologically injured soldiers needed treatment away from their posted base, 
“like people who have the plague.”56 The CAF unsurprisingly approached the fight against 
stigma from a strategic perspective, and CAF leaders kept all OTSSCs on-base despite Marin 
and future Ombudsmen’s protestations. 
Regardless of their intended purpose, OTSSCs and any related initiatives to combat 
mental health challenges were only effective if injured soldiers actually utilized them – that 
meant attacking stigma head on. Thus, the military also took steps to address the inherent 
challenges of penetrating a culture that shunned discussions of mental “disorder.” Grenier, a UN 
spokesperson in Rwanda from 1994-1995 and Afghanistan veteran, was himself deeply affected 
by his military experiences and subsequently diagnosed with PTSD. After the aforementioned 
1998 Rwanda video was unveiled, Major-General Christian Couture approached Grenier and 
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expressed interest in the subject, asking him to delve into possible solutions and report back.
57
 
Couture subsequently had Grenier posted to the Director, Casualty Support and Administration 
so he could work full-time on his initiatives.
58
 Under the Director, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave 
Wrather, a “very empowering boss” with the attitude of “do what’s right and later find the policy 
to support the action,” Grenier was given latitude to explore novels ways of approaching 
stigma.
59
 Based on his own treatments, which he deemed somewhat “antiquated” and 
inconsistently effective, Grenier became “quite obsessed” with examining how the military as an 
institution approached the issue from leadership and clinical perspectives.
60
 He explained:  
 
I refused to embrace the notion that I had an illness ... or an ailment called ‘post traumatic 
stress disorder’ ... [W]hen you’re first hit with this whole notion that your brain is sick, 
that in itself is a huge barrier to recovery; when you learn that you have a ‘disorder.’ So 
as a patient, as a human being, as a soldier, I started thinking, ‘What the frick is wrong 
with us?’ ... and over the years developed a concept where ... what was needed was to de-
medicalize these issues to a certain degree. Not that treatment needs to be de-
medicalized, but the way our culture, our organization, our leaders, our employees, our 
soldiers perceive these conditions, has to be terminology that is accepted culturally by our 
people.
61
 
 
 
Similar to Roméo Dallaire and Joe Sharpe, Grenier believed one solution was to convince 
both the chain of command and rank-and-file soldiers that psychological injuries were as 
legitimate as physical ones. For Grenier, this strategy involved relabeling medical words that 
were anathema to soldiers and military culture. He argued that “it’s one thing to blame stigma, 
but it’s another thing to actually strategically address the issue of stigma by rebranding to a 
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certain degree, at one level anyway, many things that happen [e.g. psychological injuries].”62 
From 1998 to 2001 he pondered and researched the problem.
63
 During his investigation he was 
particularly intrigued by Queen’s University professor and retired RCAF air navigator Allan 
English’s 1999 paper for the Croatia Board on historical and contemporary interpretations of 
combat stress.
64
 Reading the word “injury” while pondering stress’ effect on past soldiers gave 
Grenier the idea for a new term for service-related stress illness – “Operational Stress Injury 
(OSI).”65 Utilizing the term “operational stress” was a conscious decision to encompass “wider 
meanings” than narrow medical diagnoses.66 It was also demonstrative of how, like “battle 
exhaustion” was used in the Second World War to lessen the stigma of diagnostic labels such as 
“neurosis” or “psychoneurosis,” “operational stress injury” was likewise a military solution to a 
military medical problem.
67
 
The new OSI term encompassed a wide range of psychological injuries stemming from 
military service, including PTSD, other anxiety disorders, depression, and conditions less severe 
but still impediments to daily functioning.
68
 Bringing those various maladies under one umbrella, 
with an emphasis on “injury,” was an attempt to reduce the stigma of psychiatric diagnoses and 
demonstrate that like a broken leg, the psychological and physiological symptoms of PTSD 
“resulted from injuries to the brain and psyche, caused by exposure to military-related trauma.”69 
Grenier and like-minded reformers wished to place unseen psychological injuries on the same 
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plane as visible, physical ones.
70
 In his own words, Grenier said his intent was “not to transform 
the way clinicians diagnose PTSD, but it was to allow our [military] culture to understand that if 
you go to war, or if you go on an operation somewhere, some people might get physically hurt, 
but those who are mentally hurt are equally as injured as others.”71 He was trying to achieve “a 
[physical] parallel for mental health whereby people can talk about Bob now from a mental 
health perspective outside the clinical terminology. They don’t have to say ‘Bob has post-
traumatic stress disorder,’ which has a hugely negative connotation in the minds of that 
[military] culture. They can simply say ‘Bob had a real tough tour, Bob had a real tough 
operation, he’s not been the same; he might be injured.’”72   
Simultaneously Grenier worked to effect change where the rubber met the road. From 
1998 to 2001 he developed a support program for psychologically injured soldiers. In March 
2001 while posted at Land Force Central Headquarters in Toronto, Grenier learned about the 
McEachern case and asked his commanding officer, Major-General Walter Holmes, for 
permission to fly to Edmonton and meet with the young corporal.
73
 Holmes, supportive of 
Grenier’s work, gave his blessing. Grenier promptly booked a flight and met with McEachern, 
who was awaiting trial at the Alberta Hospital, a psychiatric hospital in northeastern Edmonton. 
Their meeting convinced Grenier decisive changes were necessary. He recalled: 
 
I go to the Alberta Hospital ... sign him out for the day, to find out that nobody 
[from the CAF] had visited him. He was there after doing a bit of time in jail ... We spent 
the whole day together, hit it off, and that’s when it came to me, ‘Holy fuck, things have 
to change.’ Because, you know, I had always asked myself through my own isolation and 
struggles ... ‘I’m a captain, I’m a major; if it’s tough for me imagine what it must be like 
for the corporal’ ... I have the latitude to take walks, to walk away, to go to meetings, to 
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go for coffee, but a corporal doesn’t have all that latitude. So that was a huge 
precipitating moment. 
 
 
After seeing McEachern, Grenier decided to meet with fellow veterans from the Rwanda 
mission during a business trip to Ottawa. There he brought a few colleagues to lunch to hear their 
opinions about his idea for a peer-support-based program for psychologically affected troops.
74
 
They were enthusiastic about the idea and provided him with further input. Thus, Grenier 
became in his own words a “glue stick” for various ideas stemming from his research, the 
McEachern case, and ideas from rank-and-file soldiers.
75
  
In May 2001, Grenier’s efforts came to fruition with the creation of the Operational 
Stress Injury Social Support program (OSISS).
76
 OSISS became operational in March 2002, and 
combined the timeless belief that soldiers know best other soldiers’ plight with a formal structure 
under the aegis of the DND and Veterans Affairs. The first major step involved hiring Peer 
Support Coordinators (PSCs), men or women diagnosed with an OSI but deemed by their 
psychologist or psychiatrist to be at a sufficient stage of recovery to handle support work.
77
 Each 
PSC was required to attend mandatory training provided by a multidisciplinary team of 
psychiatrists, psychologists, clinical nursing specialists, and social workers at St. Anne’s 
Hospital in Montreal.
78
 Training activities included learning about peer support, methods of 
conflict resolution, how to understand and respect boundaries, and ensuring continued self care.
79
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Once hired and trained, PSCs were involved in a consistent dialogue with clinicians and 
provided continuing education.
80
  
As the program expanded nationwide PSCs’ tasks included providing outreach and one-
on-one assistance for OSIs sufferers, organizing peer-based social support groups, mentoring 
those in recovery, and organizing volunteer programs.
81
 For coordinators like peacekeeping 
veteran Greg Prodaniuk, one of the first PSCs hired when OSISS launched in 2001, more than a 
vocation, support work provided an outlet for helping others who were suffering. Prodaniuk 
stated: “I think the compassion and care that I got from those around me when I was not doing 
well is really the thing that I sort of in a way got addicted to. And that’s the piece I think that has 
been a profound change in my life.”82 Prodaniuk’s goal, like the entire organization, was to help 
others have a profound change as well. OSISS was highly praised by the Ombudsman in his 
December 2002 follow-up report to the McEachern complaint. Marin noted that his investigators 
heard “widespread praise for OSISS throughout the CF community and VAC.”83 He argued that 
OSISS would be a “key contributor to the cultural change required to combat the stigma 
associated with OSIs and to ensure that CF members who may have an OSI are not too 
frightened to come forward to get the help they need as soon as possible.”84 Grenier, Couture, 
and Wrather were all singled out for their efforts, as well as the “commitment and dedication of 
the OSISS peer co-ordinators.”85 
Despite the widespread praise OSISS received, resistance to the OSI term and OSISS 
program nonetheless developed from within the civilian and military medical communities. The 
“most frequent” complaints came from professionals who saw the Operational Stress Injury term 
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as “imprecise and not reflecting the current terminology their professions use to designate those 
possessing the symptoms of OSI [i.e. Using “OSI” instead of “PTSD” etc.].”86 Grenier attributed 
much of the resistance to “turf wars” and an ingrained belief amongst some senior CAF leaders 
that when approaching medical issues “the only people that can have a say of any credence are 
the people who wear the doctor’s symbol on their door.”87 He noticed particular pushback from 
Colonel and chief CAF psychiatrist Randy Boddam in Ottawa. As the OSISS program took 
shape Grenier believed Boddam felt threatened by the attention given to ideas coming from 
outside the medical community. He inferred that resistance stemmed from the fact that “now all 
of a sudden you have this uneducated guy with no PhD, who’s at the same table, and his opinion 
starts to be valued.”88 Joe Sharpe agreed with Grenier’s assessment, affirming that “Randy 
[Boddam] was a serious obstacle to adopting a new approach to dealing with PTSD ... [I]f he 
hadn’t come up with an idea, then the idea must be flawed. He had major conflicts with other 
psychiatrists – most notably Greg Passey.”89 Sharpe recalled that during one meeting he attended 
Passey and Boddam had an especially heated argument that “nearly came to blows.”90 
Grenier was not the only reformer dealing with resistance from some in Ottawa. 
Concurrently, as Grenier worked to get OSISS off the ground, Colonel Christian Barabé, the 5 
Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group Commander at CFB Valcartier from 2000 to 2002, was 
concerned about the number of soldier suicides occurring there, and worked with the University 
of Laval Chair of Occupational Health and Safety Management, Jean-Pierre Brun, to try and root 
out the problem.
91
 Barabé was particularly concerned that at that time there was no holistic effort 
to understand the psycho-social issues faced by soldiers. Thus he allowed Brun and a Laval 
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research team access to the entire Brigade Group and its troops, with the goal of discovering the 
most common issues. The researchers conducted interviews, spoke with the chain of command, 
and utilized questionnaires to ascertain what stresses troops were under and how they felt about 
their workplace environment.
92
 The team used the results to produce a study of the climate 
prevailing on-base.
93
  
When the “medical system” in Ottawa got wind of his actions, Barabé was advised to 
cease further studies.
94
 Among other things, the study’s methodology and legitimacy were called 
into question, much to Barabé’s consternation given the academic credentials of the Laval 
team.
95
 Like Grenier, Barabé attributed Ottawa research and medical personnel resistance to “turf 
wars” and a desire to ensure innovations came from the CAF/DND centre rather than 
periphery.
96
 Regardless, he continued with various initiatives. Several innovations were 
produced at CFB Valcartier, including the Deployment Support Group, a mix of Regular Force 
and Reservists whose job was to provide support for families of soldiers overseas and help 
injured troops back to work.
97
 Joe Sharpe later praised Barabés enterprises as one of the first 
systematic studies of soldiers’ psychological health, and the basic concept of a deployment 
support group was later utilized for the Joint Personnel Support Unit, discussed below.
98
        
While Barabé fought to implement reforms at Valcartier, in Ottawa Stéphane Grenier 
worked to convince clinicians about the benefits of the OSISS approach. During the program’s 
development Grenier noticed that clinicians around Canada could be roughly divided into three 
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categories: 33% were extremely supportive, 33% were undecided, and the final third were 
deliberately or passively obstructive.
99
 From the latter group Grenier encountered “strong 
resistance” to the idea that OSISS could provide an adjunct, social method of alleviating OSIs. 
Opposition usually stemmed from the belief that OSIs were a strictly medical subject under the 
sole purview of the medical community.
100
 Grenier was disappointed at how many practitioners 
initially dismissed a more holistic, lay approach: “I’m not going to start telling doctors what to 
do with their patients, but it is perfectly understandable and acceptable to actually influence our 
[military] leadership in how to deal with these matters. Because ... people who have Operational 
Stress Injury or PTSD, or whatever you want to call it, don’t live in their doctors’ offices. They 
have to contend day in, day out with society, their family, their workplace, [and] their 
colleagues.”101 While patients might see their doctor once a week if they were lucky, “at the end 
of the day, all of it comes together on the ground floor ... where others reside.”102   
The OSI term and OSISS were in Grenier’s estimation a few of the “the multiple 
ingredients” necessary to reshape CAF culture and ensure psychologically injured soldiers were 
supported outside of the clinic as well as within it.
103
 While he battled opposition in Ottawa and 
elsewhere, Grenier told his first four Coordinators to just “focus on [peer] supporting” mentally 
injured troops and he would take care of solidifying the program’s expansion.104 Shortly after 
OSISS’ beginnings in 2002, he noted a shift among previously undecided clinicians: “[T]hat 
clinical group of people who were extremely supportive of what we were doing grew rapidly ... 
because they saw how effective that human connection was and how it could be used as a 
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strategic lever to actually achieve greater and faster therapeutic gains for their patients.”105 There 
were, he acknowledged, bumps along the road, and on a few occasions he had to let PSCs go 
because he “might have chosen the wrong guy.”106 Nevertheless, the program rolled on, and by 
2004 OSISS had over 900 registered serving or retired soldiers on the books.
107
 At the time of his 
retirement in 2012, after a decade of the OSI term’s percolation into CAF circles, Colonel 
Grenier saw positive steps in how the word “injury” was applied to mental injuries as well as 
physical ones.
108
 Though there was more work to be done, a mental “injury” was no longer 
always “that term [PTSD] that says ‘that guy has a disorder, what the fuck is wrong with 
him?’”109 
 
New War, New Approaches 
  
While metaphorical battles occurred in Canada over how to handle psychological 
injuries, Canadian troops were engaged in literal battles in Afghanistan. After the lessons of the 
Croatia Board of Inquiry, CAF and DND officials knew they could not be caught unprepared for 
a potential rise in the number of troops returning with mental difficulties. Thus, from the 
beginning of the Afghanistan War, CAF leaders adopted novel approaches to screening troops, 
conducting post-deployment health checks, and preparing soldiers for reintegration to Canadian 
society. One decisive break from 1990s peacekeeping deployments involved the introduction of 
“third location decompression (TLD).” TLD drew on a range of historical, anecdotal, and 
sociological evidence that soldiers reintegrated more effectively and better “processed” the 
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events of their tour if provided a rest and recuperation period before returning home.
110
 The most 
compelling argument for TLD came from Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, a Bosnia veteran and 
the first commander of Canadian troops in Afghanistan. Stogran knew the subject well since he 
had personally experienced difficulties reintegrating after his 1990s peacekeeping tours. He 
proposed a short stopover and rest for troops prior to their return. The DND promptly accepted 
his advice.
111
  
Thus the first Canadian contingent returning from Afghanistan in 2002 spent several days 
on the Pacific island of Guam before flying home.
112
 Ironically, the TLD site was later changed 
to Cyprus, the island previously described as a vacation spot by Canadian peacekeepers in the 
1980s and 1990s. TLD, as the name implied, aimed to provide troops time to rest and 
decompress before readjusting to civilian society. The Cyprus stay also included information 
sessions on family and work reintegration, anger management, mental health, and suicide risk 
awareness.
113
 OSISS Peer Support Coordinators were also present to share their own post-
deployment stories and explain the organization’s role in aiding psychologically injured 
soldiers.
114
 While Ombudsman André Marin initially believed TLD was “not a productive or 
practical approach to addressing reintegration,” particularly since it kept soldiers away from their 
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families even longer, in his December 2002 follow-up report he admitted that “so far the 
majority of CF members and their families view these actions as very positive.”115 
Although TLD provided Canadian troops much needed R and R and demonstrated the 
CAF/DND’s commitment to new strategies for reintegration and maintaining psychological 
health, after several years’ implementation its efficacy was questioned. An August 2009 Toronto 
Star article based on obtained DND documents claimed “the defence department’s preferred 
method of treating the mental toll of war is taking a personal financial toll on the troops.”116 
Some members, the article reported, were finding quick ways to divest themselves of their 
salaries and danger pay on Cyprus, largely as a result of soldiers’ timeless and preferred method 
of processing war experiences – alcohol.117 Military officials running the TLD program 
recommended briefings on responsible use of money during deployment and a two-drink limit 
for soldiers’ first night of decompression, but such rules even if created were almost impossible 
to enforce.
118
  
Master Bombardier Adam Hannaford, who twice deployed to Afghanistan in 2007 and 
2008 and was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD, stated that alcohol also had an effect on 
soldiers’ attention during TLD mental health briefings: “You’re so fucking hung over or still 
drunk from the night before, you’re just really not paying attention. You’re just thinking, ‘I need 
some water.’”119 Given the psycho-social and other factors that contributed to reintegration, it 
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was difficult to assess TLD’s long-term impact on soldiers’ mental wellness; but troops, even 
despite some misadventures, found the experience useful. A 2012 Military Medicine article by 
Drs. Bryan Garber and Mark Zamorski of the Canadian Forces Health Services Group 
Headquarters in Ottawa stated that although it was tough to appraise TLD as a “medical 
intervention,” sociologically speaking the majority of Forces members supported the TLD 
concept and found the program to be of value.
120
 Tod Strickland, deputy commander of PPCLI 
battle group in Afghanistan, agreed with that assessment. Strickland believed that in addition to 
helping monitor soldiers’ immediate post-deployment mental state, TLD also helped troops 
transition back to “normal standards of behaviour.”121 Behaviours taken for granted in civilian 
life, such as “[l]eave your boots at the door, stop swearing all the time, wash your hands before 
you eat” and “[j]ust being civil” were relearned prior to returning to Canada.122 For that reason, 
Strickland argued, TLD made a “big difference” in soldiers’ social and mental readjustment.123 
Elsewhere, on the battlefield the CAF demonstrated it was also taking a proactive 
approach to psychological injuries sustained in theatre. While mental health teams were 
conspicuously missing from numerous peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, CAF leaders made 
the decision to send a team early in the Afghanistan conflict.
124
 A more novel and radical 
approach was also taken with regards to traumatic stress.
125
 To bolster the view that PTSD and 
other psychological injuries were as legitimate as physical wounds, medical officers and mental 
health teams ensured those treated for post-traumatic stress – but not necessarily diagnosed with 
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an OSI – were returned to duty “as soon as possible.”126 Citing the unit’s important role as a 
mental bulwark, trauma surgeon Major Ron Brisebois told the Toronto Star that quickly 
returning traumatized soldiers to active duty “tends to minimize the amount of post-traumatic 
stress they have.”127 The reason was simple: “It allows them to remain with their unit, and stay 
with their comrades and be accepted as one. It’s probably the best way for them to vent their 
feelings.”128 Though this strategy went largely unnoticed when first reported in 2002, five years 
later, in March 2007, chief CAF psychiatrist Randy Boddam, then deployed on a four-month tour 
in Afghanistan, made headlines when he revealed the military was sending some soldiers with 
OSIs to the Afghan theatre.
129
 
The military’s decision to send soldiers with OSIs once more unto the breach highlighted 
the thorny issues surrounding psychological injuries. Boddam’s view, expressed to the Globe 
and Mail, reflected the CAF leadership’s new attitude toward the problem: “Let’s acknowledge it 
[mental illness], let’s bring it out of the shadows and get people in so they get treatment sooner, 
and [sic] be employable and living their lives the best they can.”130 He clarified the military’s 
stance by insisting the Forces did not “deploy knowingly anybody who is suffering from a 
mental illness that would impair their ability to function in this environment.”131 Instead, 
physicians and psychologists sent only those who were on “maintenance phases of their 
treatment.”132 Boddam and Dr. Mark Zamorski, head of the military’s deployment health section 
in Ottawa, emphasized the vast continuum of mental health states, with Boddam stating “Not all 
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post-traumatic stress disorders are created equal.”133 The problem, and something the Canadian 
media noted, was that physicians seemed unable to predict the total effect that an Afghanistan 
tour would have on soldiers with OSIs, as well as how an OSI would affect their operational 
performance. Boddam opined that assuming all else was equal placing soldiers in an operational 
setting “may not in any way exacerbate their illness.”134 On the other hand, Zamorski’s honest 
but nonetheless unsettling appraisal reflected the reality that any attempt to treat psychological 
injuries in the same manner as physical ones required a step into the unknown: “Is there 
somebody who’s died in Afghanistan because they weren’t paying attention because they were 
mentally ill? It’s possible.”135  
The revelation that some soldiers with OSIs – particularly PTSD – were being sent to 
Afghanistan raised a stir amongst politicians and the public, and led to questions in the House of 
Commons.
136
 Three days after the Globe and Mail printed its story Navy Commodore Margaret 
Kavanagh, Commander of Canadian Forces Health Services Group, wrote a letter to the paper 
reiterating the CAF’s confidence in its approach:  
 
Canada has deployed, and will continue to deploy, individuals who have been 
successfully treated for mental or physical illnesses or injuries ... To do otherwise would 
only perpetuate the stigma around these illnesses and injuries, and continue to drive the 
problem underground. If we want Canadian Forces members to seek treatment for a 
mental illness or an operational-stress injury, they need to trust they can be given the 
opportunity to continue with a full and rewarding career, even with such a diagnosis.
137
  
 
While an aggressive stance toward OSIs might be disagreeable to some Canadians’ 
sensibilities, in the battle against stigma CAF leaders believed the problem must tackled head on. 
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Kavanagh argued that rather than shrinking away from such an approach, Canadians “should be 
celebrating the success of those who have overcome such problems and returned to active 
duty.”138 Kavanagh’s letter and the CAF’s new approach demonstrated that, in addition to new 
attitudes, the war against OSIs also required new – and sometimes morally/ethically ambiguous – 
actions.
139
  
 
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back 
  
The new approach to psychological injuries represented broader efforts by the CAF and 
DND throughout the first decade of the new millennium to implement reforms in the mental 
health realm. Those reforms in turn took place under the umbrella of the larger “Rx2000” 
project, a major initiative to rebuild the entire CAF medical system, including mental health 
services, after the Cold War.
140
 One of the main goals of the new initiatives, as stated by 
Brigadier-General Lise Mathieu, Director General of Health Services in 2003, was the “gradual 
reduction of the fear of ‘stigmatization’ as a result of OSI,” though she admitted that “much 
remains to be done in this area to reach all those afflicted.”141 Mathieu wrote that military health 
care professionals had “become only too aware of the growing demand on the part of members 
of the Canadian forces for mental health services, not only for treatment but also for prevention 
and promotion of psychological fitness.”142  
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Though a new stance on OSIs pointed to an attitudinal shift amongst senior CAF leaders, 
there were signs that numerous soldiers were unwilling to part with traditional beliefs about 
mental illness. Just one year after the 2002 Ombudman’s Report on systemic treatment of 
soldiers with OSIs, André Marin released another report about a 22 November 2002 incident 
during the “French Grey Cup” at CFB Winnipeg. A long held tradition of the PPCLI since the 
1950s, the French Grey Cup was the championship game at the end of the Regiment’s intramural 
football season.
143
 In addition to the game itself, there was also a parade during which soldiers 
from each company designed their own float.
144
 As part of the tradition, one male soldier from 
each company was also made to dress like a woman – a “queen.” The winner, judged to be the 
most “ravishing,” was declared “Miss Grey Cup” and carried off the field by other soldiers.145 
Traditions and entertainment involving gender inversion, and allusions to homosexuality, had a 
long history in the Canadian military. During the Second World War, for example, male soldiers 
dressed in drag put on elaborate song-and-dance shows for fellow troops, while others staged 
mock weddings in which one soldier took on the role of the bride.
146
   
 Aside from the obvious gender connotations, which hearkened back to days when the 
CAF was an all-male institution, the November 2002 parade had an especially unique float. One 
2PPCLI company constructed a float depicting a train pulling a cage.
147
 Inside the cage was a 
young man dressed “provocatively in women’s clothing.”148 At first glance the float appeared to 
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simply portray a caged man “in drag,” but further details demonstrated it carried a different 
message. The Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that the float also had the words “2PPCLI 
Express” and “Next Stop North Side” written on it.149 While some interviewees prevaricated 
about the meaning, and an internal investigation concluded in December 2002 that the float did 
not reference mental illness, the Ombudsman’s findings confirmed the float was indeed meant to 
mock perceived malingerers diagnosed with OSIs.
150
 The “North Side” colloquially referred to 
the north area of CFB Winnipeg, which housed the 17 Wing of the Air Force. The 17 Wing 
provided health and social services to 2PPCLI members, including soldiers diagnosed with OSIs 
who had been reassigned for health reasons to employment in the base’s northern area.151 In 
popular parlance, those diagnosed with OSIs were said to be going “to the North Side on the 
Crazy Train,” with the latter term being an allusion to the 1980 song “Crazy Train” by musician 
Ozzy Osbourne.
152
 For 2PPCLI members the meaning was self-evident. One soldier interviewed 
by the Ombudsman’s team stated that “everybody right up to the CO [commanding officer] 
knows what the Crazy Train is.”153  
 The Ombudsman’s investigation concluded there was “a widespread perception within 2 
PPCLI that a significant number of members who have been diagnosed with OSIs are faking or 
exaggerating their symptoms. The perception is that they are doing this in order to obtain 
advantages that are not available to other members, such as occupational transfers and/or 
pensions.”154 Although the float was apparently intended to deride only those deemed 
malingerers, the message affected all members with OSIs in a similar manner. Former Croatia 
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Board member Mike Spellen was an OSISS Peer Support Coordinator at the time of the incident 
and recalled receiving a phone call on 29 November 2002 about the parade float: “There were 
two guys that were pulling that float that were suffering from PTSD, unannounced to the idiots 
that made them pull this float.”155 Moreover, a civilian worker told Spellen that a 2PPCLI 
member experiencing psychological difficulties stated he was reluctant to seek treatment because 
the battalion looked unfavourably upon OSIs, citing the aforementioned parade float as an 
example of the unit’s hostility.156 Angry at the float’s connotations and 2PPCLI leaders’ attempts 
to downplay the incident, Spellen made a complaint with OSISS Program Manager, then Major 
Stéphane Grenier, and subsequently contacted the Ombudsman’s office.157 
 Marin and his team, led once again by Gareth Jones, Lead Investigator of the McEachern 
complaint, concluded the float mocked OSI sufferers, that the battalion’s internal investigation 
was “neither thorough nor objective,” and that “much work” was left to be done.158 The Crazy 
Train incident once again highlighted the inherent problems when attempting to 
comprehensively penetrate CAF culture and traditional attitudes about mental illness. The 
incident also brought out prominent commentators. Several days after the Ombudsman’s report 
was released and scrutinized by Canadian news outlets, retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie 
weighed in on the controversy in a 10 March 2003 National Post article. MacKenzie expressed 
dismay that “at the very moment this country is trying to decide if we should be putting our 
military in harm’s way ... Canada’s military ombudsman, is focused on the design of a company 
float during a 2PPCLI unit celebration ... Only in Canada, I hear you say.”159 Himself a retired 
PPCLI member, MacKenzie believed the French Grey Cup parade was nothing more than a fun 
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and silly tradition.
160
 He also pointed out that the float in question was investigated “as as a result 
of a single complaint;” hardly, in his mind, a sign of larger problems.161 MacKenzie’s overall 
take was that for 2PPCLI members and leadership “there was nothing in Marin’s report to accept 
responsibility for!” He summed up his stance by stating: “Soldier’s humour can be pretty black 
at times, but in this case it was pretty good; an upfront attempt to send a message to those 
soldiers who use feigned operational stress injuries to excuse their behaviour or seek medical 
release with compensation.”162 MacKenzie’s response to the Crazy Train incident and 
subsequent investigation reminded soldiers that “Regimental tradition is more important than a 
backhand slap from someone [Marin] who has not walked the walk.”163 In a further nod to 
traditional views of the ideal soldier, MacKenzie’s rebuttal was also, in his own words, a 
counterattack against Marin and others reformers’ “‘touchy feely’ philosophy.”164   
 Although unpalatable to some, MacKenzie’s viewpoint spoke to those who valued 
traditional attitudes and believed that an increased focus on OSIs created further problems in the 
form of malingering. That belief was a perennial concern for those who viewed psychological 
injuries in an unfavourable light, and had roots as far back as the First World War. MacKenzie’s 
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arguments also addressed concerns that, in a consistently understaffed military, there were 
nonetheless always men and women looking for the proverbial free ride. As just one example, 
Master Bombardier Adam Hannaford was diagnosed with PTSD but initially hesitant to accept 
his condition because he believed some other soldiers were feigning the disorder for personal 
gain. He recalled: “It’s like, OK well if this person’s [a supposed malingerer] got it [PTSD] then 
I can’t have it. How the fuck can I justify it?”165 Hannaford expressed “disgust” at what a 
particular soldier “got” and how she “played the system so well,” stating that “it’s people like 
that [malingerers] that make it difficult for people like me ... or people that are in that situation 
similar to me.”166 Hannaford’s view, and MacKenzie’s similar take, demonstrated that despite 
professionally estimated low percentages of “fakers,” there were strong beliefs that a greater 
acceptance and willingness to discuss OSIs led to many individuals milking the system.
167
  
The problem with adopting such a stance, though, was that exactly who was malingering 
and the true extent of the problem were subjectively determined conclusions when made by 
anyone but professionals.
168
 In a discussion with the author, retired Brigadier-General Christian 
Barabé, Commander of Land Force Québec / Joint Task Force (East) from 2005 to 2008, said 
that a small number of individuals “abusing the system because of the openness” about PTSD 
was a fact of life, but those cases “should normally be picked up by the [medical] specialist.”169 
In Barabés estimation, some malingerers slipped through the cracks only because military 
medical specialists were overworked and thus unable to dedicate a proper amount of time to 
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learning each case’s specifics.170 Consequently, a number of rank-and-file soldiers were “aware 
of those who are abusing the system,” and therefore saw those cases as evidence that 
psychological injuries were illegitimate.
171
 That knowledge sometimes led to instances of 
shaming perceived malingerers, demonstrated in the extreme by the Crazy Train incident. 
Unfortunately, such actions had the effect, even if unintentional, of pushing real OSI sufferers 
further into the shadows.  
 
A New Dawn? 
  
 In spite of the Crazy Train incident, by the first decade of the new millennium it was 
clear that CAF/DND initiatives, the work of reformers, and consistent media interest had led to a 
more open dialogue and greater acceptance, at least in theory, of soldiers with psychological 
injuries. A new consciousness about psychological trauma emerged in both military and civil 
society. One noticeable trend was more frequent media investigations dissecting and explaining 
psychological trauma amongst Canadian soldiers of all generations, especially veterans of the 
1990s and beyond.  
Although discussions of mental illness among Canadian soldiers and veterans were few 
and far between in preceding decades, several documentaries appeared throughout the 2000s. 
The first was a November 2001 documentary titled War Wounds & Memory, directed by 
Vancouver-based filmmaker Brian McKeown. Aired by the CBC on Remembrance Day 2001, 
War Wounds & Memory examined the plight of Canadian Vietnam War veterans and the struggle 
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to find meaning in their service whilst simultaneously fighting PTSD.
172
 McKeown was, in his 
own words, “pre-disposed” to the subject.173 His own father, a First World War combat veteran, 
had a “darkness about him,” and as with many veterans of that conflict, “had nightmares until the 
end, always about the war.”174 McKeown’s interest in making a film about traumatized Canadian 
veterans thus stemmed from: his father’s experiences; an introduction in the late 1990s to a 
group of Canadian Vietnam vets living in Vancouver; and an “insight and fresh understanding of 
combat trauma that has taken place from the 1990’s to the present day.”175  
 Media interest unsurprisingly shifted to the Afghanistan War’s effect on soldiers’ minds. 
In the lead-up to Remembrance Day 2009, the popular CBC program The Fifth Estate aired an 
episode titled “Broken Heroes” about Afghanistan veterans with PTSD.176 Featuring candid 
interviews with Roméo Dallaire as well as rank-and-file soldiers, “Broken Heroes” focused on 
the psychological costs of modern war. Among other topics, the program examined the darker 
side of avoiding treatment, with one soldier describing his descent from healthy living to cocaine 
and alcohol addiction.
177
 Soldiers also discussed the self- and culturally-imposed stigmas 
attached to psychological “weakness” amongst those built up to feel invincible.178 Chief of the 
Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk, while citing the great progress made in retaining soldiers with 
stress injuries, nonetheless highlighted the military’s perennial challenge: 
 
We permeate the culture, that kind of warrior culture, where we want people to be 
warriors. We want them [warriors], because they have to go into harm’s way at sea, at 
40,000 feet in the air, or in places like Afghanistan. We need that. We need them to be 
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adventurous. We need them to be strong of heart. But at the same time we need them to 
be accepting, that we’re not all in armour suits; and that when we do have a problem, that 
they go in for assistance.
179
 
 
 
Moreover, although there was a louder dialogue about stress injuries and greater efforts 
made to retain those afflicted, the reality was that, historically, most of those diagnosed with 
PTSD left the military or were discharged.
180
 When asked by the program’s interviewer whether 
those statistics suggested it was better for soldiers to “suffer in silence,” Natyncyzk countered 
that the “emphasis here is on recovery.”181 Natyncyzk’s response subtly acknowledged that 
mental recovery and a continuing career in the military were still often incompatible goals. 
A 2011 documentary War in the Mind, produced by TVOntario and narrated by Canadian 
actor Paul Gross, likewise focused on the dilemmas facing Afghanistan veterans.
182
 War in the 
Mind once again featured interviews with prominent figures like Dallaire and Mental Health 
Adviser to the DND Dr. Rakesh Jetly, as well as emotional recollections by traumatized rank-
and-file troops. A well-balanced appraisal of both reforms and obstacles, the documentary 
exposed the reality that despite significant initiatives such as TLD and peer support programs, 
old prejudices persisted, with Gross reminding viewers that “militaries are still macho cultures, 
and especially at the lower levels, the ‘suck it up’ factor still exists.”183 As one example of 
enduring attitudes, an unidentified veteran told the story of a traumatized comrade whose peers 
often snuck up behind him and yelled “boo” to provoke a startle response.184 The storyteller 
lamented: “They think it’s a joke, they think it’s funny because they don’t understand ... because 
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they didn’t experience it themselves.”185 Such examples were, in Dallaire’s mind, evidence that it 
was necessary to continue the battle and slowly “wear down the system.”186 
In addition to a greater number of documentaries and television programs, another 
outgrowth of the new national consciousness about psychological injuries was the willingness of 
soldiers to publish autobiographical accounts about their struggle with PTSD. After Dallaire’s 
influential 2003 book Shake Hands with the Devil, other Canadian soldiers were encouraged to 
write about how PTSD had affected their lives. Retired Bosnia veteran Captain Fred Doucette’s 
2008 book Empty Casing not only described his traumatic peacekeeping experiences in Sarajevo, 
but also provided a vivid description of how he slowly transformed from “tough soldier” 
unwilling to admit any weakness, to becoming an OSISS Peer Support Coordinator in 2002.
187
 
Doucette discussed many of the unique problems inherent when dealing with OSIs, not the least 
of which was that recovery, when possible, often took several years or more.
188
 As one example 
he wrote that even long after his peacekeeping tours, the sight of a pumpkin on Halloween could 
still conjure up images of a mangled human head.
189
 Like Dallaire, Sharpe, Grenier, and other 
champions for CAF cultural reforms, Doucette emphasized that despite evident progress there 
was a long battle ahead: “It will be a long time before the system will consider an OSI an 
honourable injury, one that is treatable and not a sign of weakness.”190 He concluded his 
autobiography by reminding readers of the nation’s responsibility for soldiers injured during 
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service, declaring that the last things troops wanted was “to be discarded like an empty [shell] 
casing and left on the battlefield to disappear into the dust.”191 
Retired Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Linford, a Gulf War, Rwanda, and Afghanistan veteran 
with over thirty years’ experience with the Regular Force and Reserves, likewise wrote about 
PTSD’s effect on his life in his 2013 book Warrior Rising. Inspired by Dallaire’s example, 
Linford wrote a candid account of how treatment and understanding brought him back from the 
brink after traumatic experiences, particularly in Rwanda, led to his mental deterioration.
192
 
Similar to many soldiers of the 1990s, Linford’s peacekeeping and war experiences haunted him 
for a long time – ten years – before he was diagnosed with PTSD.193 In that time, he began to 
feel he was gradually experiencing “the loss of my soul as a human as well as my identity as 
Chris Linford.”194 Unlike soldiers’ previous works, Linford’s book directly addressed how 
masculine norms and expectations affected his decision to avoid genuinely addressing thoughts 
and emotions.  
In an especially poignant anecdote, Linford described leaving for the Gulf War and his 
nervousness about crying in front of his wife: “I think most males of our society would have 
similar fears given how we were educated as young boys regarding displays of emotion.”195 
Carrying the burden of stoicism on his shoulders, Linford described feeling “shame, weakness 
and failing as an officer and a man” when he finally admitted to himself that he could not handle 
PTSD alone.
196
 But as he received treatment and came to terms with his situation, he noticed the 
value in accepting vulnerability as an inevitable part of life for anyone: “I had never felt stronger 
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about who I was and how I needed to think about myself in the future.”197 Linford praised the 
work of OSISS and the Outward Bound Veterans’ Program, a course designed to help mentally 
and physically wounded veterans utilizing outdoor activities and teamwork, with assisting in his 
recovery.
198
 He reiterated the argument, made by several reformers throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, that treating psychological injuries was not just a medical responsibility, but a social one 
as well. He declared that, “Peer support extends to all of Canada! The importance of the 
‘Community’ to the returning Veteran cannot be understated! It can take many forms, from a 
peer group, to family, to all neighbours and friends, and indeed the whole country.”199 Like 
Doucette, Linford emphasized that psychological injuries were treatable if CAF members sought 
help and openly addressed mental difficulties. Both autobiographies were a testament to the 
power of social support and a call for the military and Canadian society to cast off unrealistic 
expectations placed on civilian men and soldiers. They were also a testament to a new and 
persistent dialogue about psychological injuries that began in the 1990s and by the mid-2000s 
brought trauma into the Canadian national consciousness. 
 
The New Veterans Charter and Pension Problems 
 
 
 Discussions throughout the decade about psychological injuries also took place against 
the backdrop of evolving policies towards Canadian veterans. On 13 May 2005, the House of 
Commons unanimously passed the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment 
and Compensation Act, popularly known as the “New Veterans Charter (NVC).”200 Designed as 
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a “living charter” to supersede the Pension Act, an act that had remained largely the same since 
the first version was passed in 1919, the NVC provided a series of career transition services, 
rehabilitation services, vocational assistance, and of course, disability awards for ill or injured 
Canadian veterans.
201
 The NVC’s emphasis was on helping veterans transition to civilian life. 
Implemented in April 2006, the Charter came under intense scrutiny and criticism when it 
became popularly known that the Disability Award within the NVC replaced a previous lifelong 
disability pension scheme for ill or injured veterans with a one-time, tax-free payment that as of 
2013 was capped at $298,587.97.
202
 An investigation by the Toronto Star disclosed in November 
2010 that the average payout was $38,000.
203
 The capped lump-sum payment, which, as revealed 
by long-time Toronto Star columnist Rosie DiManno, was far less than that offered to British 
and Australian soldiers, became in many peoples’ estimation “The core failing of the Charter.”204  
 For those released from the CAF due to psychological injuries, the lump-sum payment 
could prove an especially tantalizing way to spend away their troubles. Mike Spellen, who 
counselled many traumatized young veterans with varying substance abuse issues while working 
as an OSISS Peer Support Coordinator, described the main problem with the new approach:  
 
So here you’ve got a guy that’s an addict, self-medicating, PTSD ... and everything else, 
and he could have a gambling addiction. You’re going to give him “X” number of 
thousands of dollars one-time payment. And those guys will blow that in a weekend ... 
And now you’ve got an angry vet ... Because if a guy’s twenty [years-old] or something 
like that, at least if you gave him money every month and he’s still got his addiction and 
you’re getting him some treatment, hopefully down the road he’s [going to break the 
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addiction]. But, you know, they do a one-time settlement for these guys and that might be 
worth five or ten years of payments, but you’ve still got the guy with the problem.205  
  
 
 Rosie DiManno agreed with the spirit of Spellen’s assessment, noting that a Toronto Star 
investigation revealed some young vets “jumped at the lump sum offer that looks appealing to a 
person in their mid-20s who has a poor grasp of the long-term future.”206 Numerous men and 
women, DiManno stated, “youthful, with little financial guidance – have blown it on stuff rather 
than arrange investments and structured money management.”207 
 Veterans’ Ombudsman and former Afghanistan commander Colonel Pat Stogran publicly 
criticized the NVC. Appointed in 2007 as the first Veterans’ Ombudsman, Stogran turned out to 
be more than Veterans Affairs and the federal government bargained for. As the Afghanistan 
War – the longest war Canada had ever participated in – came to a close, and an increasing 
number of wounded soldiers returned, there was strong evidence that old departmental attitudes 
persisted despite the new Charter’s creation. After three years on the job and receiving countless 
veterans’ complaints Stogran said Veterans Affairs had an “insurance company culture of denial” 
that placed financial savings at the top of the organization’s priority list.208 He further added 
there was “an overwhelming perception within the veterans community that they’re being 
cheated,” and after three years he had “seen the evidence” behind their claim.209  
Stogran’s appraisal sounded eerily similar to claims made by numerous serving soldiers 
and veterans during the Croatia Board of Inquiry ten years earlier, and fuelled several media 
reports that there was “complete onus on the veteran to prove that he or she has been grievously 
and irreversibly harmed, with no reasonable prospect of returning to service or the civilian labour 
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force.”210 A study reported in the Globe and Mail by academics Alice Aiken and Amy 
Buitenhuis at Queen’s University compared financial benefits under the Pension Act and NVC 
and further criticized the latter legislation. The most pertinent aspect was its conclusion: “Our 
study demonstrates that veterans are financially disadvantaged under the New Veterans Charter. 
In addition, the compensation gap between the [New Veterans] charter and the Pension Act 
widens if a veteran lives longer, has more children, has a higher disability assessment or is 
released at a lower rank.”211 In Stogran’s view, as he stated before a House of Commons 
committee in October 2010, the NVC was “clearly an attempt to unload the financial liability, 
the long-term financial burden that the government carries with injured, wounded veterans.”212   
Unsurprisingly, Stogran’s vocal and frank judgements convinced the Conservative 
government to avoid reappointing him to a second term, with Veterans Affairs Minister Jean-
Pierre Blackburn saying it was “time for a new ombudsman to offer a new perspective.”213 
Nonetheless, during his final months in the position in late 2010 Stogran made it clear he would 
not walk away quietly. In August 2010 he declared the Veterans Ombudsman position was just 
“window dressing” for an “obstructive and deceptive” bureaucracy, and said that one of his final 
missions was to let Canadians “know how badly so many of you are being treated.”214 Then 
Chief of Defence Staff Walter Natyncyzk, Canada’s top-ranking soldier, avoided commenting 
directly on the government’s decision not to reappoint Stogran, but nevertheless stated during a 
news conference in August 2010 that Stogran had “certainly voiced with clarity what the issues 
are.”215 Stogran continued his battle even after his term ended, and in March 2013 told the CBC 
that veterans with PTSD were being denied treatment, and in some cases pensions, after their 
                                                          
210
 The Toronto Star, 20 September 2010.  
211
 The Globe and Mail, 24 August 2010.  
212
 The Toronto Star, 6 November 2010. 
213
 The Globe and Mail, 18 August 2010.   
214
 Ibid.  
215
 The Globe and Mail, 21 August 2010.  
  
266 
 
release. He summed up the situation as “different time, different place, but same old story,” 
describing the VAC system as “an empty shell of treatment and services.”216 Stogran 
vociferously advocated on behalf of soldiers and veterans, and as a popular and experienced 
leader, his opinions contributed to a reappraisal of the “living charter.”   
In September 2010, the Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
announced new measures to address the needs of the country’s severely wounded soldiers. The 
government earmarked an additional $2 billion dollars for VAC programs, which benefitted an 
extra 4,000 veterans over the next five years.
217
 Also included in the new measures was a 
lifetime $1000 monthly stipend for approximately 500 veterans so severely injured that they 
were not expected to work again in their lifetime.
218
 Those recipients of a Disability Award were 
also now provided three options: “a lump-sum payment,” “an annual installment over the number 
of years of a Veteran’s choosing,” or a combination of the two.219 The payment still, however, 
comprised a lump sum paid until the total amount awarded was reached, rather than a lifelong 
monthly pension. Stogran said he was “encouraged” by the government’s move, but still worried 
about the way the VAC system “set the bar as high as any insurance company in Canada in the 
interests of preserving the public purse … when the legislation actually directs it should be 
liberally interpreted.” 220 He believed the system was still “severely broken” and there was a 
“black hole of bureaucrats” who had a “deny, deny, deny” method of handling soldiers’ 
claims.
221
 Master Corporal Paul Franklin, an Afghanistan veteran who lost both legs during a 
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suicide bombing in 2006 and was the subject of a 2007 book, said the measures were a “good 
start” but did not believe the financial commitment of $1000 a month for severely injured 
soldiers was “anywhere near enough.”222 He further added his wish that the lump-sum award be 
increased.
223
 For his part, Minister of National Defence Peter MacKay denied that Stogran’s 
grievances were a factor in the new changes.
224
 In March 2011 Parliament passed the Enhanced 
New Veterans Charter Act.
225
      
  
Ottawa Reacts 
 
 
As soldiers’ pension issues and psychological difficulties became persistent news items, 
the CAF and federal government responded in several ways. One important initiative was the 
2007 announcement of five OSI clinics administered by Veterans Affairs to help CAF members, 
veterans, and their families.
226
 Located in population centres across the country, and later with 
satellite clinics established for rural regions, OSI clinics provided “assessment, treatment, 
prevention and support to serving CAF members, Veterans and RCMP members and former 
members.”227 Family members of the above groups were also entitled to receiving some of the 
available services.
228
 Each clinic had a team consisting of psychiatrists, psychologists, social 
workers, and mental health nurses, with one of the main aims being the mitigation of 
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psychological issues resulting from mental disorder through therapy sessions.
229
 The clinical 
team also liaised with community practitioners to ensure follow-up care was provided and no one 
in need slipped through the cracks.
230
 Along with OTSSCs, OSI clinics supplied another layer of 
treatment and social support for the numerous men and women that required help after 
Afghanistan and earlier deployments. 
By December 2008, when almost 5,000 of the CAF’s 87,000 Regular Force troops and 
Reservists were receiving mental health care in one form or another, the government earmarked 
even more money for OSIs.
231
 That announcement came on the heels of Mary McFadyen’s 
December 2008 Ombudsman report which showed that staff shortages were a detrimental factor 
at some bases, such as CFB Petawawa, where 5,100 military personnel were served by only one 
psychologist and one psychiatrist; requiring many to travel over 160 kilometres to Ottawa for 
help.
232
 That number was in strong contrast to CFB Valcartier, which had eight psychologists 
and four psychiatrists for 4,500 troops.
233
 Given that Petawawa was “the home base for many of 
the recent deployments to Afghanistan” at that time, it was unsurprising that the Ombudsman’s 
investigators discovered soldiers were “having difficulty accessing timely mental health care 
services.”234 McFadyen’s report highlighted that strenuous workloads were an issue for many 
CAF health care specialists, and made attracting and retaining clinicians difficult. In the case of 
OTSSCs, staff shortages made outreach more “incremental,” since there was a “serious shortage 
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of time available for most mental health professionals,” despite “adequate funds.”235 There were 
evident challenges for the future. 
Another important augmentation for existing services was the 2008 creation of the Joint 
Personnel Support Unit (JPSU).
236
 Commanded in Ottawa by the Director Casualty Support 
Management, the JPSU was the central administrative unit which oversaw Integrated Personnel 
Support Centres (IPSCs) dotted across the country, aiming “to provide comprehensive care and 
integrated support for ill and injured members and their families.”237 Essentially, the JPSU 
ensured uniform access to care and consistent approaches throughout Centres nationwide.
238
 Put 
another way, the JPSU, and the IPSCs it oversaw, were intended as a “one-stop service” for 
soldiers and families, with the JPSU playing a “central [administrative] role in the transition 
process for CF personnel recovering from serious illness or injury, and either progressing 
towards a normal work schedule or preparing for a civilian career.”239 Whereas previously 
injured members had to seek out medical, financial, and vocational resources themselves, the 
JPSU connected members with those services and cut down on efforts to obtain support and 
care.
240
 Nevertheless, although a step in the right direction, perspectives still varied on the 
JPSU’s effectiveness. Some felt that removing ill and injured members from the “family 
structure” of their unit and peers during a period of vulnerability was “an abdication of the 
fundamental leadership principle of caring for one’s own.”241 Brigadier-General Christian 
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Barabé believed having a centralized command system in Ottawa for ill and injured soldiers 
meant “you detach the responsible [local] authorities from actually what’s happening on the 
ground.”242 As with other reforms of the new millennium, there was divided opinion on how to 
construct a comprehensive system of care.   
Moreover, for psychologically injured troops, there were other obstacles to overcome. 
The universality of service principle, which was still intact in the second decade of the twenty-
first century, meant that injured personnel, including those diagnosed with OSIs, had a finite 
amount of time to either return to normal duties or face release.
243
 As more soldiers posted to the 
JPSU with psychological injuries from Afghanistan and earlier peacekeeping operations were 
released, there was, Ombudsman Pierre Daigle stated in 2012, “a sense on the part of some that 
an organizational promise was made [to retain psychologically injured soldiers] and then reneged 
upon.”244 There was a persistent view that going to the IPSCs and being posted to the JPSU were 
a “kiss of death” for a soldier’s career. That belief prevented an unknown but likely significant 
number of soldiers from seeking care.
245
 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman wrote that the creation 
and general acceptance of the JPSU/IPSC structure appeared “to be providing improved 
management of ill and injured.”246 Despite some hiccups, the JPSU promised better and more 
standardized care for those in need than previously disparate measures.
247
 
Master Warrant Officer Barry Westholm, whose story was recounted in the first chapter, 
thought the JPSU was a “stellar idea.”248 In 2009, he quit the Regular Force – a “huge decision” 
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– to sign on as a Reservist, a requirement to join the JPSU.249 After numerous interview stages 
and screening processes he was accepted, becoming the first regional Sergeant Major for the 
JPSU in the eastern Ontario region, the most senior position of a non-commissioned officer in 
the unit.
250
 Initially, he felt the staff level was adequate and that overall the unit ran smoothly. 
What he discovered shortly after work began though, was that the JPSU was already at an “end 
state.”251 No provision was made for any staff increases as the number of personnel posted to the 
Unit grew. Thus, after the early “great success,” the Unit became inundated when existing 
personnel were forced to handle a sharp climb from approximately 100 to 500 soldiers posted to 
it.
252
 In spite of their best efforts JPSU staff became, in Westholm’s words, “overwhelmed.”253 
He recalled that “the people that suffered were both the staff and the people posted-in.”254  
As the situation deteriorated Westholm felt an inner conflict about the need to obey his 
superiors and his responsibility to the ill and injured soldiers under the Unit’s care. The inability 
of staff to keep up with the heavy workload meant that, in his mind, they were putting ill and 
injured soldiers “in harm’s way.”255 In a testament to the situation’s severity, Westholm recalled: 
“We did lose people to suicide. And although I could never state categorically that the situation 
in the JPSU contributed to the suicide, I can say that we didn’t do enough to prevent them ... 
Because we couldn’t get to them all in time.”256 He attempted to carry on, but shortly after the 
January 2013 suicide of Master Corporal Charles Matiru, a four-time Afghanistan veteran who 
committed suicide after suffering from PTSD, Westholm resigned in protest — one of the 
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strongest gestures a military member could make.
257
 His very public decision was meant to draw 
attention to the JPSU’s “dire need for assistance.”258 Thus he laid everything on the line and 
“grenaded” all his bridges.259 He subsequently sent a document to the Governor General, Prime 
Minister, and numerous military leaders, outlining both the hard work of JPSU staff and their 
tragic inability to cope with the demands placed on them.
260
 Westholm’s commanding officer 
informed him that his behaviour was “very much a disappointment” and he was later told to “just 
stay home,” an order he nonetheless refused to follow.261 Although his resignation did not make 
the splash he hoped for, a series of Ottawa Citizen articles in 2013, partially responsible for a 
late-2013 Ombudsman’s investigation into the JPSU, lent credence to Westholm’s claims.262 A 
year after his resignation he told Citizen reporter Chris Cobb that there was a “spectre of 
indifference” towards veterans within the federal government.263 
Ombudsman Pierre Daigle’s 2013 preliminary assessment of the state of the JPSU 
bolstered Westholm’s assertions and raised more red flags. Although JPSU commander Colonel 
Gerry Blais described staff levels as adequate, after soliciting comments from sixteen JPSU staff 
and 177 clients, Daigle wrote that “60% of interviews referenced insufficient staff numbers 
relative to JPSU member and client demands.”264 His assessment concluded: “Observations 
made during this review suggest there may be a requirement to review overall governance of 
support offered to ill and injured members.”265 Several months later, the Ottawa Citizen once 
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again drew attention to systemic problems outlined by Daigle, with Chris Cobb writing that the 
JPSU still remained understaffed.
266
 Despite requests for figures on the situation at Petawawa 
and Ottawa, considered “the most overloaded and inefficient units,” JPSU staff refused to 
provide the Citizen the information Cobb wanted.
267
 For all of its hard work, the JPSU was, by 
2014, “widely criticized by serving soldiers, veterans of JPSU and military mental health 
specialists.”268  
The year 2014 began as another bad one for the Unit, as eight CAF suicides in a little 
over two months between the end of 2013 and early 2014 brought more criticism from veterans’ 
advocates.
269
 The case of Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Beauchemin was another controversial 
moment. A veteran of Haiti and Bosnia operations in the 1990s, Beauchemin was posted to the 
JPSU on a return-to-work program when he committed suicide in January 2014. His death once 
again implied serious problems within the CAF mental health network.
270
 Moreover, late in 2014 
the situation became desperate as the Ottawa IPSC, one of the busiest in the country, lost two of 
its staff members, leaving two Section Commanders to assist more than 225 injured personnel.
271
 
While the Centre attempted to regroup, soldiers with urgent crises, including PTSD, were told to 
call 911 or visit Ottawa’s Montfort Hospital.272 IPSC platoon commander Lieutenant (Navy) 
Adam Winchester said that the Centre’s tempo had “rapidly increased.”273     
While JPSU staff continued to battle their workload and veterans’ groups expressed 
dissatisfaction, in 2015 the Department of National Defence “quietly shelved” an internal 
investigation into the Unit, stating that a report would not be completed until sometime in 
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2017.
274
 That decision was a disappointment to Ombudsman Gary Walbourne, who previously 
halted his 2013 probe based on an understanding that the DND would issue its own report by 
summer 2015.
275
 Regardless, Walbourne refused to wait, and in July 2015 began his own 
investigation, stating that given the JPSU’s importance for ill and injured troops, a report was 
necessary “now, rather than later.”276 Others agreed. Retired Corporal Chris Dupée, the founder 
of Military Minds, a 130,000 person online PTSD awareness group founded in 2011, told the 
Ottawa Citizen that the system continued to fail many of its injured, who were “falling through 
the cracks.”277 In the same article, Westholm commented that the JPSU had great potential but 
was “horrifically mismanaged at the highest level.”278 Thus, although important initiatives and 
reforms had been made since the new millennium, fifteen years later there were still many 
individuals from within and outside the military who believed the system let many soldiers and 
veterans down, sometimes with devastating consequences. Military leaders and DND officials 
were cognizant of the need to admit the existence of mental health problems amongst a segment 
of the CAF and veteran population, but they were still unwilling to admit when they had a tiger 
by the tail. Instead, they fell back on a tried and tested method: deny the problem’s extent until it 
blew over. Numerous soldiers and veterans suffered while the PR battle continued.  
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CONCLUSION: ENDURING STRUGGLES AND ENDURING HOPE 
 
As the Afghanistan War continued throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, the number of 
physically and mentally injured soldiers increased exponentially. Concurrently, while casualties 
grew the precise number of psychologically injured troops became a thorny issue. Similar to past 
conflicts, rates and figures widely varied. A 2007 Toronto Star article featuring an interview with 
Dr. Mark Zamorski stated that about 28% out of a total of 2,700 CAF soldiers screened after 
Afghanistan had symptoms of mental health problems.
1
 An April 2009 Toronto Star article 
featuring figures provided by VAC spokesperson Janice Summerby stated that one in five 
deployed to Afghanistan – 1053 Canadian soldiers and police officers –  later left the CAF and 
RCMP with PTSD or other psychiatric problems.
2
 The article further reported that VAC 
expected an increase in the total numbers over time.
3
 In her 2008 report on OSIs Interim 
CAF/DND Ombudsman Mary McFadyen avoided using exact figures, but inferred that the 
number of soldiers and veterans with psychological difficulties was likely in the thousands.
4
 Yet 
another Toronto Star article from 2010 said the number of Afghanistan veterans with PTSD was 
about 5% – “at least 1250.”5 Figures like those were enough evidence for conservative and 
controversial Globe and Mail columnist Margaret Wente to agree with Lewis MacKenzie. She 
believed numerous soldiers and veterans were abusing the system: “[W]hen stress is mowing 
down far more troops than the Taliban, maybe something’s out of whack.”6 But in spite of 
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Wente’s assessment, a consistent stream of reports suggested the number of casualties was 
growing.  
 While a perennial debate over the extent of psychological casualties continued, the 
public’s attention was drawn to another dark shadow of the Afghanistan War – suicide. 
Throughout the 2000s, the Canadian public became aware of numerous instances of suicide 
amongst CAF members. In 2009, for example, there were sixteen recorded CAF personnel 
suicides, the highest annual number since tracking began in 1995.
7
 In late 2013, four soldiers 
committed suicide in just one week.
8
 One of them, Master Corporal Slyvain Lelievre from the 
Van Doos Regiment, had deployed to Bosnia three times before serving in Afghanistan in 2010.
9
 
The quick succession of suicides in 2013 led former Chief of the Defence Staff and charismatic 
General Rick Hillier, “Uncle Rick” as he was affectionately called by troops, to call for a board 
of inquiry or Royal Commission.
10
 Although suicides were difficult to directly link to 
deployments, they nonetheless raised further questions about the CAF’s approach to mental 
illness and the extent to which support mechanisms were failing troubled soldiers.
11
 More 
pressure was placed on the CAF and federal government when DND statistics revealed that by 
31 March 2014 more soldiers had been lost to suicide (160) than combat in Afghanistan (138) 
between 2002 and 2014.
12
 Those statistics, which included Reservist suicides, a category left out 
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in past tallies, led opposition MPs to accuse the federal government of “lowballing” earlier 
numbers to downplay the issue.
13
   
One of the most troubling cases was that of Corporal Stuart Langridge, a “dedicated, 
loyal and motivated” veteran of the Former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan who committed suicide 
in his room at CFB Edmonton after struggles with depression, alcohol, and drugs — all potential 
signs of PTSD.
14
 In the aftermath and ensuing investigation, many disturbing details emerged 
about both Langridge’s case and the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service’s (CFNIS) 
handling of the matter. Langridge’s stepfather Shaun Fynes accused the CFNIS of withholding 
Langridge’s suicide note for fourteen months. He claimed the note revealed Langridge had PTSD 
and thus was withheld as part of a “very calculated deception to protect the uniform from 
embarrassment.”15 Mr. Fynes later told a Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) 
inquiry that Langridge was “ping-ponged” between civilian and military medical systems, with 
the former not wanting to deal with him and the latter not knowing what to do.
16
 Both Mr. Fynes 
and his wife Sheila, Langridge’s mother, claimed their son was treated as a drunk and addict by 
superior officers.
17
 Mr. Fynes declared before the Commission that Corporal Langridge was 
essentially “killed by the military.”18 Adding to the controversy, after the MPCC inquiry ended 
Ottawa Citizen reporter Chris Cobb revealed that the sixty-two day inquiry and investigation cost 
more than $3.5 million.
19
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The Langridge case and its aftermath received national media attention and exposed 
controversies that proved embarrassing for CAF and DND officials. In one particularly strange 
instance, Cobb’s colleague David Pugliese at the Ottawa Citizen claimed that in 2010 he was 
asked, or rather urged, to discontinue writing about the Langridge case by an officer ostensibly 
working for the Chief of Defence Staff.
20
 Pugliese suggested that CAF and DND leaders were 
upset because, “The Langridge story challenged the military’s and government’s message that 
Afghan veterans were being taken care of” and drew national media attention to the implied link 
between post-traumatic stress and suicide.
21
  
  
Legacies and Dilemmas 
 
By the end of Canada’s Afghanistan combat operations in July 2011, over 40,000 service 
personnel had been deployed there, making the Afghanistan War the largest Canadian military 
operation since the Second World War.
22
 During the War, 158 soldiers died, and 1,859 members 
were physically wounded.
23
 Moreover, of the 25,000 to 35,000 military members expected to 
release from the CAF between 2011 and 2016, at least 2,750 were predicted to suffer from a 
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severe form of PTSD, and a further 5,900 were predicted to suffer from other diagnosed mental 
health problems.
24
 In terms of concrete figures, as of March 2010 VAC psychiatrists had 12,689 
total cases, with PTSD numbering 8,758 of those.
25
 By April 2015, since its inception in 2001 
the OSISS network had assisted 10,181 peers, indicating both the past and future need for its 
services.
26
 The creation of groups such as Wounded Warriors Canada, a non-governmental 
organization assisting physically and mentally wounded soldiers through a series of national 
programs and events, was also a sign that government initiatives were not always enough.
27
 
Retired Brigadier-General Christian Barabé matter-of-factly stated that although Wounded 
Warriors and similar groups provided excellent and necessary assistance, their very existence 
demonstrated “that there are deficiencies in the system.”28 
At present, soldiers and veterans with psychological illness still also face the possibility 
of ostracism by their colleagues, friends, and superior officers. Even in the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, problems of the mind are often interpreted by military members as a sign of 
weakness.
29
 Those stigmas, which exist in civilian society as well, are heightened in a military 
milieu. The John Wayne figure – tough, stoic, brave, and seemingly invincible – still forms the 
manly ideal for much of Canadian and North American society, especially amongst those in the 
military.
30
 Despite decades of medical and socio-cultural changes, which saw the dominant 
image(s) of masculinity bend and mental illness no longer interpreted through overtly gendered 
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medical theories, traditional masculinity still pervades civilian and military society.
31
 Even the 
rise of the double-income family and working mother, initially viewed by many as a sign of 
men’s social decline, has not thoroughly damaged the belief that a man’s identity is tied to his 
role as breadwinner and family leader.
32
 The military’s fitness culture and a heightened need to 
adhere to masculine norms combine to convince many soldiers that the best approach to any 
physical or mental problems is to “tough it out.”     
In the Canadian Forces, socio-economic concerns, namely remaining with the military 
and worries of peer rejection, have led to a perennial stigma and fear surrounding mental illness. 
Retired Lieutenant (Navy) Bruce McKay, a Chaplain who served from 1980 until 2013, spoke 
with hundreds of soldiers about their innermost thoughts and private matters throughout his 
career. By the late 2000s he saw changes in how troops spoke about mental health problems, 
with fewer soldiers entirely denying when something was wrong. Nevertheless, he noticed that 
instead of openly acknowledging problems, many opted for euphemistic statements such as “I’m 
just dealing with some stuff at home.”33 McKay also noticed reluctance among numerous 
soldiers to see military medical staff or social workers, because such information went into their 
personnel file. The decades-old fear of their problem “getting out” persisted.34 Troops’ worry 
that private information expressed during appointments would somehow reach their superiors or 
colleagues was enough to keep many silent. In an attempt to seek some form of help, soldiers 
sometimes requested private discussions with McKay. During those conversations they would 
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“talk about ‘can’t sleep,’ would talk about nightmares, [and] they would talk about how they’ve 
woken up strangling their wife and things like that.”35  
For many dealing with emotional difficulties or psychological stress, social support 
proved a key factor in their resiliency. Master Corporal Toby Prigione, due to be released from 
the military in 2014 because of mental and physical health matters, stated that family and groups 
like OSISS were particularly helpful. She stated that, quite simply, “It’s always nice just to have 
someone who’s willing to listen.”36 Retired Sergeant Derek Spracklin, a veteran of Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Afghanistan, likewise believes in the power of support: “You definitely need a good 
support network.”37 Like Greg Prodaniuk, Spracklin aimed to use his positive experiences with 
social support and “gift of the gab” to help others: “I love sitting down with guys, chatting about 
coffees, chatting about stories, and trying to help them along ...When you sit down with the 
groups of guys and girls [in OSISS group sessions] ... it gets people understanding ... everybody 
has had their own problem ... Out of ten people, nine have gotten through it and you’re the one 
that’s waiting to get through it.”38 Spracklin believes that with regard to mental health problems, 
sometimes there is “more to it” than medical diagnoses.39  
For retired Sergeant Daniel Hrechka, a veteran of two Middle Eastern peacekeeping 
tours, family and peer support were a critical factor in getting over traumatic events. Since being 
diagnosed with PTSD in 2010, “it’s been family and peer support ... hanging with other guys that 
are going through ... different stages of their healing process.”40 Hrechka affirmed that “being 
with like-minded soldiers is a really warming feeling” because “we know we’re surrounded by 
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people that get it.”41 He found it difficult to discuss his problems with civilians, particularly 
because of his injury’s invisible character: “You look at me, you don’t see anything wrong. 
That’s the constant battle with the civilian population. [They say] ‘There’s nothing wrong with 
you, Dan, you’re fine.’”42 Myths and misconceptions made support from those that “get it” all 
the more crucial for normalizing his experiences and path to recovery.
43
        
The military must train men and women to be tough, so that they are able to face all 
manners of physical and mental duress. That axiom was crudely but accurately summarized by 
one soldier during the Croatia Board of Inquiry: “You have to train them to be dangerous 
weapons ... You can only put so much of a leash on a pit bull because you know he has still got 
to be the pit bull if need be.”44 How to train a “pit bull” and still have him or her show empathy 
towards injured comrades is the biggest dilemma the military faces in any attempt to reshape 
CAF culture. Injuries to the body or mind, especially the latter, which are often invisible and 
subject to numerous discretionary factors, challenge the warrior ethos that the military instills. 
The ideal warrior of earlier eras has changed in numerous ways, and there can be no doubt that 
soldiers with psychological injuries are, by and large, better off than their counterparts in the 
twentieth century. Nevertheless, as this dissertation has demonstrated, there are still numerous 
obstacles ahead. One of the military’s biggest challenges will be to convince soldiers to abandon 
the “cult of the strong, silent individual” who bears all suffering stoically in favour of a team-
oriented approach to health and wellness.
45
 When queried about change over time, Brigadier-
General Sharpe stated that in the past fifteen years he saw “a growing acceptance of the team at 
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the core of the warrior ethos.”46 The challenge, he wrote, was “to get that culture to continue to 
evolve.”47 
By examining trauma in the Canadian military during the post-1991 period, something 
hitherto only addressed in article-length studies, this dissertation has brought together events and 
themes previously discussed in a disparate manner, and created future opportunities for 
comparative histories that draw on the experiences of veterans from different eras. This study has 
begun to fill a gap in the Canadian historical literature on war trauma, much of which has 
revolved around the historical experience of shell shock during and after the First World War. 
Recounting the Canadian military experience with trauma after the Cold War, it has highlighted 
the persistence of trauma narratives all throughout the nation’s participation in war and 
peacekeeping operations after 1914, and demonstrated the numerous ways that history can 
provide sign posts for contemporary and future discussions. At the same time, it has considered 
the ways that individual experiences are shaped by, interact with, and alter prevailing cultural 
ideas of trauma. Listening to post- Cold War veterans’ experiences helps us to understand that 
while trauma has been a persistent theme in modern wars and peacekeeping, its expression and 
conceptualization has been framed by historical contingencies. This speaks to the need to 
continue exploring those contingencies, as well as the various lenses that trauma is viewed 
through by physicians, the military, politicians, the public, and of course, soldiers themselves.  
From an historical perspective, Sharpe’s aforementioned thoughts on military culture and 
the many reform initiatives to de-stigmatize mental illness support historian Mark Micale’s belief 
that the early twenty-first century represents a unique cultural and historical moment for 
discussing topics, such as masculinity and mental illness, which were previously kept hidden 
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from view.
48
 Like Paul Jackson’s 2004 work on homosexuality in the military during the Second 
World War, this dissertation is a product of a more open approach to topics previously, and 
entirely, taboo for the military, general public, and historians.
49
 One inadvertent effect of 
Canada’s peacekeeping and war operations of the 1990s and 2000s was that they contributed to a 
reappraisal of decades-old approaches to mental injuries. Traditional approaches, which left 
numerous troubled veterans to seek reminiscences with comrades over a beer at their local 
Legion, no longer sufficed. In battling psychological injuries, the military, physicians, and the 
Canadian public were forced to look inward and acknowledge the individual, institutional, and 
cultural beliefs that kept such topics off the table for so long. Importantly, this introspection also 
involved addressing predominant views of the ideal man and warrior.  
Peacekeeping trauma, and later the Afghanistan War, brought mental health problems out 
of the shadows, and CAF reformers contributed to a national dialogue on a previously unseen 
scale. The lived experiences of those who publicly shared their stories during the Croatia Board 
of Inquiry, and after Afghanistan, highlighted the political, medical, societal, and cultural factors 
that shaped trauma discussions throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. 
Trauma, moreover, forced a reappraisal of Canada’s role in international affairs. The question, 
still under debate in 2015, is, if peacekeeping is no longer peaceful, and wars are seemingly no 
longer winnable in a traditional sense, what role should Canada play on the world stage? The 
Afghanistan conflict temporarily brought war back as the military’s raison d’être, but with the 
mission’s end in 2014 it remains to be seen how Canadians will reconcile their dual image as 
both peacekeepers and warriors, and if peacekeeping will once again become the military’s 
primary role during international conflicts.      
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This dissertation is in many respects a product of the dialogue and events it has related. 
The experiences shared by CAF members and veterans, some of whom have been quoted in this 
study, represent a unique historical moment when Canadian veterans, for the first time, have 
been willing to publicly express the consequences of PTSD, or whichever term we choose for 
psychological injuries resulting from traumatic experiences. The historical legacy of shell shock, 
battle exhaustion, PTSD, and newer terms like OSI, support the opinion shared by numerous 
historians that psychological trauma and psychiatric language are shaped by cultural beliefs 
produced and altered within a war – and in the Canadian case – peacekeeping context. The 
creation of the OSI term, a military solution to CAF cultural beliefs about “disorders,” 
demonstrates the contingency of language utilized to encapsulate trauma’s effects, and 
psychological illness more broadly.  
It is unclear what psychiatrists will choose to call PTSD in the future, and how that term 
will be altered, but historical evidence suggests we are far from at an end point when it comes to 
medical terminology connoting trauma.
50
 Despite its status as a non-medical term, the creation of 
new concepts like OSI suggests a continuing tension between a universal representation of 
trauma encapsulated in the PTSD concept and the lived experiences of those exposed to it, as 
well as the power of institutions like the military to shape cultural beliefs. Psychiatric 
terminology, despite numerous attempts, is still unable to capture and keep hold of the myriad 
ways that trauma is socially refracted by individuals and societies. History suggests it will be a 
long time, if ever, before psychiatry will be able to accomplish such a formidable task. Equally 
important, just like shell shock, battle exhaustion, and PTSD stemmed from wartime and 
peacekeeping encounters with trauma, the creation of the OSI term demonstrated the continuing 
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ability of military needs to influence cultural representations of trauma. The tension between 
medical authority, sympathy toward psychological injury, and the CAF’s desire to preserve 
manpower, will likely continue for a long while yet.      
Canadians have justifiable reasons to take pride in our nation’s military heritage, much of 
which has been forged by war deeds and numerous peacekeeping operations around the globe. 
As the title of Jack Granatstein’s book suggests, a great deal of our nation’s historical experience 
has been shaped by “Waging War and Keeping the Peace.”51 Our historical record towards 
injured veterans, and particularly those psychologically debilitated by military service, has 
unfortunately been less admirable. Throughout the past one-hundred years, many veterans’ road 
to hell was paved by the ostensibly good intentions of politicians and pension officials. That road 
was also paved by persistent mental health stigmas and unrealistic expectations of what it meant 
to be a proper man and soldier. A lamentable ambivalence and national blind spot has sometimes 
characterized the Canadian public’s attitude toward injured veterans, and with each passing 
conflict Canadians seem to gradually forget about those who bore the brunt of our foreign policy 
decisions. This ambivalence has been most evident with regard to the “new” generation of post-
Cold-War-era veterans, those who have participated in peacekeeping missions and conflicts that 
did not have the easily defined good-versus-evil narratives of the First and Second World War. 
Many Canadians know little to nothing about their deeds. Relatively speaking, their numbers are 
much smaller than their early- to mid-twentieth century counterparts. But as thinkers across time 
have stated, the true test of a nation’s morals and values is how it treats its more vulnerable 
citizens.   
In our collective desire to form a national identity based on our most treasured values, we 
must not forget about those who have witnessed the worst in humanity and committed sanctioned 
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acts of violence on our behalf, for they have in many cases sacrificed their mental health for the 
nation. In the conflict between how wars and peacekeeping missions are memorialized, and their 
often grim reality, veterans of all ages represent our closest link to the past.  
 
Final Thoughts 
 
 
 Since this story opened with an anecdote about Canadian veteran Barry Westholm, it 
seems fitting to conclude with a brief tracing of the subsequent path taken by the reformers and 
psychologically injured veterans discussed throughout its narrative.   
 After he left the Joint Personnel Support Unit in 2013, Westholm became an advocate for 
physically and mentally injured soldiers. He frequently counsels and supports injured soldiers, 
particularly with the complex and labyrinthine process involved in seeking compensation for 
injuries. He also acts as the proverbial bee in the bonnet of CAF and DND officials, frequently 
sending e-mails to politicians and military leaders about an injured soldier’s situation, suggesting 
remedial action be taken or hastened. Given his long career, personal battle with PTSD, and 
experiences with the JPSU, Westholm is a fount of knowledge about the treatment of injured 
soldiers, and his thoughts and efforts have been spotlighted numerous times by the Ottawa 
Citizen. He divides his time between advocacy efforts and attempting to convince military and 
DND leaders to overhaul their system for aiding injured troops transitioning to civilian life, 
particularly the JPSU.  
 After his retirement in 2012, Stéphane Grenier began utilizing lessons learned from the 
OSISS experience in the civilian workplace. He currently works for Mental Health Innovations, 
an organization dedicated to bringing peer support initiatives and other innovations to the 
corporate environment. He sees many similarities between military and civilian mental health 
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issues, and believes Canadians as a whole need to address the stigmas that pervade our society: 
“Both [groups] will have a tendency to isolate, both will resist treatment, both will resist taking 
medication, regardless of the culture. Both will try to get over this [injury] themselves. Both will 
be embarrassed at the same level. Both will self-stigmatize.”52 Grenier still firmly believes in the 
power of social support, stating that, “Social support will provide hope, and with hope you can 
open the door to recovery.”53 
 Joe Sharpe continues to work in several capacities, including as a patron for Veterans 
Emergency Transition Services, a non-profit corporation headquartered in Nova Scotia that 
provides aid to transient and homeless veterans across Canada. Recently, he has been 
“reactivated” as a strategic advisor to the CAF Strategic Response Team investigating sexual 
misconduct within the Forces – another perennial issue for the military.54 Given his long and 
multifarious career with the military, he views the necessary reform of CAF culture not just as a 
prerequisite for better treatment for individual men and women of the Forces, but also “as a 
matter of operational readiness.”55 He sees the continuing erosion of the “old culture” as one of 
the main challenges facing the military over the coming decades.
56
 After the Croatia Board of 
Inquiry, Sharpe and Mike Spellen remained friends, and are still in regular contact with one 
another. When Spellen was asked his opinion about what needs to be done to combat systemic 
CAF problems he matter-of-factly replied: “The government’s got to stand up. Either that, or 
next time you want to go to war, send all the politicians over.”57 
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For Andrew Godin, life since retirement in 2006 has been “an ongoing battle.”58 After his 
1990s peacekeeping deployments he found himself increasingly disconnected from family, and 
physicians advised him not to seek employment. Godin found such advice difficult to heed 
because “every fibre in your body tells you [that] you should be out doing something ... the 
things that a man or a person is supposed to do.”59 He thus tries to live “day to day,” and is 
involved with Wounded Warriors Canada, OSISS, and other veterans’ organizations. Like 
numerous colleagues, he believes social support from fellow veterans and Canadian society helps 
him navigate post-retirement life: “I have that [support] through my military family ... My family 
family, a little different story. They somewhat understand, but they don’t quite get it; which is 
fine, they weren’t supposed to get it. It’s not their job to get it. The military family, I’m still close 
to them. They understand. They know. They were standing there.”60     
 As mentioned in the final chapter, Greg Prodaniuk became part of the first cohort of 
OSISS Peer Support Coordinators in 2001, and remains in that position to this day. In his work 
as a PSC, Prodaniuk aims to impart the benefits of social support on those he works with. He 
affirms that a lopsided focus on the medical dimensions of PTSD has failed to capture how 
military operations affect a soldier’s beliefs, morals, and outlook. His appraisal of the mental 
processes veterans work through after war and peacekeeping service demonstrates that like shell 
shock before it, PTSD is in many respects a metaphor for the profound impact trauma has on a 
soldier’s worldview:  
 
I think people are [now] looking at these injuries sort of in a society sense, and 
just wheeling out the psychiatrists to explain what’s going on is kind of ringing hollow. 
It’s not filling in the parts of the story that people really want to engage ... I think the next 
change is we’re going to be evolving towards understanding this as a process, as a ... in 
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some ways almost looking at it as a grief model ... something everyone can relate to. 
Everyone loses people in their lives and it changes their lives, and how do they carry on? 
And I think that’s really what happens here. Veterans lose something. They lose their 
youth, they lose their innocence, they lose some of their morals, [and] some of their 
ethics are challenged. They lose time, momentum, [and] access to the good life that 
happens in our country. And I think that that’s really what we’re talking about.61 
 
 
Prodaniuk’s story, like several others throughout this narrative, is a testament to how 
social support for those dealing with psychological difficulties can have very positive effects, 
above and beyond what medical treatment alone can offer. As this study has shown, social 
support is not just an individual, familial, or military concern, but a national one. Lastly, 
Prodaniuk’s final interview remarks about his road to recovery demonstrate that viewing trauma 
as both an injury and a metaphor allows us to trace the difficult historical journeys of both 
individual Canadians and our nation:  
 
I was prompted, encouraged, and decided to take the high road, and because of 
that I’ve opened up sort of a richness and understanding in my life, and a quality of life 
that I may not have achieved if I had gone down some other paths. So, when I reflect 
upon the injury, I see it as a definite point of deviation or a course change in my life ... I 
look at it as, [“I was a”] young guy who went on operations and I was impacted. And it 
moved me a few degrees at a critical point in a different direction, and I’m grateful that ... 
I had the wherewithal and the support to gain a perspective on it, and use it in turn to 
inform my life moving forward. I think it’s made me a much better man. It’s made me a 
much better father, better husband. It’s made me a better leader. It’s made me a more 
balanced person. It’s taught me a lot, about the inner workings of people, and about how 
people approach impasses in their lives. And it’s not so much an understanding as an 
overarching theory. It’s more about the story of life and the things that you do in your 
youth, and the consequences of it, and where you go. And I think that’s how I look at the 
injury now when I reflect back on it. I look at it as a significant moment in my life, and 
it’s something that has created who I am, who I am now.62 
 
 
Prodaniuk’s journey, and the other recounted stories, point to a new type of masculinity 
and leadership, and to the redrawing of what constitutes courage. Although Dallaire’s high-
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profile battle with psychological difficulties is best known to Canadians, this new form of 
optimistic and courageous leadership goes beyond any one individual. Every soldier and veteran 
that comes forward about their own trials and tribulations, or approaches their colleagues’ 
problems with an open mind, encourages a greater acceptance that manliness, and what 
constitutes the ideal soldier, need not be delineated with such sharp edges. There is room for a 
view that one can be both tough and compassionate, and that requiring help does not make one 
less of a man, woman, or soldier. While PTSD and other difficulties have brought some soldiers 
to ruinous decline, new ideas and approaches have provided many with opportunities not just for 
medical recovery, but for moral and spiritual recovery as well. This is a new chapter in a story of 
trauma and recovery that began long ago, and it is one that must continue to be written. If history 
is any indication of future directions, Canadians will continue to see the psychological fallout of 
the Afghanistan War for years to come, making the subject a perennial issue that must not fall off 
the public radar as memory of the conflict begins to fade.   
 This dissertation has used oral interviews with veterans to demonstrate the socio-
economic and moral/spiritual effects trauma has had on Canadian military members across a 
one-hundred-year period. Without claiming that PTSD is simply a successor to shell shock or 
battle exhaustion, it has nonetheless shown that while terms and symptom patterns have changed, 
trauma has always had devastating social and moral effects on veterans; something that gets lost 
when too much emphasis is placed on medical narratives. Moreover, by thoroughly examining 
the history of trauma in the Canadian military after the Cold War, this dissertation has waded 
into largely uncharted territory to show that ideas and representations of trauma have 
consistently been wrapped up in individual, political, and societal concerns. This narrative has 
expanded on earlier historical accounts mentioned throughout, which focused largely on the 
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experience of trauma during war, rather than after it. Most importantly, this study has built on 
work by historians like Mark Humphries who recognize the value of a multifaceted approach that 
takes into account medical as well as cultural narratives. Future Canadian scholarship on 
veterans’ trauma will no doubt continue to benefit from the combined use of social and medical 
histories, and the multidimensional perspective such an approach provides. 
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